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ABSTRACT  
The vital role of the judiciary in enhancing constitutionalism cannot be overemphasised. This 
attains particular significance in Africa where the failures of constitutionalism are well 
documented. This thesis explores the impact of constitutional jurisprudence on 
constitutionalism and rule of law in Malawi. Any such study, of necessity, contends with the 
concept of judicial activism. By drawing upon scholarship and jurisprudence from other 
common law jurisdictions this thesis proposes a basis for concluding that judicial activism 
may sometimes undermine constitutionalism.  
Though there is an independent judiciary in Malawi, constitutionalism has not fully 
materialised. In this context, it is proposed that the reason for such deficiency is not the lack 
of judicial activism on the part of the Courts in Malawi; rather an insufficient conception of the 
judicial role suited to the Malawian context. The study seeks to demonstrate that such 
insufficiency has resulted in the courts adopting a liberal democratic approach to 
constitutional adjudication in a jurisdiction more suited to a social-trust-based approach. To 
the extent that the liberal democratic approach is at odds with the norms, traditions and 
values indigenous to Malawi it has served to undermine constitutionalism. In this context, the 
thesis highlights other relevant studies establishing that the social-trust based paradigm has 
a legal basis in the Malawi Constitution as well as other primary governance legislations 
such as the Corrupt Practices Act. 
This thesis identifies the importance of judicial training tailored to defining the judicial role 
within the peculiar socio-political context in a specific jurisdiction in order to preserve the 
democratic imperative of autochthony at the root of legitimate constitutionalism. It is argued 
that without such a deliberate approach the judicial role (even through innovations of judicial 
activism) could end up being another elitist tool employed to hijack the democratisation 
agenda embodied in the current Constitutional order by reason of the courts advocating 
values which are alien to the Malawian socio-political order. While conceding that training 
alone can never produce certainty, it is proposed that in this case it would enhance a more 
appropriate appreciation of the peculiar judicial responsibility espoused under the Malawian 
constitution. 
 
Keywords: Judicial activism, constitutionalism, judicial deference, governance, democracy, 
judicial process, constitutional interpretation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
‘… it is not the existence of …office [and power] holders and ordinary citizens … that produces popular demand 
for [citizens participation in governance], it is what office holders do to ordinary citizens, what people with power 
do to those without it.’1   
 
1.1 Statement of the research problem 
Ideally, the citizens of a country should identify with its written constitution if the constitution 
is to have a ‘social reality’ beyond that of a written legal document;2 if it is to be a binding 
declaration of whom the people of that country are or aspire to be, of the values which they 
represent and will strive to have enforced; if its observance is to become a common and 
shared motivation amongst them.3 The constitution needs to be infused with philosophies 
and/or ideologies that the citizenry identify with if they are to be respected.4 It is precisely in 
all these foregoing areas that the Constitution that Malawi adopted in 1994 fails the test. 
In 1994 Malawi adopted a liberal democratic constitution, which has been described ‘as one 
of the most liberal’ constitutions in the world.5 However, as pertinently pointed out by 
Kanyongolo6 and affirmed by Nkhata,7 liberal democracy has no indigenous ideological, 
philosophical and historical roots in Malawi. The adoption of a constitution infused with an 
ideology or democratic theory that is at odds with the Malawi nation has been traced to the 
short-comings in its drafting process that was not adequately consultative of the majority of 
Malawians.8 Existing literature on the status of governance and constitutionalism in Malawi 
attributes the failure to entrench good governance and constitutionalism in Malawi largely to 
the failure of the people of Malawi to identify with the liberal democratic values entrenched in 
                                                          
1
 M Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 1984) xii. 
2
 DJ Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate Over Originalism (CUP, 2005) 3; see also MJ Nkhata, 
‘Rethinking Governance and Constitutionalism in Africa: The Relevance and Viability of Social Trust-Based 
Governance and Constitutionalism in Malawi’ (University of Pretoria: PhD Thesis, 2010) 1 – 283, 66 (pointing 
out that it is only when the ‘citizenry identifies with a particular constitutional document and is animated to 
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the Constitution.9 Further, in general, the bad news that existing literature delivers is that ‘the 
liberal democratic paradigm has failed Africa and is currently failing Malawi as well’10 and 
that fact cannot be disputed ‘even by the most optimistic and committed of its disciples or 
evangelists.’11 In that context, Kanyongolo has argued for a reconsideration of the liberal 
democratic foundations of the Constitution of Malawi with the aim of replacing them with 
constitutional principles that are indigenous but without losing the essence of what 
democracy constitutes as a concept.12 In essence, as put by Nkhata, it can be said that 
Kanyongolo recommends ‘the repeal of the 1994 Constitution and the adoption of a new 
Constitution.’13 
Heeding Kanyongolo’s call, but in appreciation of the improbability of achieving a ‘political 
consensus … for the repeal of the 1994 and the adoption of a new Constitution’, Nkhata 
proposes an alternative approach. That is, the 1994 Constitution remains the Constitution 
that binds the Malawi nation to date and in the foreseeable future. Therefore, proceeding on 
existing findings that show that democracy as a concept ‘is not alien to Africa [and to Malawi] 
while liberal democracy [as a theory of democracy] is’,14 Nkhata proposes a ‘social trust-
based governance’ model that infuses democracy as a form of governance with values that 
are prioritised by the citizenry in accordance with ‘established culture, traditions and 
history.’15 Since the proposed approach is meant to work within the very framework of the 
1994 Constitution as it stands, Nkhata calls on the Malawi Judiciary to ‘seriously reflect on 
their role in the democratisation of Malawi’, and ‘to create jurisprudence that addresses 
Malawian problems from a “Malawi-centric” perspective.’16 In essence, the work of the 
judiciary in this context entails interpreting the constitution in a manner that allows the ‘social 
trust- based governance model’ to, more or less; override the dominance of liberal 
democratic theories in the Malawi Constitution.  
In a related work, Chirwa, among other things, calls for the courts to develop a ‘truly 
indigenous constitutional jurisprudence, reflecting the history and shared values and ideals 
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of the Malawian people.’17 However, both Chirwa and Nkhata appear to exhort the courts in 
Malawi to employ judicial activism as part and parcel of their approach to the interpretation of 
the Constitution.18  
It is within this context that the current research seeks to contribute to the development of 
‘Malawi-centric’ constitutional theories aimed at promoting                                                                                                                                         
constitutionalism and rule of law in Malawi, by analysing the manifestations of judicial 
activism (if any) in constitutional jurisprudence in Malawi. However, previous research 
studies have shown that when the fundamental aim is the entrenchment of constitutionalism 
and rule of law in a particular society, it is erroneous to ‘fit all human experience within a 
particular projection.’19 In response to that, the main argument of this thesis is that lessons 
need to be drawn from the Malawian experience with liberal democracy when calls are made 
for the Malawian judiciary to practice judicial activism. To that end, the main research 
question therefore is: 
Whether judicial (in)activism is a solution or a hindrance to the entrenchment of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in Malawi? 
 
1.2 Literature Review and Definitions 
1.2.1 Background information 
Theories that posited law as a self-contained body of knowledge whose development and 
nature is independent of the ‘social conditions in which [it] exists,’ have been significantly 
challenged by those which have exposed a complex relationship between law and attendant 
social conditions.20 For instance, the common law, which has been adopted by or largely 
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influenced the nature of law in about 54 Commonwealth countries,21 including the United 
States of America, is in actual fact ‘rooted in centuries of English history’ and can be ‘more 
accurately’ described as ‘a residue of immutable [English] custom’.22 It was in appreciation of 
the complex relationship between law and social conditions that the people instrumental in 
the establishment of the United States as we know it now whilst maintaining the common law 
system chose to abandon the concept of parliamentary supremacy in favour of constitutional 
supremacy and resolved to have a written constitution.23 Thus, though American liberal 
constitutional democracy and relevant constitutional theories have been adopted by or 
largely influenced the development of democratic governance in developing countries,24 they 
themselves are rooted in centuries of American history, and social and political realities.25 As 
aptly pointed out by Cotterrell, much of what is now considered as ‘modern jurisprudence’26 
on the nature of law and related matters, is really ‘Anglo-American legal philosophy’ and had 
‘better [be] understood as reflecting specific responses in legal philosophy to pressures, 
developments and conditions arising in particular times and places’ and not ‘as timeless’ as 
has ‘tend[ed] to be portrayed’.27  
Similarly, it is that realisation, among other reasons, that has prompted some scholars to call 
for a distinction to be made between ‘the concept of democracy and theories of 
democracy.’28 Democracy as a concept has attained near universal consensus,29 namely, 
that democracy is the best form of government and for the law and its institutions to obtain 
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legitimacy for their respective authority in the regulation of the citizenry appears to have 
been won a long time ago.30 However, there is no universal agreement on the best theory of 
democracy,31 which pertain to questions of how to make the concept of democracy 
operational- e.g. ‘by prescribing how democracy might be realized, in what institutional form,’ 
and in what form (e.g. liberal democracy).32 That is, the origins of theories of democracy are 
themselves contextual in that they are traceable to ideologies of particular places and 
times.33 Thus a distinction indeed must be drawn between the suitability of democracy as a 
concept and the various theories of democracy, in a particular country. As has been 
discussed previously, studies in Africa have shown that liberal democracy is failing in Africa 
due to the differences in social and political contexts, whereas democracy itself remains the 
best form of government even for Sub-Saharan African countries like Malawi. 
Democracy’s advantage as a concept over the other forms of government is the role it 
promises the citizen in governance. Democracy promises the citizen participation in 
governance. That is, it represents a ‘mode of decision-making about collectively binding 
rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic 
arrangement to be that where all members of the collective enjoy effective equal rights to 
take part in such decision making directly - one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest 
conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise.’34 However, 
as aptly put by Walzer, ‘if all citizens had literally the same amount of influence, it is hard to 
see how any clear-cut decision could ever be reached’.35 It is that fact that makes it 
imperative even in a democracy to vest in institutions or officials the ‘power’ of state for 
purposes of maintaining and enhancing the peaceful co-existence of individuals in a 
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society.36 ‘Power’ in this sense is defined as the ability to determine matters with finality ‘not 
only for oneself but for others’ as well.37  
 
It is within the context of political power that democracy as a concept intersects with the 
theories of democracy, for it is those theories that seek to prescribe how that ‘power’ should 
be allocated. For instance, liberal democracy advances the principles of separation of 
powers, and limited state powers.38 In fact it is the liberal democratic theory of separation of 
powers that has been uncritically adopted as the dominant thesis in most African countries39 
with its emphasis on the courts as the restraint on the use of political power by the Executive 
and Legislative arms of Government.40 
However, recent studies on the emergence of ‘judicial power’ in ‘emerging democracies’41 
point to a need to abandon the narrow understanding of ‘political power’ as a phenomenon  
that is wielded only by the executive and legislative arms of government in preference for 
one in which courts ‘are understood as part of existing configurations of political power.’42 In 
other words, research in emerging democracies on judicial function has shown that courts 
are themselves wielders of political power which renders them equally liable to abusing that 
role.43 Arguably, no type of judicial behaviour embodies the tension inherent in debates 
about judicial power like that reflected within the context of that which is loosely called 
‘judicial activism.’ It is for that reason that this thesis would like to contribute to existing 
scholarship on the study of the role of the judiciary in a democratic society, especially 
emerging democracies, by focusing on the manifestations of ‘judicial activism’ (if any) in 
Malawian Courts. The significance of such a study might be reflected in the realisation that 
‘research on courts and judicial activity in Africa is scant.’44  
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The study will seek to draw some lessons from the conclusions of others who have studied 
judicial power manifested through ‘judicial activism’ elsewhere, namely that the uncritical 
application of constitutional theories and definitions derived from perspectives and 
categories obtaining in other jurisdictions is erroneous as such theories and definitions 
cannot accurately ‘provide a road map for understanding’ the essential issues peculiar to the 
jurisdiction under study.45 It is for the foregoing reason that this study subscribes to the 
‘contextual approach’ to the study of ‘judicial activism’ in particular, and law, democracy, and 
their respective institutions in general.46  
At the same time it is important to clarify that by adopting such a contextual approach this 
study does not necessarily subscribe to ‘antifoundationalism’ and its disregard for objective 
narratives of law.47 As Cotterrell explains in a rather rhetorical fashion: ‘If our ways of 
thinking have no secure foundations, what can we know? How can we be sure of anything? 
Why is any view better than another?’48Rather, the proposed contextual approach seeks to 
avoid the inevitable mistakes arising from adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach49  to 
governance issues since that fails to acknowledge ‘specific historical and cultural realities of 
the society in question.’50  
1.2.2 Definitions 
Most of the definitions in this section will be brief as they shall be discussed in more detail in 
subsequent chapters. The terms or concepts central to this study include (but are not limited 
to): constitution, judicial activism, constitutionalism, rule of law, and constitutional interpretive 
methodologies such as originalism, interpretivism (and non-interpretivism), literalism, and 
positivism. 
However, it is important at the outset to echo what Cotterrell has stated elsewhere that: 
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…potentially anything about law might become contested because law lacks 
secure foundation to put at least some matters beyond the possibility of 
disagreement. No objective criteria of truth or value provide an unchallengeable 
basis of legal…knowledge.51 
This is very true pertaining to definitions of the words that are central to the analysis in this 
thesis. There is no universal agreement as to the definition of any of the terms highlighted 
above.  
The ‘constitution’ 
There is no universally agreed definition of the word ‘constitution’ as constitutions are 
classified in various ways depending on the purpose for which the categorisation is sought.52 
At the most rudimentary there are written and unwritten constitutions; in that sense the 
Westminster constitutional order has no single document comparable to the US 
Constitution.53 Constitutional values in Britain have evolved as a matter of practice and 
custom, with the Legislature occupying a central place in governance.54 The Westminster 
model supports Parliamentary Supremacy; the American model on the other hand, is 
founded on the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy.55 Malawi adopted a written 
Constitution that clearly spelt out that all laws and acts of the executive and the legislature 
would have to conform to the constitution or be declared invalid by the courts-in short Malawi 
adopted the doctrine of constitutional supremacy as the organising principle of governance 
and reduced this into a written constitution.56 
Nevertheless, there are various jurisprudential perspectives on such written constitutions 
and how they are made. Some classify them into three categories: the ‘realist’, the ‘idealist’ 
and the ‘transitional’ or ‘new’ perspective57. To the realist a constitution is an expression of 
‘the balance of power’ at the time of its creation.58 Thus it is deemed to reflect the strength of 
the negotiating positions of the various stakeholders, in the almost cynical sense that it 
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‘merely divides the spoils between political elites’.59 According to the realist perspective a 
constitution has no mediating role in the process of social change or political transition.60 For 
the idealist, however, a constitution is the ‘foundation of a new political order.’61 The 
constitution in that respect serves a foundational function: it represents the end of an era and 
the creation of a new one.62 In a similar context, Samuels argues that in a post conflict 
scenario the extent to which a constitution sets up a ‘democratic process’, other than merely 
reflecting ‘incumbent/ occupier dominance’ may impact the quality of democracy created and 
the viability of the state itself.63  
Somewhere between the realist and idealist views lies what has been termed as ‘transitional 
constitutionalism’ or ‘new constitutionalism’.64 Conceptually, transitional constitutionalism is 
closer to the idealist position; the difference being that it envisages a much wider and 
thorough appreciation of the peculiar role of the constitution in establishing and developing a 
new political order.65 Transitional constitutionalism relates to ‘constitutional developments’ 
taking place following a substantial political change.66 It is therefore a type of 
constitutionalism in which law (in the form of the constitution) is perceived to have ‘an 
extraordinary constituting role’67 in the stabilisation of democratic governance. In this 
discourse it is proposed that Malawi’s transition from autocracy in 1994 can be characterised 
as such a radical regime change; the new Constitution ushered in a completely novel 
political dispensation. Thus, the transitional constitutionalism framework is appropriate in this 
case considering the political transition taking place within Malawi as it emerges from 
decades of political subjugation into a participatory democratic order.68 The judicial process, 
especially when interpreting the Constitution therefore becomes an integral aspect of this 
transition. That is why this research is located within the transitional constitutionalism 
framework. 
Constitutional democracy and constitutionalism 
If the mere existence of a Constitution was an end in itself then Malawi would not have 
needed to have a new Constitution in 1994.  Malawi had a Constitution which legitimated Dr. 
Banda’s single-party state and his life presidency and hence paved the way for his 
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authoritarian regime, where the government was not accountable to the people and there 
was minimal participation by the public in governance. Similarly, the mere existence of a 
democracy does not adequately describe what type of democracy it is: by way of example, a 
democracy can be parliamentary, such as the United Kingdom, where the legislature is not 
bound as a matter of law to some supreme overriding law. In this context, the people can 
only repudiate the decisions of the legislature through general elections, and ‘until that 
time … the courts [cannot] seriously undermine the legislative decisions made by a majority 
of the Commons.’69 Thus parliament is supreme. 
However, there is another type of democracy called Constitutional democracy. Even though 
there is no universally agreed definition for constitutional democracy, this study will adopt 
Nwabueze’s descriptive definition of constitutional democracy which attempts to define the 
idea by making reference to its four key attributes: first, the people freely elect the 
government. Second, the powers of the government are limited by a written constitution 
which is itself the supreme law. Third, the constitution overrides all inconsistent legislative 
and executive acts. Fourth, the rulers (and the ruled) observe and respect the constitutional 
provisions in all government administration and political interactions.70 The Constitution in 
this context, as even Magaisa further explains ‘provides for the basic legal and institutional 
structures for the exercise of state power and its relationship with the citizens [the] … 
antithesis is arbitrary rule where the state exercises its power without restraint or checks and 
balances.’ 71 Thus in a constitutional democracy- as an aspect of separation of powers-the 
judicial arm of government is expected to be a non-partisan guardian of the constitution.72 It 
is expected to act as a safeguard against arbitrary use of power by the executive and 
legislative branches. There is therefore a normative quality to constitutional democracy 
beyond the existence of a document that provides for the above structural arrangements. 
Fundamental values must underlie such a Constitution and these norms must be enforced 
accordingly by the courts. In political practice the maintenance of a constitutional democracy 
requires a continuance commitment to the enforcement of the Constitution and its 
fundamental values. 
Malawi would readily fit the criteria of a democracy that holds regular elections.73 Further, it 
has a written Constitution which provides that it is the supreme law of the land and purports 
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to delimit the powers of the government; 74 however under the Constitution such limits are 
supposed to be enforced by the courts.75 The question (which this thesis will also address) is 
whether the courts in Malawi exercise this function with any doctrinal consistency? 
Otherwise the very existence of constitutional democracy in Malawi might be at risk.76 Thus, 
the fourth limb- of observing constitutional provisions would be correspondingly 
compromised. For instance in a recent constitutional interpretation referral  the Malawi 
Supreme Court of Appeal said that ‘subsequent amendments to the Constitution, once duly 
passed in the normal way by the National Assembly and thereby becoming part of the 
Constitution, those provisions...cannot be invalidated or declared to be unconstitutional or 
inconsistent with the other provisions of the Constitution.’77 This proposition is more akin to 
parliamentary and not constitutional democratic order that it warrants closer analysis. Does 
that mean the courts are not concerned to evaluate the substance of the amendment in 
order to determine their constitutionality? Such a doctrinal approach to adjudication would be 
in line with most judiciaries with a common law heritage; but as Oloka-Onyango aptly 
observes such a judicial approach is quite inimical to the protection and promotion of 
democratic guarantees and may increase the danger of the exercise of state power 
degenerating into arbitrariness.78  It is the jurisprudential imperative for normative content 
that connects the notion of constitutional democracy with the phenomenon of 
constitutionalism.  
Even though the definition of constitutionalism is not straightforward,79 and many definitions 
have been proffered by scholars, 80 arguably Brandon’s definition illustrates the inter-linkage 
between constitutional democracy and constitutionalism well. According to Brandon, 
constitutionalism is a political theory that is concerned with the architectural structure and 
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basic values of a society and its government; it is therefore preoccupied with the problem of 
how the power of those who rule might degenerate into arbitrariness.81 Modern 
constitutionalism is therefore a prescriptive doctrine that indicates how state power should 
be exercised and does not simply describe how governments exercise their authority in 
practice.82 Currie and de Waal explain that constitutionalism is normative because it spells 
out the values that must prevail in the governing process. Such values go beyond the 
constitutional rules alone; they are supposed to influence the conduct of policy-makers, 
administrators and more importantly, judges.83 It is in this context that the constitutional 
jurisprudence from the Malawi Courts will be analysed with particular focus on whether it can 
be said that the courts have displayed judicial activism or not and how that has impacted on 
the development of a culture of constitutionalism in Malawi. 
In analysing the constitutional jurisprudence from Malawi courts, the study will propose the 
conceptual framework advanced by Backer which posits constitutionalism also as a 
normative framework for evaluating the form, substance and legitimacy of the constitution 
itself.84 This approach is necessary since recent research on Malawi done by Nkhata has 
shown that the current constitution in substance lacks legitimacy in Malawi because the 
people of Malawi do not identify with its underlying values. Nkhata therefore proposes the 
adoption of ‘transformative constitutionalism’ for the Malawian context because of the 
emphasis it places on the role of the courts; this study endorses that proposal. In this 
context, though yet again there is no universally agreed definition, transformative 
constitutionalism is defined by Klare as: 
…a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed…to transforming a country’s political and social 
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and 
egalitarian direction.85 
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Within the rubric of transformative constitutionalism theories, constitutional interpretation at 
times involves having recourse to value judgments that are ‘external to the Constitution 
itself.’86 However, as Nkhata pertinently states: 
…under transformative constitutionalism, judges bear the responsibility of 
justifying their decisions not just by reference to authority but also by reference to 
ideas and values that the society prioritises.87 
It is proposed that these observations which highlight the necessity for courts to 
accommodate the prioritised values and ideas of a given society renders the study of 
Malawian jurisprudence in the general framework of discourse on judicial activism quite 
pertinent. 
Judicial Activism  
Arguably, nothing brings to the fore the complex role/function of the judiciary in respect to 
the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, constitutionalism and in safeguarding and 
enforcing the Constitution through constitutional interpretation as the discourse on judicial 
activism. It is not uncommon to come across scholarly articles that call upon judiciaries in 
respective jurisdictions, especially in Africa to practice judicial activism;88 in that vein one 
could be excused for comprehending judicial activism (‘JA’) as a synonym for justice. But as 
a detailed analysis of the manifestations of JA in a subsequent chapter will show, in reality, 
the word or concept of ‘judicial activism’ is like an empty shell available for whosoever 
fancies it to fill in whatever content they want it to contain even if it were the exact opposite 
of what a prior speaker may have filled it with.89 
This has led to calls from some scholars for the term ‘judicial activism’ to ‘be exiled from 
educated discourse’.90 It is proposed in this study that despite such strong and insightful 
observations however, judicial activism as a term cannot be so easily abandoned. As 
another commentator has aptly pointed out ‘scholars who avoid seemingly indefinable terms 
like activism risk withdrawing their research from large public discussions about judicial 
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conduct.’91 Even if for arguments sake, JA were to be merely a political term, giving up on it 
‘on grounds of indeterminacy’ would lead to a situation where there was ‘precious little 
political discourse left.’92 ‘[P]ublic reasoning and debates are central to the pursuit of 
justice’93 and discussions of JA appear to gain momentum in the realm of 
public/political/legal debate.94 Consequently, there is a compelling need to maintain the 
usage of the term ‘judicial activism’ in order to contribute to that debate. However, there is an 
equally important need to find a baseline for discussions on JA, especially one that could 
somehow minimise the opportunity for misinformation and misunderstanding. And no context 
is more ideal for this endeavour than a discussion on the work of the judiciary in a country 
undergoing a constitutional transition such as Malawi, which has itself been a target of calls 
for JA.95  
JA discourse attains significance in this study because one theme that features highly in JA 
discussions is the appropriateness or inappropriateness of constitutional interpretation 
methodologies.   
Constitutional interpretation theories 
If Constitutions only contained language that was very clear and amenable to one precise 
meaning, issues of constitutional interpretation would not arise for there would be only one 
outcome: the ordinary meaning. However, Constitutions also contain terms that are vague 
and ambiguous. In this context, speaking in his address to a recent constitutional review 
conference, one jurist pointed out the need for courts in Malawi to develop some doctrines in 
order to discharge their function of interpreting and protecting the Constitution with 
democratic fidelity.96Furthermore, one commentator has even suggested that the 1994 
Constitution is a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential models. 97 But given the 
judicial controversy generated by such a view, the implications of such an understanding 
might need to be further explored in order to ascertain the correct judicial understanding of 
the Constitution.98 It is a basic argument of this discourse that the court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution is premised upon how it conceives of the Constitution: its vision of the document 
informs its approach to the subject of interpretation. 
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In their recent work Barber and Fleming provide a useful typology of the various approaches 
to constitutional interpretation that are reflected in the debates on the topic.99 These are: (1) 
Textualism, which seeks meaning from the plain words of the document. (2) Consensualism 
draws meaning from the prevailing social consensus on what the words mean. (3) The 
Philosophic approach focuses on the broad concepts embodied in the words and draws 
meaning from the nature of things that the words refer to. (4) Originalism, on the other hand, 
aims to uphold the intentions or the original meanings which the framers or ratifiers or the 
founding generation ascribed to the document. (5) Structuralism focuses on the arrangement 
of offices, powers and institutional relationships as a guide to interpretation. (6) Doctrinalism 
accords primacy to judicial precedent and other doctrines of the courts. (7) Pragmatism 
seeks to give judicial meaning with reference to the preferences of the dominant political 
forces.100This discussion will explore whether originalism, structuralism or pragmatism would 
best reconcile the aspirations of transformational constitutionalism as a process of 
reconstituting the Malawian political landscape. By focusing on the public views gathered 
through the nationwide consultations undertaken as part of the constitutional review 
process101, it would be proposed that giving weight to the intentions of the framers (or 
founding generation)102 represents an essential consideration in constitutional jurisprudence. 
However, in order to reflect the organic dynamism at the core of the current legal (and 
political discourse in Malawi) one would lean towards living constitutionalism as the proper 
framework of judicial interactions with the Constitution. 
In fact jurists like Rehnquist recognised two major theories of constitutional interpretation 
today: namely originalism and living constitutionalism.103  Traditionally these theories have 
been viewed as (almost) mutually exclusive in application.104  Thus originalism has usually 
been associated with judicial restraint105 while living constitutionalism has been allied with 
judicial activism. By defining the constitution as a basic structure framework, originalism 
seeks to uphold strictly the constitution as a social compact.106 In broad terms adherents of 
originalism have tended to be either textualists or intentionalist, thus paying much attention 
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to the legal text of the constitution and the original intention of those who drafted and 
enacted the constitution when interpreting the provisions today.107 On the other hand, living 
constitutionalism embraces pragmatic jurists who sometimes consider the consequences of 
a given interpretation and prefer to achieve justice by filling in what they perceive are gaps in 
the original text.108  
In his recent work Balkin proposes framework originalism as a compatible theory with living 
constitutionalism.109 In brief framework originalism views the Constitution as an initial 
framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that must be filled out over time 
through constitutional construction (which encompasses things like amendment, 
interpretation and other issues which fit the general rubric of constitutionalism). According to 
this theory, in implementing the Constitution later generations are expected to uphold the 
basic framework through fidelity to the original meaning110 (as opposed to the original 
expected application). This leaves room for possible constitutional constructions responsive 
to future (unforeseen or unforeseeable) developments in the society.111 This conceptual 
space is taken up by living constitutionalism; whereby gaps in the original framework are 
filled through amendment and other processes.  
According to Balkin, constitutional construction (as opposed to interpretation) is an on-going 
process which involves all the various political and civic actors at the centre of governmental 
authority. In the case of Malawi, it might be contended that the Constitution created such 
space for institutions like the Malawi Law Commission (an executive and not judicial body) to 
manage the process of constitutional construction (instead of the politically charged 
legislature). Other theorists on the other hand, adopt simpler categorisations of constitutional 
interpretation theories: for instance Brest adopts a dualist originalist and nonoriginalist 
classification.112 Of course he further subdivides originalism into strict and moderate groups. 
Within the strict category fall what he calls ‘strict textualism’ (literalism) and ‘strict 
intentionalism’. Literalism seeks to construe words and phrases very narrowly and precisely 
or literally.  A strict intentionalist tries to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers 
unswervingly. Moderate originalism on the other hand acknowledges the authority of the 
Constitution; but in application the judges are more concerned with the general purposes of 
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the framers as opposed to specific intentions.113 According to the present study, any 
constitutional interpretation theory that purports to be purely originalist cannot stand the test 
of time, simply because no constitution can fully address matters that are unforeseen or 
unforeseeable. Judicial activism on the other hand is not the panacea to addressing those 
inherent conceptual inadequacies in devising a robust Constitution since judicial activism 
itself needs to be bridled within the bounds of constitutionalism. 
That is, as has been previously discussed, judicial power is itself political power. Therefore 
the need to entrench constitutionalism of necessity demands that constitutional interpretation 
itself be subjected to the Constitution. Arguably it is in this context that Ely, in his seminal 
work framed the discourse in terms of interpretivism and non-interpretivism 
methodologies.114 Interpretivism suggests that judges deciding constitutional issues should 
restrict themselves to enforcing norms that are stated explicitly or are clearly implicit within 
the written Constitution.115 Non-interpretivism holds that courts should go beyond that set of 
references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the 
document. Ely goes on to argue that interpretivism fits better the ordinary understanding of 
how law works: “if your job is to enforce the Constitution then the Constitution is what you 
should be enforcing, not whatever may happen to strike you as a good idea at the time.”116  
All the above constitutional interpretive methodologies have been developed under Anglo-
American jurisprudence hence it is necessary to critically analyse their applicability to 
Malawi. It is essential to appreciate that the development of such jurisprudence has not been 
the work of Courts alone, rather it has been a result of a multi-disciplinary effort whereby 
legal philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists (including those advancing theories of 
sociology of law) among others, each in their respective areas of expertise contributed to the 
discourse. It is in this context that this thesis will advance the argument that the responsibility 
to identify and arrive at the appropriate constitutional interpretive methodology for Malawi 
cannot be left to the judges alone. Rather, it must be a multi-disciplinary approach. 
1.3 Methodology and Focus of the Research 
Initially, this research had aimed to conduct an empirical analysis of pertinent historical and 
jurisprudential data such as was held by Special Law Commission on the Review of the 
Constitution to highlight how dominant elite interests have undermined the legitimacy of the 
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constitution-making processes from the colonial inception of the country through the 
independence era to present so-called multiparty epoch. However, research conducted and 
concluded recently by other Malawian scholars117 have dealt with the socio-historic issues 
from pre-colonial Malawi (then Nyasaland) to post-1994 Malawi in sufficient depth that it has 
been possible to conduct this research as desk research.  
 
The focus of this research is premised on the assumption that ‘[a] constitution [should] enjoy 
a special place in the life of any nation. It [should be] the supreme and fundamental law [of 
the land, which] sets out the state’s basic structure including the exercise of political power 
and the relationship between political entities and between the state and the people.’118 The 
question being posed therefore is whether the courts are acquiescing in a process that is 
perpetuating a type of politics that is not answerable to a higher normative order. One aspect 
of the proposed study will therefore examine the qualitative impact of amendments119 on the 
Constitution. A durable Constitution for Malawi should be fashioned along such terms as 
would directly address any peculiar socio-political tendencies which historically120 tended to 
affect the public space by excluding certain key traditional forms of governance.121 According 
to Sunstein constitutions should be designed to address those aspects of a country’s history, 
culture and political heritage that make it liable to harm in the ordinary conduct of its 
affairs.122 In the case of Malawi it bears highlighting that as early as 1997 (i.e. barely three 
years into the new constitutional era) Ihonvbere noted that ‘the delay in establishing a 
senate...means that the checks and balances which the senate would have provided would 
be absent.’123 In this context the abolition of the Senate from the constitution will be 
examined as a departure from the terms of the original contract. Since the Senate 
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nominations were largely under the authority of local government authorities124 the study will 
seek to demonstrate its abolition might well have sowed the seeds for the perpetual 
postponement of local government elections since 2005.125 
 
Under the aegis of judicial activism we will examine whether the courts could have 
responded differently to such amendments.126Thus I propose to explore the legitimacy127 of 
the current judicial interpretation of the Constitution in the light of the seminal observation 
that: 
 … the key to making an autochthonous constitution is to consult the people on 
its contents. This approach has several advantages; in particular its 
inclusiveness can help…enhance the chances of addressing, in the new 
constitution, issues of importance to the people.128  
It is for that reason that this study will explore the existence of a suitable constitutional 
interpretation methodology in Malawi at present with a view to propounding the argument 
that judicial activism as a phenomenon must be bounded by constitutional accountability to 
curtail elitism that has historically undermined the inclusive democratic imperative at the root 
of indigenous governance philosophies; it is hoped that the ensuing discourse will contribute 
to a deliberative consideration of the subject of constitutional interpretation theory in general 
and judicial activism in particular. 
1.4 Scoping the current general discourse and the Malawian problem   
Ellet, as well as Van Doepp, has written on the emerging judicial power in Malawi.129 Ellet 
clearly asserts that the Malawian courts are quite robust. They are not shy to make decisions 
contrary to the expectations of the ruling elites. In fact the presidential referral quoted above 
is one of her examples.130 Ellet examines the level of internal and external autonomy and 
how those contribute to judicial independence as a democratic prerequisite. Van Doepp on 
the other hand discusses the question of corruption and how that affects judicial 
independence. Another interesting study has been undertaken by Hansen who explored the 
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need for judicial education in human rights.131 In essence, Hansen’s study concluded that 
judges from the ‘old school’ were less keen to cite human rights jurisprudence in their 
decisions because of lack of exposure.  
On the regional scene Oloka-Onyango proposes that one way of entrenching constitutional 
government is to have a ‘more definitive provision that confers courts with the power to 
reverse any actions that violate the provisions of the Constitution...whether these are 
Legislative or Executive.’132 This observation is premised upon Oloka-Onyango’s analysis of 
Ugandan jurisprudence; he noted that the courts (as part of the common law heritage) 
tended to be purely positivist and extremely restrictive in their application of constitutional 
guarantees of human rights.133 In the context of Malawi there are such constitutional 
provisions that confer the bench with the mandate to assess all executive and legislative 
acts.134 Like Uganda too, the Malawian bench has strong common law heritage (not to 
mention the experience of dictatorship).135The focus of my analysis will be whether such 
constitutional guarantees have been exploited by the court to consolidate constitutional 
government? If not, what are the factors that can account for such lack of vigilance? 
Furthermore, how much is such jurisprudence contributing to the governance deficit in 
Malawi?  
For instance the extent to which incorrect jurisprudence may have contributed to the 
encouragement of a culture of legislative or executive ‘unaccountability’ will be explored. The 
study will also focus on how the original framers of the constitution proposed to deal with 
such inherent propensity of the ruling elites to consolidate their vested interests once they 
assume political power. How about the ease with which the original basic structures of the 
constitution were changed on the pretext of lack of money?136 
In my view, the Malawi Judiciary’s role in the system of checks and balances determines the 
existence of constitutionalism and hence the quality of constitutional democracy. At the heart 
of constitutional democracy is good governance in the sense of ‘the provision of a 
mechanism for popular participation in governance and decision-making’.137 In political 
discourse governance has been described as the institutionalisation of normative values that 
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can motivate and provide cohesion to members of society at large.138 In my view such 
cohesion can best be achieved by giving expression to the broadest spectrum of opinions 
within the political ‘power map.’139 So far, from the colonial era140  to the present constitution-
making processes141 that aspect of inclusiveness has been neglected to the detriment of 
good governance in Malawi.142 It is in that context that the role of the judiciary in the 
transformative constitutionalism enterprise will form the central plank of the ensuing 
discourse. 
1.5 Overview of Chapters  
The work has been organised into eight chapters. At its most modest, this research seeks to 
fill an empirical gap by chronicling constitutional law developments in Malawi as part of the 
on-going democratisation process in sub-Saharan Africa. At a more ambitious level, I set out 
to interrogate the dynamic intercourse between constitution-making theories and 
constitutional interpretation methodologies.  
Chapter 1 states the problem, and the justification of the thesis. It also discusses broadly, 
the main concepts of judicial interpretation, rule of law, constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional making theories. This chapter notes the impact of judicial interpretation on 
transformative constitutionalism in order to lay out a clear conceptual foundation for critically 
analysing the role of the Malawi Judiciary in the promotion of rule of law and democracy. The 
discussion highlights the emerging critique on the notions of democracy and 
constitutionalism within a redefined philosophical emphasis suitable for a society like Malawi 
and how (if at all) such novel thinking has (or should) impact the relevant jurisprudence 
under the rubric of judicial activism. 
Chapter 2 seeks to introduce and elaborate upon the three key concepts around which the 
present research has been constructed, namely judicial activism, rule of law and 
constitutionalism. The discussion in this chapter analyses the various definitions and 
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manifestations of judicial activism (‘JA’) as the definitive conceptual basis on which the 
research discourse revolves, tracing its presence within different jurisdictions in order to 
highlight the persistent conceptual contradictions and inconsistencies of approach evident in 
its usage. By defining judicial activism as an incidence of judicial discretion, the study will 
propound the need to confine such jurisprudential approaches within the bounds of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in order to prevent elitist tendencies in the relevant 
governance discourse. 
Chapter 3 delves into the historical, political and legal developments in Malawi in order to 
provide the relevant background to the discussions in subsequent chapters. This chapter 
provides a definition of ‘elitism’ and discusses how colonial elitism divided Malawi (then 
Nyasaland) into two societies- urban and rural, which resulted in the rise of ‘nationalist 
elitism.’ The ensuing discussion aims to highlight how though different in form, the two types 
of elitism (i.e. colonial and nationalist) effectively disrupted and distorted African governance 
systems which were largely participatory and consultative, and replaced them with a 
paternalistic type of governance model that largely excluded the non-elites; the aim is to 
show how both colonial and nationalist elitism served to hinder the development of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law within the Malawian society. Further, since 
manifestations of ‘judicial activism’ have been related to ‘constitutional elitism’ it is hoped 
that a discussion of the social transformative character of the 1994 Constitution and its 
emphasis on participatory democracy will provide an appropriate framework for an analysis 
of judicial (in)activism of the judiciary in Malawi by interrogating the impact of judicial 
decisions on the entrenchment of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Malawi.  
Chapter 4 seeks to bridge the discussion on judicial activism in Malawi with similar 
discussions from other comparable jurisdictions. As the discussion in chapter 2 
demonstrates, the term JA has contradictory and irreconcilable definitions as well as results, 
which necessitated the proposal of a new definition in this thesis. However, the usage of the 
new definition proposed in this thesis to assess whether Malawian Courts have practised JA 
or not, would hinder comparative analysis. For this reason, this chapter will analyse whether 
the Malawian Courts have practiced JA or not using the ‘criteria’ discussed in chapter 2. The 
aim is to situate the behaviour of the Malawian courts on a comparable basis to Courts in 
other jurisdictions before proceeding to analyse the impact of such JA (if any). 
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Chapter 5 proceeds from the premise that the 1994 Constitution placed the Bill of Rights at 
its centre.143 As a consequence, post 1994 has seen a surge in Constitutional cases where 
the applicants sought to protect their rights as enshrined in the Constitution.144 This 
development has encompassed rights and freedoms of significance to criminal law such as 
presumption of innocence and personal liberty. The developments appear to have led some 
scholars to assert that the 1966 Malawi Constitution as a document which ‘did not guarantee 
human rights.’145 It will be argued that such a description does not represent the true legal 
position and may inhibit a proper appreciation of the evolution of judicially active 
jurisprudence within the area of criminal law under the ‘old’ and ‘new’ constitutions 
respectively. 
Chapter 6 acknowledges that the Malawi Judiciary has been recognised as being ‘probably 
the most credible branch of government in Malawi,’ for displaying remarkable independence 
‘in spite of many political and economic pressures and constraints.’ 146This discussion will 
nevertheless propose that in spite of such demonstrable judicial independence the 
constitutional jurisprudence still bears remarkable signs of ‘inappropriate deference’ to the 
executive arm of government. While conceding that a comprehensive analysis of judicial 
independence and judicial deference may be beyond the scope of this study the aim, in this 
context, is rather to consider the concept of judicial deference in contradistinction to the 
notion of judicial activism in order to underscore the transformative potential of the latter 
within an emerging constitutional jurisprudence.  
Chapter 7 generally posits that within the context of transformative constitutionalism the 
jurisprudence emanating from the courts in Malawi has a direct bearing on either 
consolidating or eroding the gains made through the constitution making process.147 In the 
light of observations to the effect that ‘the Malawi constitution is endowed with 
jurisprudentially transformative qualities’148 how then have the Courts in Malawi discharged 
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their constitutional responsibility in the area of judicial review of the actions and/or decisions 
of Government to prevent ‘an overreaching executive undermining the rights of the 
citizens’?149 The notion of constitutional review (as contrasted from ordinary judicial review) 
offers an interesting discussion point under the aegis of judicial activism given the prevailing 
narratives which tend to characterise any such judicial intervention as activist. The ensuing 
discourse should offer interesting insights on the philosophical imperative to refrain from 
universalist definitions of context-sensitive jurisprudential concepts.   
 
Chapter 8 will summarise the conclusions arising from this study. The discourse aims to 
show that legal culture and socialisation constrain legal outcomes irrespective of the 
substantive mandates entrenched in the constitution. It will be proposed that there is an 
urgent need for a deliberate investment in judicial training and research designed to 
generate appropriate appreciation of the peculiar capacity of the courts (embodied within 
their judicial-decision-making function) to consolidate constitutionalism. It would thus be 
useful to note how any present conclusions/findings may form the basis for future critiques of 
judicial decision-making in more thematic approaches.  
 
Practically it is hoped that this work might play a role in encouraging a more thoughtful 
judicial approach to constitutional interpretation as well as efforts at entrenching a culture of 
constitutionalism in Malawi’s legal education, especially for those assuming judicial office.
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Chapter 2 
The Definition of ‘Judicial Activism’: A Comparative Analysis 
‘Judicial activism means different things to different people. It evokes responses which are not only dissimilar and 
divergent, but also inconsistent and incompatible…’1 
 
2.1      Introduction 
This chapter seeks to introduce and elaborate upon the three key concepts around which the 
present research has been constructed, namely judicial activism, rule of law and 
constitutionalism. The discussion in this chapter will analyse the various definitions and 
manifestations of judicial activism (‘JA’) as the definitive conceptual basis on which the 
research discourse revolves, tracing its presence within different jurisdictions in order to 
highlight the persistent conceptual contradictions and inconsistencies of approach evident in 
its usage; this somewhat unwieldy nature of judicial activism as a legal phenomenon has 
engendered calls from certain quarters for the outright abandonment of the usage of the 
concept as a jurisprudential description for its purported emptiness. Within the general 
context of such stern philosophical criticism of judicial activism this chapter sets out to 
demonstrate why engaging with the concept (JA) might be unavoidable for any research 
which seeks to honestly contribute to academic discourse on the judicial function or role as 
an integral aspect of a constitutional democracy. This chapter will contend that despite its 
alleged emptiness of meaning, the notion of JA is still gaining considerable prominence 
within literature analysing judicial decision-making around the globe. Therefore, in 
interrogating the apparent contradictory and inconsistent manifestations of JA, the aim is to 
identify a thread of commonality in all the varied discourses on JA so that one can thereby 
articulate something more conceptually coherent for purposes of the rest of the research 
analysis. In a similar fashion, due to the presence of a growing body of research which 
points out the urgency of the need to entrench the rule of law and cultivate a culture of 
constitutionalism in emerging democracies such as Malawi, this chapter will also devote 
some space to grapple with these two concepts with a view to offering a jurisprudential 
context for propounding an argument why appropriate or permissible judicial activism should 
by definition never be extra-constitutional. Some legal and other arguments for divorcing the 
definition of JA from value-judgments on judicial decision-making will be advanced in this 
chapter; the aim here is to try and offer some clear parameters for distinguishing the political 
(and somewhat dismissive) commentaries on judicial activism from the more legal or 
philosophical critiques which yield more interesting observations for present purposes. 
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 D Banerjea, ‘Judicial Activism: Need for a National Debate’ in D Banerjea, A Subrahmanyan, and V. 
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2.2       ‘Judicial activism’ within its historical context 
There is no universal agreement on the definition of ‘judicial activism’ (‘JA’) both as a 
jurisprudential concept and even as a term of speech despite the fact of its being in use for 
centuries and that it has attained eminence in recent times.2 In reality, the definitions that are 
available do not only vary in their substance, but are also patently contradictory and may 
even be irreconcilable as will be discussed below. As a concept, JA in the USA has been 
traced all the way back to the eighteenth century,3 while in the UK its judicial origins are 
ascribed to the judgments of Lord Denning within the 20th century.4 Prior to the more recent 
twentieth century discussions, scholars appear to have approached the notion of JA within 
the thematic context of what is sometimes loosely described as ‘judicial legislation.’5 Even 
within such debates, the scholars’ definitions of the idea of ‘judicial legislation’ were quite 
varied. For Blackstone, it represented the very nature of the common law which empowered 
the judge to actively interpret the law and articulate his reasoning for his decision on given 
facts;6 for Bentham, ‘judicial legislation’ was a ‘usurpation of the legislative function’ and a 
charade or 'miserable sophistry [by the Courts].’7 On the other hand for Austin, the notion of 
‘judicial legislation’ characterized the power that judges exercised to make rules which 
obtained ‘as law’ through the ‘acquiescence’ of the ‘sovereign’ as the only authority and 
power entitled to make law.8 To that end, there were divisions over a definition and more 
‘prominent authors took sides on either side of the debate.’9 
As a term of speech (which is commonly used in ordinary discourse), ‘Judicial Activism’ is 
said to have been coined first in the USA in the year 1947 by Arthur Schlesinger in his article 
‘The Supreme Court: 1947.’10 However, it has been correctly observed that Schlesinger did 
not set out to offer any definition of the term but rather presented his analysis as a simple 
profile of all the Supreme Court Justices in office at the time; his article therefore divided the 
Justices into two broad categories of ‘judicial activists’ and ‘champions of self-restraint’ 
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based on his understanding of ‘the alliances and divisions among them.’11 As this example 
shows, even as a term of speech, JA can be as divisive as it has as a jurisprudential 
concept. It has both proponents and opponents though there is no agreement in either camp 
as to its precise definition.  Thus some scholars clearly spell out how they comprehend JA in 
the context of their discussion while others proceed with their discussions without any such 
definition most likely on the fallacious assumption that the reader must already know what 
the term means.12 In order to avoid any such confusion it is essential, therefore, to analyze 
the various definitions so far available with the ‘ambitious’ aim of articulating a more 
coherent and comprehensive definition of judicial activism which will help to locate the 
ensuing discourse in the rest of the thesis within a comprehensible conceptual framework. 
2.3       Navigating the intricate terrain of defining the term Judicial Activism 
The inconsistencies and contradictions in the various definitions of JA come out most 
prominently when discussing the definitions by the different authors. 
2.3.1     Is it when a Court ‘ignores’ Precedent? 
The term JA has been applied to Courts that have, in the view of those using the term, 
ignored precedent.13 The definition of JA as ignoring/disregarding precedent has provoked 
intense debate among scholars. The discussion has at times been so acrimonious that some 
commentators have accused those who adopt such a definition of advocating ‘strict 
adherence’ to the doctrine of precedent and have even gone so far as to call them ‘legal 
fundamentalists’ who do no more than claim ‘the prerogative of legitimacy for a conservative 
approach to administration and development of the law’ hence guilty of conducting 
themselves in a manner ‘unworthy of serious legal thinkers.’14 However, some critiques do 
agree that a court that departs from ‘established precedent’ is involved in JA but they tend to 
disagree as to whether that is appropriate JA15 or inappropriate JA.16 Regardless, defining 
JA in terms of ‘ignoring precedent’ can be quite misleading: firstly that approach glosses 
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over fundamental adjudicative differences between Civil17 and Common law systems with 
their distinctive treatment of precedent respectively and secondly the critique oversimplifies 
the complex process that judicial precedent is in a common law system.18 
In the first place, it would be fair to suggest that those who define JA in simple terms of 
disregarding/ignoring precedent do not adequately account for the flexibility permissible 
within the common law doctrine of judicial precedent; in so doing they proceed from a 
definitional premise that renders it impossible to distinguish that approach from the kind of 
‘unbridled’ departure from established legal principles (as embodied in previous judicial 
decisions) also characterized as judicial activism. Even though the common law doctrine of 
precedent19 has been a subject of much debate in its own right20 it must be acknowledged 
that it confers inherent flexibility to a common law court through the fundamental rule that 
decided cases must be followed unless they are distinguishable from the case at hand. By 
allowing decided cases to be distinguished or explained away as fundamentally different to 
the issues in question, the common law has a built in mechanism for judicial maneuver in 
adjudicating legal issues.21 In saying this it is very pertinent to remember that in law ‘it is not 
everything said by a judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent,’ rather it is 
only the reason for the decision (ratio decidendi) that becomes a definitive or decisive point 
on the question or issue.22 In practice, what constitutes such ratio decidendi may not be so 
easily distinguished from what is ‘a statement by the way’ (obiter dicta). 23 Much flexibility 
therefore emanates from the process of discerning which statements by the judges in 
decided cases constitute the ratio or obiter because though the ‘language of the deciding 
judge’ is the determining factor (in the case he determined), ‘the interpreter has as much to 
say as the speaker so far as the meaning of words concerned.’24 In addition, what is ratio 
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decidendi in a given case is influenced by the relevant and particular facts of the case; yet it 
is obvious that minor differences of fact are bound to arise within any two cases which are 
otherwise similar and in consequence the room for distinguishing previous decisions cannot 
be completely eliminated within the ordinary exercise of the adjudicative function of the 
common law court.25  
Secondly, those who define JA in terms of disregarding/ignoring precedent do not often 
make a distinction between vertical and horizontal precedent.26 Complexities might further 
arise from the fact that the binding nature of precedent also depends on whether the case is 
one from a court of superior jurisdiction (‘vertical precedent’) or of the same level as the 
court deciding the case (‘horizontal precedent’). 27 In most common law jurisdictions, the 
binding nature of vertical precedent is more coercive than horizontal precedent. For 
instance, in the UK, the House of Lords clearly affirmed the centrality of the doctrine of 
precedent to common law adjudication by stressing that it provides ‘some degree of certainty 
upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs as well as a basis for orderly 
development of legal rules;’28 nevertheless the House of Lords simultaneously explained that 
a common law court can ‘depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so’ 
because it ‘recognize[d] that too rigid an adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a 
particular case and also unduly restrain the proper development of the law.’29  
Further complexity may be attributed to the fact that the actual rules of precedent applicable 
in a particular jurisdiction vary from one common law jurisdiction to another. For instance, 
the USA with its written Constitution and federal system has a varied application of the 
doctrine of precedent, classified in a threefold scheme by Kmeic as ‘constitutional precedent’ 
(flowing from its written constitution) and ‘common law precedent’ (flowing from its 
foundation as a common law country), and ‘statutory precedent (flowing from the courts’ 
interpretation of Statutes).30 Consequently, in order to appropriately classify a court’s 
handling of precedent as JA (if at all), first and foremost there is need to identify the type of 
precedent in issue since not all such previous decisions are binding on the court under 
examination. However, it is proposed that the more appropriate issue to address in the 
context of a court’s handling of precedent, is the level of discretion that a court has (or 
should have) in determining applicable case authority since barring ‘incompetency, 
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dishonesty or legal heresy’ genuine differences can and do arise.31 In that vein, it would be 
legally incorrect to describe as judicial activism every instance of such departure from 
previous decisions. 
2.3.2        Is it when the Courts invalidate legislative enactments? 
One scholar defines judicial activism as ‘any occasion where a court intervenes and strikes 
down a piece of duly enacted legislation.’32 Even though this definition in its broad 
generalization does not represent the views of all academic commentators, a considerable 
number of scholarly articles from different jurisdictions have employed the invalidation of 
legislative enactments as a measurement of judicial activism (if only in part).33 However, it is 
suggested that equating JA to all instances where a court has invalidated legislative 
enactments presents its own definitional hurdles. Firstly and paradoxically, the same term, 
‘judicial activism’ has been applied to describe courts that have done the exact opposite, 
namely, declined to invalidate legislative enactments.34 Secondly, such a definition could be 
misleading as it may not properly account for other relevant legal factors underlying the 
particular court decision invalidating the legislative enactments. A more thorough analysis of 
such a decision could alter the definition as one would then have to consider issues such as: 
- (i) the rules of constitutional/statutory interpretation employed; (ii) the nature and content of 
the Constitutional and/or statutory provision(s) under consideration; (iii) the application of the 
doctrine of precedent (or lack thereof), just to mention a few of such peculiar legal features. 
 
As such, one cannot help noticing that some scholars have applied the term JA to describe 
courts which upon careful analysis, adopted or employed judicial processes that contradict 
the definition of JA as given by other scholars. To illustrate, ignoring precedent (an aspect of 
iii above) has been proffered by some scholars as proof of JA in its own right.35 If that 
definition were to be true at all times, then all instances where the court ignores precedent to 
arrive at its decisions should be referred to as JA. However, applying that definition 
alongside the definition of JA as invalidating legislation brings out an internal contradiction. 
For instance, some conservative courts in the USA have been known to ignore precedent 
set by liberal predecessors to decline to invalidate legislation, when a liberal judge through 
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adhering to such precedent would have accordingly invalidated it.36 The inconsistency of 
judicial activism definitions becomes even more apparent when the foregoing observation is 
expressed another way: some courts in the USA, have employed ‘judicial activism’ (ignoring 
precedent- as defined by some) in order to decline a ‘judicial activist’ outcome (invalidating 
legislative enactments- as defined by others).37  
 
2.3.3       Is ‘judicial activism’ a word of commendation or censure? 
The following statements from different commentators offer an instructive point of departure 
in considering the value-laden content carried within the label of JA within different 
jurisdictions and other varied contexts: 
According to Justice Kirby of Australia “… demonizing judicial honesty and integrity as 
“judicial activism” in the hope of restoring old doctrine and methodology [is] an endeavor that 
should be resisted…”38 While S. Sinha as the Chief Justice of India once said that “judicial 
activism, during the last three decades, gave a new hope to justice starved millions. …. The 
courts by taking recourse to judicial activism are not encroaching upon the exclusive domain 
of the executive inasmuch as the go all of the courts is to render justice.”39 Another author 
P.P. Rao writing on JA in India states that ‘initially [JA] meant judicial creativity,’ but ‘at times 
[it is] understood as dynamism on the part of judges who wield judicial power in an effective 
manner without crossing the constitutional limitations.’40 However, Rao goes on to add ‘there 
is yet another facet of judicial activism [in India]…’ where the judges have ‘assumed 
enormous powers beyond the contemplation of Constitution-makers…’ which have been 
‘counter-productive’ and risks the credibility of the judiciary.41 
The above statements beg the question, what exactly should the listener/reader take the 
usage of the term ‘judicial activism’ to convey about a particular court? According to Justice 
Kirby, it is clear that the term JA should never be used to describe the work of judges with 
moral honesty and judicial integrity as the term connotes some impropriety of adjudicative 
methodology or doctrine. For Justice S. Sinha however, JA is synonymous with judges 
behaving justly and appropriately in discharging their constitutional function with due 
historical regard of a given socio-economic context being reflected in their decisions and 
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methodologies. On the other hand, Rao propounds a different perspective on the nature of 
judicial activism in that his comments suggest that JA can be synonymous with two 
diametrically opposed judicial realities: one scenario where the judges are behaving 
constitutionally by being judicially active and another where they are in fact acting 
unconstitutionally in the same name of judicial activism. This necessarily begs the question 
which is a more accurate representation of the meaning of JA? How is the term used in 
different countries or jurisdictions? Is it a word of commendation or censure or indeed can it 
be both all at once? In scoping the terrain of the relevant literature it emerges that different 
countries have different answers to these questions. 
2.3.3.1   The United States of America 
JA has both its supporters and critics in the USA. However, ‘common to all definitions of 
judicial activism [in the US] is the concept of judicial overreaching,’ which some defend as 
necessary for the protection of the rights of minorities,42 even though JA in the USA has also 
been used to further entrench the oppression of minorities.43  The general position however, 
is that disdain for JA unites liberals and conservatives even though the two sides do not 
agree on its definition, causing one judge to opine: - ‘Everyone [in the USA] scorns judicial 
“activism.”’44 In essence both liberals and conservatives use the term to describe judicial 
decision-making that they perceive to be a departure from the norm or standard expected of 
judges without necessarily agreeing on what that norm or standard is or should be.45  
An analysis done by scholars has shown that in the USA, where the term ‘judicial activism’ 
has been applied, the Court’s conduct of the judicial process may be categorized into any or 
all of the following heads: 
1. Striking down arguably Constitutional Acts of other branches 
2. Ignoring precedent 
3. Judicial legislation 
4. Departures from Accepted Interpretive Methodology 
5. Result-oriented Judging.46 
 
Despite the existence of supporters of JA, there is a general agreement among scholars that 
in the USA the term is used as a condemnation not a compliment.47 In that context, the 
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Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of United States48defines ‘Judicial activism’ as ‘the 
charge that judges are going beyond their appropriate powers and engaging in making law 
and not merely interpreting it.’49 
 
Thus the position in the USA is aptly described by Justice FH Easterbrook: 
“Activism" remains, however, a term of opprobrium. Everyone wants to 
appropriate and apply the word so that his favored approach is sound and it’s 
opposite "activist." Then "activism" just means Judges Behaving Badly - and 
each person fills in a different definition of "badly."50 
2.3.3.2   Australia 
The Hamlyn lecture on JA by Justice Kirby51 and an article by Wheeler and Williams52 
adequately capture the situation tenable in Australia. Justice Kirby writing on JA likened the 
usage of the term ‘judicial activism’ in the Australian context to describe judges’ conduct as 
‘judge-bashing’, or synonymous with ‘a swear word.’53  Further, Kirby records that the 
Australian public labeled the judges they perceived as being ‘judicial activists’ as: 
‘bogus’ … guilty of ‘plunging Australia into the abyss,’ a ‘pathetic … self-
appointed [group of] Kings and Queens,’ a group of ‘basket weavers’ … 
unaware of [their] place … ‘needing a good behavior bond’ … ‘undermining 
democracy’….54 
 
Similarly, Wheeler and Williams state that the ‘invocation of [judicial activism] is often a 
surrogate for direct criticism of a particular decision or result or methodology,’55 and the term 
JA has thus become ‘something of a proxy of judicial excess.’56 In keeping with the lack of 
clarity that goes with most of the discussions on JA, Wheeler and Williams while stating that 
judicial activism is ‘such an empty concept’ went on to conclude that the High Court in 
Australia had displayed ‘restrained activism’ without even providing or proposing and 
definition of the concept. Regardless, even those who argue that the ‘activism’ of the 
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Australian High Court has been appropriate acknowledge that the application of ‘judicial 
activism’ to judges in Australia is generally depreciatory.57  
2.3.3.3   India 
Banerjea states that ‘… the [Indian] society is divided sharply, nay, acrimoniously… [on 
judicial activism]’.58 As a result, descriptions of Indian judicial activism spam the broadest 
possible spectrum ranging from the complimentary ‘judicial creativity’ to the denigrating 
‘judicial terrorism’.59 Indian and international scholars and judges60 are equally divided in 
their opinion on judicial activism in India though they do not necessarily agree on its 
definition.61 Others have taken a middle position stating that the manifestation of JA may 
have a local dimension to it;62 and that on a comparison of Supreme Courts in the common 
law jurisdictions, ‘the jury is very much still out on whether the activism of the Indian 
Supreme Court has gone too far.’63   However, an eminent Indian jurist has divided the JA 
periods in India into two categories: ‘1950 – 73,’ and ‘1978- present’ where he describes the 
‘1950 – 73’ period as a period of ‘fairly principled and doctrinally sustainable approach’ to 
activism and the ‘1978 – present’ epoch as one of ‘undisciplined and theoretically 
questionable activism.’64  
The consequences of Indian JA have equally been mixed. For instance, JA in India (however 
defined) is said to have brought hope to the powerless, downtrodden and marginalized 
through the Court’s adjudication on a variety of rights ranging from the right to education to 
the right to a clean environment.65 However, in the very area of protection of human rights, in 
particular the right to property, Sathe states that JA in India has arguably led to the 
marginalization of the majorities who were landless and it is such activism that has served to 
further entrench the powerful status quo of the propertied minority.66  
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49 
 
Similarly, on the one hand, some scholars argue that ordinary citizens have confidence in 
the Supreme Court as a result of its JA.67 That by abandoning ‘traditional English writs or 
blinked rule of standing of British Indian vintage’,68 the Indian judiciary ‘induced’ public 
interest litigation (PIL), considerably increased access to justice for the underprivileged, 
oppressed and poor classes of people in India.69 On the other hand, it has been reported 
that even though ‘judge induced’70 PIL ‘provides a career path for many an entrepreneur in 
the market for human rights activism’71 its intended beneficiaries have had to say to ‘the 
Supreme Court of India: Physician heal thyself.’72   
Some still maintain that where the executive and legislative arms of Government are ‘guilty 
of apathy or abdication of responsibility’ in the face of corruption in high places, massive 
election frauds, and where education has become too commercialized as is allegedly the 
case in India, then the judiciary has a responsibility through judicial activism to make up for 
the lack of action of the other two governmental arms.73 However, an example of the 
practical and institutional limitations on the capacity and the risk to credibility of the judiciary 
when it seeks to make up for the failings of the two other branches of government may be 
found in the case of Vineet Narain v. Union of India.74 In that decision the Indian judiciary by 
means of judicial activism set out to make up for the apparent lack of action on the part of 
the other arms of government. The case was brought by way of PIL by a journalist who was 
frustrated by the apparent reluctance of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) to 
carry out investigations into allegations of corruption involving ‘high dignitaries.’75 The main 
question before the court was: ‘Whether it is within the domain of judicial review and it could 
be an effective instrument for activating the investigative process which is under the control 
of executive?’76 The case centered on entries made into diaries and note books seized from 
the premises of a Mr. SK Jain and his relatives which allegedly pointed to corruption 
involving high profile politicians (‘Jain Diaries’). The Indian Supreme Court decided to 
become directly involved in the investigations and monitored the CBI’s conduct of 
investigations and ‘only closed the case after the CBI submitted charge-sheets in the 
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criminal court concerned.’77  Interestingly, when the case went before the New Delhi High 
Court against the Jains and others, the case was dismissed for want of evidence among 
other reasons.78 The CBI appealed and the matter was heard by a panel of three judges who 
upheld the decision of the trial court on the point that the evidence contained in the diaries 
was not admissible and reliable evidence in the absence of further evidence establishing the 
truthfulness of the entries.79 In effect, investigations presided over by the Supreme Court of 
India resulted in an acquittal of the accused persons for insufficient and unreliable evidence. 
One may legitimately ask – does that not show that (contrary to popular sentiment) the CBI 
might have already properly assessed the evidence and found it wanting and hence decided 
not to proceed further with the matter? In other words the case buttresses the argument that 
certain public law domains may lie beyond the institutional and structural competence of the 
judiciary. Nevertheless some scholars have applauded the proactive approach of the 
Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain case as innovative despite the embarrassing outcome 
of the subsequent criminal trial and appeal.80 
International scholarship, on the other hand, suggests that whilst ‘seeking to build great 
structures’ the Indian Supreme Court has actually shaken the foundations of ‘the 1950 Indian 
Constitution…to the extent that the Court’s judgments no longer carry the weight and respect 
they once did.’81  Further, it is sometimes argued that for the people who should have 
benefited from PIL, the ‘manifestations of judicial activism merely mask the endless potential 
of all forms of state power for re-victimization of the already much violated.’82 In other words, 
this line of argument proposes that judicial activism in India has just shown the oppressed 
masses of India that judicial power expressed in terms of judicial activism is itself another 
form of state power that can just as effectively be invoked to oppress and marginalize the 
majority of the people. 
2.3.3.4   South Africa 
Possibly due to its terrible apartheid history, it appears that South Africa has been spared 
from the inconsistent and at times irreconcilable definitions of judicial activism that are 
present in other jurisdictions. The apartheid regime, a minority government of people self-
classified as “‘European’ (later ‘white’)’83 managed to set up a ‘constitutional arrangement’ 
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(made up of a written Constitution, Acts of Parliament and subordinate legislation), that 
‘effectively excluded’ the original inhabitants of the land (blacks) who constituted ’80 per cent 
of the population.’84 This meant that all the injustice and oppression occasioned on the 
original inhabitants of the land was all done in accordance with the law of the land.85 Even 
though some people so affected challenged the actions of the apartheid regime in court, 
such as challenging constitutional amendments, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa, declined to invalidate the offending amendments among others.86 As the 
apartheid regime became more oppressive, the judiciary justified its indirect endorsement of 
the oppression by declaring, ‘we declare what the law is, we do not make it,’87 and insisted 
that they were ‘the strongest bastions of human rights’ in spite of evidence to the contrary.88 
It was in that context of oppression that calls for judicial activism in South Africa was initially 
made.89 Those calls were generally directed at judges when construing statutory and 
constitutional provisions whose ordinary meaning would occasion injustice; in such a 
scenario they were encouraged to disregard the ordinary meaning or ‘to construe the words 
in a manner that [would avert] any imminent injustice, [in order to] ensure that justice is 
done.’90 The injustice practiced in apartheid South Africa challenges one commonly held 
view that judicial activism is counter-majoritarian.91 That is, through constitutional 
amendments, ‘the popular will’ in South Africa (determined in terms of the electoral process) 
was in actual fact the will of a minority racist population, who through a combination of 
conquest92 and subsequent legal reforms governing the electoral process, managed to 
exclude the ‘will’ of the majority population.93 Judicial activism in South Africa, in order to 
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bring about ‘justice,’94 was in fact to be counter-powerful-minority. It is a sad fact of history 
that the South Africa justices however, disregarded those ennobling calls.95 
However, change did arrive in the end, in the form of a new constitutional dispensation 
through the coming into force of the new South African Constitution.96 The South African 
Constitution (‘RSA Constitution’) contains provisions which were adopted with the particular 
purpose of being a catalyst for social transformation. 97 It contains a Bill of Rights which 
includes civil and political rights as well as social and economic rights, and entrenches 
‘dignity, equality and freedom’ as foundational to constitutional democracy.98 In particular, 
the RSA Constitution contains Section 39 (2) which calls upon ‘every court, tribunal, or 
forum,’ ‘when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law,’ to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ In effect, S. 
39 (2) of the RSA Constitution, calls upon the Courts in RSA to do what has been defined in 
other jurisdictions as judicial activism.99 Even so this explicit constitutional mandate  has not 
stopped some commentators from arguing that South African ‘top courts’100 are practicing 
JA.101 Other scholars however argue that those courts are anything but judicially active, 
especially when JA is conceived in terms of the courts being agents for social 
transformation.102 
It would appear that those scholars, who have argued that the courts in South Africa are 
practicing JA, have used the term predominantly as a statement of commendation.103 Such 
discussions use several notable cases to illustrate their favorable assessment of the South 
African judiciary.104 For example in the case of S v. Makwanyane,105 the RSA Constitutional 
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Court (‘CC’) outlawed the death penalty when there was still a high likelihood of public 
controversy and in so doing promulgated the position that the RSA Constitution’s right to life 
provision was ‘ahead of the social consensus’.106  In the case of Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v. Grootbroom,107 the CC rendered social-economic rights such as the right 
to housing directly enforceable in a court of law. This decision represented a radical 
departure from ordinary liberal democratic distinctions between justiciable and non-
justiciable rights and reflects a judicial approach that deliberately seeks to remedy the 
historical injustices of apartheid and its exclusion of the majority from enjoying the economic 
benefits accruing within a given society. However, in all the above cases, it is very pertinent 
for present discussions to observe that in reality the South African Courts have merely given 
judicial effect to the provisions of the new RSA Constitution; as such even those who 
contend that there is JA do acknowledge that it is a ‘special type of’ JA which those courts 
are practicing.108  
Other scholars however, propose that the RSA CC has in fact exercised judicial restraint and 
even avoidance in dealing with certain crucial cases in the context of transforming a hitherto 
exclusionary legal system and generally oppressive governance structure. 109In order to 
highlight the restrictive way in which the South African CC has interpreted some pro-poor 
constitutional provisions, a comparison is made with the Indian judiciary.110 Due to poverty of 
the majority in India whose access to justice was hampered by the high costs of bringing 
cases before Courts and stringent rules of standing before commencing a court case, the 
Indian Supreme Court relaxed, by interpretation, the applicable rules such that in essence 
even a letter by the aggrieved individual or another on their behalf to the Supreme Court has 
been deemed as sufficient to begin a cause of action before it.111 The point to emphasize 
here is that the Indian Supreme Court extended the rules of standing and the mode of 
commencing or bringing a case before it to that extent without any express Constitutional 
provision upon which to found their very expansive approach. The situation in RSA is 
markedly different. In issue in this particular context is Section 167 (2) of the RSA 
Constitution which provides that: 
National legislation or the rules of the Constitution Court must allow a person, when it 
is in the interest of justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court: 
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a. to bring a matter directly to the Constitutional court;112 or  
b. to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court from any court. 
It is very remarkable that while some proponents of judicial activism routinely denounce 
positivism (understood as giving ordinary meaning to the text of a constitution), it is beyond 
dispute that a positivist reading of S. 162 (2)(a) should entitle even a poor litigant to 
approach the CC as a court of first and last instance.113 In fact, it has been acknowledged 
elsewhere that ‘ironically’ the judicial positivism that was a problem in the apartheid era 
would in fact ‘be an advantage in the new [constitutional] dispensation.’114 However, unlike 
the Indian Supreme Court which ‘“actively invites” cases to be brought to it as a court of first 
and last instance’115 the RSA CC has decided that it will not ‘ordinarily deal with matters both 
as a Court of first and as one of last resort.’ 116 Whereas in the case such as the Christian 
Education South Africa v. The Minister of Education117 the applicants were not necessarily 
poor, the principle enunciated in that decision to the effect that the direct access procedure 
is ‘an extraordinary procedure and that it should be granted only in exceptional 
circumstances’118 has served to bar actually poor litigants from accessing the CC. 
Subsequent research done by Dugard and Roux119 on the issue of access to the CC has 
revealed that ‘unrepresented applicants [who are unrepresented because they are poor and 
thus cannot afford legal representation] are typically turned away…’120 
Furthermore, the CC has specifically decided that ‘it is … not ordinarily in the interests of 
justice for a court to sit as a court of first and last instance, in which matters are decided 
without there being any possibility of appeal…’121 In light of such a judicial statement it can 
be argued that the CC has in effect determined that the direct access provided for under S. 
167 (2) (a) is itself contrary to the interests of justice. It is an interesting and significant 
historical oddity that the retrogressive heritage of the Appellate Division of the RSA Supreme 
Court from the apartheid era had in fact led to the creation of the CC to enable applicants to 
directly access the CC.122 By its restrictive decisions on direct access, the CC has in effect 
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forced the majority of poor applicants back to the pre-1996 status, whereby they still have to 
go through the ordinary courts including the once infamous Appellate Division of the RSA 
Supreme Court, in order to seek constitutional redress;123 and that judicial direction arrived at 
in what is arguably clear contradiction to the purport of section 167 (2)(a). Thus contrary to 
the acclaim of those who have described the RSA CC as practicing commendable judicial 
activism, others point out that in reality the court has exercised unabashed judicial restraint 
in ‘its direct access and social rights jurisprudence,’ which has in turn ‘… made it harder for 
the poor to litigate cases than the text of the 1996 Constitution would suggest.’124 Even such 
critiques however, would seem to implicitly endorse the predominant South African 
understanding of JA as a tool for social transformation; in arguing that the judges have 
exercised judicial restraint, the critics are using the resultant capacity of the relevant court 
decisions to promote or inhibit access to justice by the poor as an essential criterion to 
measure the extent to which the present judicial approach significantly redresses the 
historical injustices of the disbanded pre-1994 legal regime.  
 
This discussion shows that the term JA when applied to RSA jurisprudence is predominantly 
invoked as a word of commendation and this is very different from the way it is used in other 
jurisdictions such as the USA, Australia, and even India (in some contexts). This goes to 
emphasize the point that it is unwise to assume that the term has a universally applicable 
meaning in all literature at all times. 
2.4       Refining the discourse on JA 
The foregoing analyses have adequately shown that JA has at times been equated to 
judicial creativity and even judicial terrorism, and that it has been credited with the 
emancipation of the marginalised as well as denounced for the further marginalisation of the 
socio-historically disenfranchised sections of society. This apparent paradox of results 
indicates that JA has both positive and negative resonances as well as consequences. Such 
a realisation warrants a further analysis of some conceptual links that have necessarily 
arisen in our on-going efforts to trace the definitional contours within which the idea of 
judicial activism is experienced, discussed and critiqued.125 
 
                                                          
123
 Dugard and Roux (n 102) 119. 
124
 Ibid 118. 
125
 See also Green (n 3) arguing that there is no essential link between JA and justice; also Corder (n 97) arguing 
that JA is not synonymous with liberalism; Baxi (n 71) disputing the assertion that JA is essentially counter-
majoritarian. 
56 
 
2.4.1     Why JA is not synonymous with ‘Judicial Creativity’ 
There are those who have made JA synonymous with ‘judicial creativity’ without further 
explaining or defining what ‘creativity’126means. It is suggested here that discussing JA in 
terms of ‘judicial creativity’ only increases the chance of misinformation since it ignores an 
essential characteristic of common law adjudication.127 ‘Judicial creativity’ is inherent ‘in the 
very nature of common law.’128 By operation of law there is an obligation on the common law 
judge to decide like cases alike.129 It is almost axiomatic that ‘so long as human language 
remains imprecise and human capacity to predict the future limited’, unprecedented complex 
issues will continue to come before common law judges.130 Within such a realistic scenario 
of legal disputes, the judicial creativity integral to the common law becomes an 
indispensable device for fashioning just decisions responsive to the manifest diversities of 
human problems; for the judge is nevertheless expected to articulate the ‘law’ applicable as 
‘… [an] authoritative spokesperson’ on the community’s law derived from ‘precedents and 
principles’ which he deems relevant to a particular set of facts (as he has determined from 
the available evidence).131 However, barring ‘incompetence, dishonesty or legal heresy,’132 
genuine differences of judicial opinion do emerge concerning which facts are relevant, which 
precedent is applicable or distinguishable, and whether the questions arising are those of 
policy or law. It is in that process of discerning the justice of the case based on legally 
relevant facts that common law judges inevitably do develop the law subject to the subsisting 
requirement to furnish reasons for any decision taken- the need to articulate a legally 
coherent judicial determination is designed to ‘discourage a naked usurpation of [legislative] 
power by judges.’133 Thus though entitled to extrapolate new principles from existing ones in 
order to dispose of unprecedented cases, under the common law, the judge is not expected 
to be the ‘…original author of new ideas…’ rather he must proceed as part of the 
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‘community’ (representing ‘an evolving collective legal’134 wisdom) of whom he becomes the 
‘spokesperson’135through his reasoned decision. 
It is now generally accepted that common law judges do ‘make law to some extent’;136 the 
differences and questions arise in the context of articulating ‘how’ and ‘when’ and ‘to what 
extent’ they are justified in doing so.137 It could be argued that the questions  as to how, 
when and the extent to which a common law judge may or is justified in ‘making’ the law 
pertain more to an important issue of judicial discretion. In deciding which interpretive 
method is appropriate or not, whether facts are material or not, or whether a case authority is 
applicable or not, a judge exercises choice. Now, ‘[whenever] a judge makes a choice he or 
she effectively exercises discretion’; hence discretion is an integral part of the judicial 
decision-making process.138 Common law allows for judicial discretion but restricts judicial 
creativity in the development of law in that the judge ‘must subordinate their own individual 
reasoning and values to those’139 of the community of whose interests they are guardians.140 
Consequently, for purposes of avoiding misinformation, discussions on JA in courts should 
address the broader question of the nature of judicial discretion as opposed to ‘judicial 
creativity’ – what is (or should be) the scope and limits of judicial discretion  vis-à-vis the 
development of law by judges?  
2.4.2        Why JA is not synonymous with ‘liberalism’ or ‘progressiveness’ 
It is not uncommon to come across a discussion on JA that casts the judge as deemed to be 
exercising JA as a ‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’ judge. Take for instance the words of USA Judge 
LM Swygert: 
Judicial activism traditionally uses the principles built into the constitution and 
statutory law to foster the ends of social justice. The term connotes a liberal 
approach so as to read into legal norms the essence of due process and equal 
protection under the law.141 
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Compare those remarks to the views of New Zealand Judge EW Thomas who accuses 
‘legal fundamentalists’142 of loving ‘[t]he phrase judicial activism’ and using it with ‘acidic 
delicacy’ to taint with ‘illegitimacy’ the work of ‘liberal and creative’ judges. Both Judges 
Swygert and Thomas (like most who use that term in association with JA) make no attempt 
to define the word ‘liberal.’ 
Is it ‘liberal’ in terms of liberal political theory which emphasizes a society founded on 
‘atomistic individual[ism]’143 as a basis for freedom for the individual from coercion? If so, 
then equating such ‘liberal’ judges with the enhancement of freedom for the individual 
encounters difficulties- since, as some have pointed out, discourse on ‘liberalism’ hides a 
‘fundamental contradiction, … the contradiction that individual freedom and autonomy are 
possible only under conditions of collective restraint and coercion.’144 In addition, ‘liberals … 
fight to the death to prevent any law’ impinging on individual autonomy such as abortion 
laws but yield to regulations and policies that restrict the ability of the State to cater for the 
poorer sections of society,145 which would enhance individual autonomy in ways not 
embraced by ‘liberals’ since it concerns welfare issues.146  
Further, as has already been noted, judges involved in judicial activism have invalidated 
‘socially progressive and economically distributive acts and policies’ in the USA,147 and 
brought about the further marginalization of the poor through their decisions in India.148 
Lastly but not least, judges classified as ‘conservative’ in the USA have also been actively 
involved in judicial activism during which time ‘liberals opposed [such] interference by 
advocating judicial restraint’.149 Therefore classifying the JA judge as ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ 
(whether to commend or denounce the implied converse) is both erroneous and misleading; 
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the evidence on the ground suggests that ‘judicial activism lacks any essential link to 
progressive politics or liberty.’150  
2.4.3        Why JA should not be classified as ‘counter-majoritarian’  
It is equally not uncommon to come across a discussion on JA that describes it as 
essentially ‘counter-majoritarian.’151 Such discourse predominantly emanates from American 
democracy discourse. In that context, those who classify judicial activism (though not always 
taking the time to define the term comprehensively)152 as ‘counter-majoritarian’ proceed from 
the premise that it protects minorities from the ‘tyranny’ of the majority.153 In this context, 
judicial activism is generally construed as referring to the situation when the Court ‘goes 
beyond’ the text of a Constitution or ‘… adopt doctrines that contradict the text of the 
Constitution either to uphold or nullify a law.’154 Most scholars in the USA whether they are 
for or against judicial activism appear to endorse a definition along those lines.155 Those who 
oppose the idea of courts going against the written Constitution in the USA argue that in 
doing so the courts are actually ‘short-circuiting the electoral process and disenfranchising 
the people’156 and others insist that the courts in that way are undermining democracy by 
going against the rule of the majority.157 On the other hand, others such as Dworkin argue 
for or justify Courts going beyond the written text of the Constitution on the basis that not 
doing so ‘limits constitutional rights “to those recognized by a limited group of people at a 
fixed date of history.”’158 Dworkin is highlighted here because his theories purport to put 
forward universally applicable principles and represent the current dominant legal theory on 
the judicial-making process.159  
In this context, judges who go beyond the text of the Constitution are considered to be 
judges who take human ‘rights seriously’.160 Thus Dworkin describes JA as ‘a program 
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[where] … courts … work out principles of legality, equality, and the rest, [and] revise those 
principles from time to time in the light of what seems to the court fresh moral insight…’161 
According to Dworkin and other ‘legal realists’ therefore, judges should not shy away from 
using ‘their own moral beliefs’ and disregarding written laws (including the Constitution) in 
order to ‘protect individuals and minorities’.162 Examples are given of how Courts in some 
jurisdictions such as Canada have added sexual orientation as ‘a ground of discrimination’ 
into the Canadian Charter of Rights contrary to the intention of the original framers.163 
In this case, ‘law’ according to Dworkin ‘is entirely a matter of interpretation’ derived from 
pre-existing ‘legal resources’ in the form of principles and legal rules, where the principles 
control the application of legal rules.164 For Dworkin, within pre-existing ‘law’ there is always 
an answer to every hard issue before the court, and the judges derive their authority ‘from 
within law itself.’ In interpreting the law, the fundamental duty of the judge is said to be the 
promotion and protection of human rights especially ‘independent of the majority will.’165 
However, in interpreting the law, judges (according to Dworkin) are not supposed to be free-
agents but should be guided by some fundamental values that underpin the relevant legal 
system and they must advance those values through their peculiar interpretive judicial 
mandate.166 Therefore, according to this line of argument, it is those fundamental values that 
authorize the judge to go beyond the written text of a Constitution where doing so will 
advance the rights of individuals. As the following discussion will argue, this proposition of 
the expansive nature of the judicial interpretive mandate which purports to explain or justify 
judicial activism as a liberal democratic imperative may not be without its shortcomings. 
2.4.3.1     Why the ‘counter-majoritarian’ label cannot be of universal application 
On the face of it, these arguments are very compelling167 until their counter-arguments are 
carefully considered.168 The principal counter-argument being that Dworkin’s theses are 
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rooted in legal abstractions that are too far removed from the practical realities of judicial 
decision-making169 and if anything they seem to be conceived with the US constitutional and 
judicial system in mind.170  Though not exhaustive, some of the reasons for proposing the 
counter-argument will be outlined below.  
2.4.3.1.1  Preservation of the supremacy of the Constitution 
Even those who support the idea of judges going beyond the text of the written Constitution 
point to the very Constitution or constitutional principles as a source of both the authority for 
the judges’ power to go beyond the text and any subsequent extra-constitutional 
pronouncement.171 To illustrate this point let us look at one seminal decision on the issue: 
when the US Supreme Court ascribed the power of judicial review to itself under the US 
Constitution in Marbury v. Madison172 they did so by stating that judicial review was ‘implied’ 
within the Constitution.173 Further, the Canadian Supreme Court added sexual orientation as 
a ground of discrimination under the Charter on the basis that ‘unwritten constitutional 
principles’ authorized them to do so.174  
To reiterate, those who advocate for court’s to interpret Constitutions so as to suit the 
changing times do not necessarily want ‘the notion of a national Constitution with a uniform 
meaning throughout the country [to be] lost,’175 even though they may still differ on what that 
‘meaning’ is and how it may be arrived at.176This would point to the conclusion that 
regardless of their views on what constitutes a ‘Constitution’ (and its bona fide 
interpretation); nevertheless both sides of the debate are keen to preserve the supremacy of 
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that document as foundational to all legitimate legal authority.177In other words the validity of 
any purported interpretation must be derived from its fidelity to the values which the 
document espouses. One view is that those values are explicit and must be strictly adhered 
to especially through judicial interpretation; the other view being that every constitution 
embodies values that might be implicit (such as the liberal democratic imperative of 
individual liberty) but just as definitive in its actualization which entitle courts to fashion 
judicial responses that necessarily promote those underlying values. 
It is in this context that the Constitutional framework differences between the USA and other 
jurisdictions attain significance.  
2.4.3.1.2   The nature of a Constitution’s foundational premise for protection of rights 
It is useful to indicate that the ‘counter-majoritarian’ JA discussions in the USA emanate from 
the fact that the constitutional system of the USA ‘…has a counter-majoritarian premise’ 
whereby ‘there are some areas of life a majority [is not allowed to] control…no matter how 
democratically it decides to do’ so. 178 The premise of American constitutional democracy like 
most western societies is therefore based on an ‘extreme form of individualism’ whereas 
non-western societies seem to place more premiums on the individual within the context of a 
community.179 Therefore if it could be shown that the Constitutions of such other nations do 
not embody an equally ‘counter-majoritarian premise’ any counter-majoritarian JA within 
such societies would (unlike in the USA) be in direct contravention of the very spirit and 
object of the Constitution purported to be enforced by such judicial decisions.180In other 
words such a judicial approach would be patently unconstitutional (besides being 
fundamentally undemocratic). 
2.4.3.1.3 The existence of constitutional limitation on a court’s constitutional 
interpretive role 
The debate on judicial activism as counter-majoritarian in the USA has also given rise to 
conflicting theories of constitutional interpretation such as ‘interpretivism’181 and 
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‘noninterpretivism’182 the comprehensive discussion of which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Suffice to say for present purposes however that the ‘authority to determine the 
meaning and application of [the US]… Constitution is no-where defined in the document 
itself.’183 On the other hand, the written Constitutions of other jurisdictions such as Malawi do 
make specific provision to that effect.184 This foundational difference arguably alters 
significantly the application of noninterpretivism to other jurisdictions as the document itself 
prescribes the parameters and principles of constitutional interpretation and specifically 
defines the limits within which the discretion of the court can legitimately be exercised in its 
interpretive mandate. It is argued that Dworkin does not adequately account for such 
differences between the US and Malawian Constitutions for example. 
2.4.3.1.4 The nature of fundamental values embodied in the written Constitutional 
framework 
If the principal check on the judicial power of interpretation is a set of fundamental values or 
rights, as espoused by Dworkin and others, then the fact that the fundamental values that 
govern a country’s Constitution may differ across various jurisdictions is very significant. For 
instance, private property is ‘[o]ne of the fundamental rights to be protected’ in the USA,185  
which could sadly explain the dreadful judicial activism of Dred Scott v. Sanford. To the 
extent that the courts (as interpretive agents of prevailing social values and rights) 
understood that blacks were the private property of their white slave masters, they saw the 
legislation abolishing slavery as an illegitimate limitation of that fundamental right. In this 
case, the South African Constitutional provision on the right to property may offer an 
interesting example of the constitutional tensions that arise within a society trying to 
transform itself from a hitherto exploitative and exclusive legal regime.  
The 1996 South African Constitution expressly provides for the expropriation of private 
property (not limited to land) by the State for among other reasons, ‘land reform’ aimed at 
enhancing ‘equitable access’ to land by citizens, subject to certain conditions such as 
payment of compensation.186Indeed payment of compensation subject to ‘market value of 
the property among other things’ is one key precondition. Since expropriation by its very 
nature may mean taking without the owner freely offering their property for sale it makes 
sense that the nature of compensation offered should be a very essential element indeed.  
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However, not all governments especially those of developing economies will have sufficient 
resources to acquire land at the current market value.187 Let us suppose therefore, that as in 
the case of India,188 the South African government proposed to expropriate certain 
properties for purposes of redistributing to Black South Africans not in accordance with the 
principle of acquisition at the current market rate but purported instead to justify that on the 
basis of ‘historical circumstances’ (a factor which is also recognized by the Constitution).189  
Which is the fundamental value that the Court should protect at all costs: private property or 
equitable access? It may be instructive to note that a decision by the Supreme Court of India 
to subject expropriation of land for redistribution by the Indian Government to payment of 
compensation at ‘market value’ has been denounced by proponents of judicial activism as 
‘legal positivism with a vengeance’190 concealing ‘…a hidden class bias.’191  In their view, the 
historical, social and economic circumstances in India called for a lesser amount of 
compensation rather than the ‘market value’ which the Government then could not afford.192 
Dworkin acknowledges that fundamental principles may sometimes conflict with each other 
and a balancing process may have to be undertaken by the judge.193 In this case, which is 
the fundamental value which must prevail over the other to govern the interpretation of the 
South African Constitution?194 Currently the South African Courts have recognized 
expropriation under current market value-195 but what if the RSA Constitutional Court, 
choosing to pay regard to the oppressive history surrounding land acquisition in RSA was to 
decide to attach more weight to historical circumstances as opposed to the need for 
payment of market value? Further still, what if the judges took the position that the right to 
property of the ‘landless’ individuals far outweighed the competing interests of those who 
currently owned the property as a fundamental value protected under the 1996 RSA 
Constitution, hence decided to go beyond the very text of the 1996 Constitution and 
endorsed expropriation at nominal value? Now let us suppose in this case that such a 
judicial decision would receive enormous public support even internationally? On the face of 
it, rights indeed would have been taken seriously (those of the landless) but at the same 
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time, in protecting those rights, other rights would have been trampled upon (those who 
owned the property). In this case, it is the same right (access to land) that is in issue but the 
protection of which generates an irreconcilable conflict. When the right is the same and 
therefore of equal significance, which incidence is to take precedence over the other in the 
pursuit of justice where either choice may lead to patent injustice? That is, if the court were 
to insist on expropriation at market value, then the government would not afford hence land 
will not be redistributed according to need leaving many still without access to land (injustice 
according to some), but if acquired at nominal value, it would deprive the owners of 
safeguards provided for under the Constitution (injustice according to others). In this case, 
expropriation at market value would resonate well with an American audience and very likely 
with Dworkin himself, but not a developing country audience.196Thus it could be contended 
that in arguing for going beyond the Constitution, Dworkin presupposed a homogeneous 
interpretive community, which is not the case in real life.197 
Consequently, these theories are conceptually deficient as they do not provide an adequate 
universal answer to the real issue of conflict of rights arising within different cultural and 
constitutional frameworks.198 It is for this reason that discussions of JA as ‘counter-
majoritarian’ have in turn generated debates on complex concepts/theories such as the very 
definition of a ‘Constitution’, constitutional interpretation methodologies, theories of 
democracy, and the nature of the judicial role/function (including specifically in a 
democracy).199 This contested process has precluded the attainment of universal agreement 
on the essential elements of JA.  
2.4.4        The need to ask the right question 
In this thesis it is proposed that some of the inconsistencies and contradictions on the 
elements of JA may have arisen because of addressing the wrong questions about the 
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judicial role/function.200 In this context, it is argued that the knowledge of which questions to 
ask and which ones to avoid decreases the likelihood of misinformation.201 
To illustrate the point from a common place example: tourists visiting Malawi for the first time 
are often advised to refrain from asking locals, especially those in rural areas for the 
distance between two places because they will likely get the ‘right’ answer to their question 
which will often turn out to be the ‘wrong’ answer for their purposes. The transportation 
system is very poor in rural Malawi; as a result, many locals have to walk long distances as a 
matter of course, such that a one hour walk would be considered a very short distance. 
Stories are told of European tourists who have walked at great cost to their physical well-
being after asking about the distance and getting a response of ‘short distance’ only to 
realise that by their standards it was an ‘extremely long distance.’ The likelihood of 
misinformation and misunderstanding increases with a discussion of JA because its ‘critical 
elements … are either subjective or defy clear and concrete definition.’202 The solution 
therefore lies rather in identifying the fundamental issues raised in the discussions on JA and 
refining them so that ‘something more precise can be articulated and evaluated.’203 
However, a leading jurist204 has called for the ‘repudiation of any essentialist perspective on 
judicial activism’ arguing that JA ‘has no permanent “essence”’ and that: 
The world of judicial activism remains chaotic [and] [t]he politics of judicial 
desire that animates justices remains fragmented, given the disorder of their 
desires. That disorder shapes the moments of both triumphs and tragedy of 
…judicial activism.205  
And further that: 
… [T]he telling of stories about the unfolding of diverse forms of judicial 
activism, [calls for] their ceaseless definitions and redefinitions. … this … 
subverts the model of an either/or choice: [and] narratives of judicial activism 
ineluctably de-privilege any ‘right’ way of describing, let alone defining its 
basic features and processes.206 
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Similar sentiments have been advanced by authors who have called for the term JA to ‘be 
exiled from educated discourse’ on the basis that it is ‘an empty phrase’ since it means 
anything that the speaker wants it to mean, which could be the exact opposite of what a prior 
speaker may have stated it meant.207 It is proposed here that despite such strong and 
insightful observations however, judicial activism as a term cannot be abandoned. As 
another commentator has aptly pointed out ‘scholars who avoid seemingly undefinable terms 
like activism risk withdrawing their research from large public discussions about judicial 
conduct.’208 Even if for arguments sake, JA were to be merely ‘a term of political criticism’ 
giving up on it ‘on grounds of indeterminacy’ would lead to a situation where there was 
‘precious little political discourse left.’209 ‘[P]ublic reasoning and debates are central to the 
pursuit of justice’210 and discussions of JA appear to gain momentum in the realm of public 
debate.211 Consequently, there is a compelling need to maintain the usage of the term 
‘judicial activism’ in order to contribute to that debate. There is an equally important need to 
find a baseline for discussions on JA, especially one that could somehow minimise the 
opportunity for misinformation and misunderstanding.  
Even though ‘the notion of activism remains inescapably localized’212it is arguable that the 
possibility still remains for finding a common useful question. Regardless of differences in 
constitutional power arrangements, localized conceptions of the judicial function, and the 
social and economic conditions that impact on determination of fundamental values, one 
thing remains constant: the court always exercises a certain amount of discretion which 
cannot be denied. This judicial discretion pertains to determination of material facts, 
applicable case authority, interpretive methodology, fundamental values to give effect to and 
so on and so forth. Therefore, in order to have a baseline for determining the existence of JA 
we should take cognizance of the almost universal acceptance of the supremacy of the 
constitution as the supreme law of the land.213 This then would peg the assessment of 
appropriate judicial discretion at the level of the Constitution.214 Consequently, the right 
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question may look something like this: what is the appropriate limitation (if any) to judicial 
discretion when interpreting constitutional provisions?215    
2.5        Proposing a ‘universal’ definition of judicial activism 
On the basis of the preceding discussion this chapter would like to propose the following 
definition of judicial activism; it is argued that this could have universal application for 
reasons that will be outlined shortly: 
Judicial activism is a strategy adopted by a judge(s) to arrive at a decision 
which goes against a shared understanding of the members of a society216on 
the limits of judicial discretion. 
2.5.1     Why ‘judicial activism’ 
In the main, this thesis proposes that it remains advisable to maintain the term ‘judicial 
activism’ even though there is much literature on the subject that is contradictory and 
incompatible because the only way to communicate new ideas at times, is to use old 
forms of expression.217  
2.5.2     Why ‘a strategy adopted by a judge(s) to arrive at a decision’ 
First and foremost, discourse on JA is on the role and function of the courts, regardless 
of whether the court system in a jurisdiction is divided into divisions or not.218 The 
‘court’ despite also referring to the institution, when it pertains to judicial decision-
making, specifically refers to the ‘human agents’ responsible for making the relevant 
decision.219 In this case, the word ‘judge(s)’ is sufficient to cover situations where 
different jurisdictions have different compositions of judges deciding on cases, and or 
whether they follow a system of unanimous decision-making or not at the Supreme 
Court level.220 Secondly, a primary function of the courts in any system is adjudication 
(decision-making). Consequently, even where a ‘judge(s)’ declines to hear a matter, 
that declining still takes the form of a judicial decision.221 
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The word ‘strategy’ is preferred due to the nature of the office of the judge. The person 
holding the office of the judge, always has their ‘own sense of the proper judicial role’ 
or ‘institutional propriety’ though differences may arise in that those perceptions may be 
‘formalistic or pragmatic’ etc.222In that sense, every judge understands the need for 
continuity and stability in the ‘totality of the law.’223 Consequently, no matter how 
extreme or ‘creative or imaginative’ the judge’s views might be when making a 
decision, he/she will craftily fashion his/her legal reasoning in a manner that ‘integrate[s 
it] into a [pre-existing] legal context’ in order to maintain the appearance of ‘continuity 
with the existing body of law’ to ensure its being ‘received as credible.’224  Every judge 
therefore, barring ‘incompetency and dishonesty’,225 has a personal sense of the goals 
and objectives of the judicial decision-making process and how those may best be 
achieved.226 It is in that context that judges identify the ‘framework which [should] 
guide…’ the determination of the issue before them. The frameworks in this case refer 
to the law that guides the judge in the determination of the material facts, applicable 
authority, interpretive methodology, whether an issue is a legal/policy/policy one etc. 
For that reason, it is argued that the word ‘strategy’ is ideal as one of its definitions is 
‘the framework which guides those choices that determine the nature and direction of’ 
something.’ In this case the ‘something’ becomes the judicial decision-making process.   
2.5.3        Why ‘a shared understanding’ 
A shared understanding on any issue is essential for effective communication among 
human beings.227 If human communication ‘lack[ed] secure foundations to put at least 
some matters beyond the possibility of disagreement’ then the very concept of ‘law’ or 
‘legal authority’ would lose its validity;228 for ‘law’ or ‘legal authority’ requires a 
foundation ‘to give it identity and unity, [and] to fix its scope and limits and indicate the 
source of its authority.229 In the context of the judicial decision-making process what is 
beyond disagreement is that its primary responsibility is to do justice, even though 
differences emerge over what ‘justice’ constitutes in fact.230 Suffice to say however, that 
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‘… it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance, that justice 
should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’231  
This chapter will not go into an analysis of what that means in actual practice but 
argues that the manifest-justice principle impliedly points to the existence of observers 
of the judicial justice delivery process external to the judges for whom it is of 
‘fundamental importance’ that they must see that justice is done. As already stated, the 
concept of justice has many definitions and redefinitions, but in the context of the 
principle that justice must be seen to be done, the criteria for substantive justice as 
advanced by Walzer attains significance.232 Walzer states that the criteria for the 
determination of the existence of substantive justice in a society is the extent to which 
the exercise of allocated power is done in a manner that is ‘… faithful to the shared 
understanding of [the] members [of that society].’ 233 In that context, ‘to override those 
understandings is to act unjustly.’234  
It is for that reason that the definition of JA in this chapter refers to ‘a shared 
understanding’. Further, ‘shared understanding’ is preferred in recognition of the fact 
that the concept and effect of JA is ‘inescapably localized’235 hence the participants in 
the ‘shared understanding’ will always be context-specific. 
2.5.4       Why ‘the limits of judicial discretion’ 
It has been argued that all debates on ‘judicial activism’ (regardless of the 
inconsistencies and contradictions of the attendant definitions) do evolve on the issue 
of the nature and scope of judicial discretion (or what should be). Further, it has already 
been identified by other scholars that ‘common to all definitions of judicial activism is 
the concept of judicial overreaching.’236 The differences emerge in whether the 
overreaching is justified or not.237  In order to discuss overreaching, first the right 
‘reach’ must be articulated. This in essence involves a discussion of the ‘limits’ or 
‘boundaries' of authority. It would seem logical therefore that the issue in defining JA 
should be focusing on the ‘limits of judicial discretion.’ 
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For instance, when defining JA in terms of a court’s handling of a legal/policy question, 
there is need to address the question whether the distinction between law and policy is 
always so clear-cut.  Experiences in adjudication points to an answer in the negative.238 
Even the determination between which issues pertain to law and which ones to policy, 
which may be the domain best handled by other branches of government involves a 
choice that brings in questions on the appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.239 
Similarly, when defining JA in terms of a court’s handling of precedent, as already 
discussed, there is need to draw a distinction between the level of discretion that is 
inherent in the rules governing the doctrine of precedent and the one that is considered 
‘activist’. Yet again therefore, the issue pertains to the limits of discretion. Similar 
arguments could be raised on issues of appropriate Constitutional interpretive 
methodologies (whether Court’s should fill in ‘gaps’ not envisaged by the framers or 
whether Court’s should use their interpretive role to bring about ‘social change’, or 
whether Court’s should use their own moral, religious or ideological beliefs to 
determine the content and nature of rights enshrined in the Constitution). 
Therefore, describing JA in terms of ‘limit of judicial discretion’ is broad enough to cater 
for differences in constitutional arrangements,240 applicable authority,241 conventions,242 
as well as cultural attitudes.243  
2.6       JA in the context of democracy, rule of law and constitutionalism 
The appropriate or inappropriate limits on judicial discretion can only be assessed in the 
context of democracy because it is generally accepted that it is the best form of 
government,244 even though a discussion of democratic theories is beyond the scope of this 
research. One of the main reasons why democracy is the best form of government is its 
ability to promote the peaceful co-existence of individuals through the promotion of 
‘noncoercive exercise of government authority.’245 Democracy achieves that through 
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regulating the allocation of power to ensure that the ‘powerful do not take unfair advantage of 
… those vulnerable to the exercise of’ that power.246 In this case, ‘power’ is defined as the 
capacity to ‘settle … matters, not only for oneself but for others’ with finality.247 State power 
therefore, unless ‘inhibited … divided, checked and balanced’ can become tyrannical.248 In 
this context, the exercise of a judicial function or role is itself an exercise of state power.249 It 
is in regulating the exercise of State power therefore that democracy preserves individual 
independence and freedom, and maximizes the chances of achieving equality and justice.250 
The maintenance of the appropriate use of all forms of state power251 to prevent its being 
used outside its limits however requires the existence of the rule of law,252 though the 
concept has no universally agreed definition.253 Similarly, ‘[c]onstitutionalism is a ‘key 
mechanism in the control of state powers’254 even though yet again, it is another concept that 
has no universally agreed definition.255 In an apparent chicken-and-egg cycle however, the 
existence of ‘the rule of law is an important test for constitutionalism’256 and similarly, it is not 
possible to uphold the rule of law without constitutionalism as the foundational value 
underlying the democratization process.257 It is for the foregoing reasons that this chapter will 
restrict the discussion on the limits of judicial discretion (and impliedly on any existence of 
JA) within the bounds of these two fundamental and mutually-reinforcing concepts: ‘rule of 
law’ and ‘constitutionalism.’  
2.6.1        The Rule of Law and its effect on the practice of JA 
The proponents of ‘going beyond the Constitution’ JA appear to advocate for its universal 
application258 as if the constitutional arrangements and attendant legal and social 
frameworks ‘were the same for all jurisdictions as it is in the United States’259 or their 
respective jurisdictions (if not the USA). These interlocutors appear oblivious to the fact that 
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‘going beyond the Constitution’ judicial activism260 would only serve to undermine the ‘rule of 
law’ and hence threaten chances of strengthening democracy in some jurisdictions.261 For 
instance, where the greatest need in a society is the need for the entrenchment of the rule of 
law, JA could serve to undermine the rule of law – for instance by driving the ‘voters [to] elect 
and re-elect officials who defy the court’ as a way of asserting their ‘political capacity’ against 
the courts whose ‘judicial activism’ they disapprove of.262 The rule of law (‘RoL’) is of crucial 
importance because it is the best tool for promoting peaceful co-existence among members 
of society whose search for individual autonomy and expression often gives rise to ‘heated 
and significant … disputes.’263 That is, human experience has shown that ‘the only 
alternative to the rule of law are the power of money, influence and guns’, which are 
‘corrupting influences’ and serve to uproot the very foundations of justice.264 But what is the 
rule of law? 
2.6.1.1       What the rule of law entails 
There is no universally agreed definition for RoL. However, it is acknowledged by ‘respected 
commentators’ that its most accurate description at the national level is the one contained in 
the eight elements espoused by Lord Bingham:265  
(1) The law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear and 
predictable; 
(2) Questions of legal rights and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of 
the law and not by the exercise of discretion; 
(3) The law must apply equally to all, except to the extent that objective differences 
justify a relevant differentiation; 
(4) The law must afford adequate protection for fundamental human rights; 
(5) Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, 
bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve; 
                                                          
260
 As defined in this chapter- thus in terms of going beyond the limits of shared understanding of judicial 
discretion whether in the adding rights to a Constitution or in the handling of precedent, or policy versus law 
question, or constitutional interpretive methodology etc. 
261
 J Daley, ‘Defining Judicial Restraint’ in Campbell and Goldsworthy (n 162 ) 304. 
262
 RV Rao, ‘The Apple Cart of Separation of Powers and Judicial Activism’ in Banerjea (n 1) 114 supporting his 
assertion with factual findings from India. 
263
Kirby (n 253)  200. 
264
 Ibid. See also, PH Russell, ‘Toward A General Theory of Judicial Independence’ in PH Russell and DM O’Brien 
eds., Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (University of 
Virginia Press, 2001) 7 (giving examples of judges who rule against government ‘because they are in the pocket 
of organised crime’ or ‘are closely aligned with an opposition interest group’).   
265
 Ibid (n 253) 196 citing  R McCorquodale in M Andenas and D Fairgrieve eds., Tom Bingham and the 
Transformation of Law: A Liber Amoricum (OUP, 2009) 140.  
74 
 
(6) Ministers and public officials at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on 
them reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred 
and without exceeding the limits of such powers; 
(7) Judicial and other adjudicative procedures must be fair and independent; and 
(8) There must be compliance by the state with its international legal obligations.266 
In this context element 6 in Lord Bingham’s list applies equally to judges who are themselves 
public officials and is ‘the core of the rule of law principle’ the obedience to which would take 
care of the rest.267 For example, the exercise of judicial power ‘without exceeding its limits’ is 
what would ensure that ‘[q]uestions of legal rights and liability … [are] resolved by 
application of the law and not by the exercise of discretion’; for the judge would then be 
mindful of the fine line between ‘interpretation’ and imposition of personal ideologies/values 
onto the law.268 Similarly, it is what would ensure that a judge in the decision-making process 
does ‘justice’ without undermining the requirement for the law to be clear and predictable. 
The fact that decisions can get overturned by higher courts does go to show that an 
individual judge’s conception of the ‘just’ resolution of the case can sometimes be 
erroneous.269   
The foregoing is among the reasons why it is arguable that judges bear the greatest 
responsibility for the existence of RoL as outlined in the totality of the eight (8) elements 
because: 
When the other agencies or wings of the State overstep their limits, the 
aggrieved parties can always approach the courts and seek redress against 
such transgression. When, however, the courts themselves are guilty of such 
transgression, to which forum would aggrieved parties appeal?270 
To illustrate this quandary, take for instance the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford271 which is 
universally acknowledged as an example of judicial activism (though the gone-horribly-wrong 
type).272 The Dred Scott judicial activism, though universally condemned now, had a 
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significant number of supporters in the USA during its time.273In brief, the US Supreme Court 
in 1857 invalidated a legislation abolishing slavery and held in essence that an African 
American (whether slave or born free) was not a citizen of the US and was the private 
property of their white slave owners hence the State could not deprive their owners of their 
‘property.’ Following that decision, African Americans had to wait until the coming into force 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution in 1868 (effectively 1872) in order to 
obtain recognition as citizens and not to be considered ‘private property.’274 In effect, as a 
result of JA, African Americans for 11 years (1857 - 1868) were not citizens despite the USA 
being their land of birth and presumably the only land they had memory of. It is for this 
reason that it has been observed that ‘of the different types of despotism, the judicial 
despotism is not only inexcusable, it is also the most…’ unjust.275 Hence the need to observe 
recognised limits to judicial power becomes all the more imperative.276 
Consequently, the RoL calls for limits to judicial discretion in the determination and 
application of the ‘law’. This begs the question- what limit (if any) does the RoL impose on 
judges’ discretion to develop the ‘law’ or fill in gaps in the ‘law’? In order to comply with the 
RoL the limits must inevitably be set by the law itself. Which ‘law’ then would this be? 
Since the RoL requires that no one should be above the law, there should be a law in any 
jurisdiction which is independent of the judges; which law even they must be subject to 
hence not at liberty to interpret or apply it as they deem fit. In most jurisdictions, that ‘law’ is 
the written constitution which is the supreme law of the land and often providing that it is the 
‘final arbiter.’  Therefore, it is the Constitution that must be taken to set the boundaries on the 
limits of judicial discretion in the interpretation and application of the law.  
2.6.1.2          The ‘Constitution,’ constitutional interpretive methodologies and RoL 
Constitutions are classified in various ways depending on the purpose for which the 
categorisation is sought. At the most rudimentary there are written and unwritten 
constitutions; in that sense the latter is exemplified by the Westminster constitutional  model, 
which has no single document whereas the former is exemplified by the US Constitutional 
model with a single document.277 Constitutional values in Britain have evolved as a matter of 
practice and custom, with the Legislature occupying a central place in its governance 
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matrix.278 The Westminster model supports Parliamentary Supremacy; the American model 
on the other hand, is founded on the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy.279 In order to 
have constitutional supremacy however, there is need to maintain ‘fidelity to the stipulations 
of the [written] constitution.’280 If Constitutions only contained language that was very clear 
and amenable to one precise meaning, issues of constitutional interpretation would not arise 
for there would be only one ordinary meaning of the text.  However, Constitutions also 
contain terms that are vague and ambiguous, which require interpretation and this has 
resulted in the development of different and at times opposing theories of constitutional 
interpretation. 
For instance, in their recent work Barber and Fleming281 provide a useful typology of the 
various approaches to constitutional interpretation282  that are reflected in the debates on the 
topic.283 These are: (1) Textualism, which seeks meaning from the plain words of the 
document. (2) Conceptualism draws meaning from the prevailing social consensus on what 
the words mean. (3) The Philosophic approach focuses on the broad concepts embodied in 
the words and draws meaning from the nature of things that the words refer to. (4) 
Originalism, on the other hand, aims to uphold the intentions or the original meanings which 
the framers or ratifiers or the founding generation ascribed to the document. (5) 
Structuralism focuses on the arrangement of offices, powers and institutional relationships 
as a guide to interpretation. (6) Doctrinalism accords primacy to judicial precedent and other 
doctrines of the courts. (7) Pragmatism seeks to give judicial meaning with reference to the 
preferences of the dominant political forces.284 8) Interpretivism is where the court must 
restrict its interpretation of the Constitution to the norms plainly specified or implied in the 
language in it;285 and by contrast non-interpretivism advocates for courts to protect values 
‘not mentioned in the Constitutions text or its pre-ratification history.’286 The arguments 
concerning appropriate constitutional interpretive methodologies are complex resulting in 
further divisions even within a given constitutional interpretive theory. To illustrate, advocates 
of non-interpretivism in the USA do so on the basis that most of the people in their 
generation or indeed most of their ancestors had no part in deciding the content of the USA 
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Constitution.287 However it is pertinent to note that whereas such arguments may have 
historical relevance within the USA- that the present generation did not participate in its 
adoption and ratification-the same would not necessarily hold in Malawi where the 
Constitution was adopted less than 20 years ago. This would suggest that the need to 
entrench the RoL precludes advocating for a one-size-fits-all approach to constitutional 
interpretive methodology, even though this chapter will not go into the merits or demerits of 
any of those methodologies since any attempt to do so would require a whole thesis on its 
own.  
Suffice to say for our purposes that the proponents of the various theories of constitutional 
interpretation must take into account the differences in historical, political and social 
circumstances that exist between jurisdictions if their aim is to promote the wider objective of 
entrenching the rule of law. For instance, the USA with its 200+ years of constitutional 
democracy cannot be equated to, say, India with a history of only about 50 years of 
democracy. In the discourse on JA in the USA, the text of the Constitution is not disregarded 
nor is ‘the conflict … about whether the Constitution is the fundamental normative standard 
in the American political system’; but rather it is about how to separate the Constitution itself 
from its interpretation (that is ‘interpretation’ not ‘fidelity’).288  On the other hand, in the case 
of India, it is the very text of the Constitution that stands to be undermined, and its fidelity 
challenged as a result of the JA of the Indian Supreme Court.289  
Consequently, where the need is to entrench a written Constitution as an authoritative 
source of normative standards in a society, there is a compelling need to promote fidelity to 
the text in order to give effect to the transition into a constitutional democracy.290 Further, the 
need for entrenching the RoL in emerging democracies therefore presents a stronger case 
for limiting a court’s discretion in Constitutional interpretive methodologies so that a judge 
does not amend the constitution under the guise of interpreting it;291 especially, where the 
written Constitution restricts the power of amendment.292 In order to enforce those limits 
therefore, there is a corresponding need for a shared understanding among the citizenry as 
to the meaning of the constitutional provisions. This therefore requires looking to the 
meaning of the words of the Constitution alone as they would be interpreted by the 
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contemporary man on the street.293  For that reason and in those circumstances, there is a 
stronger case for the constitutional interpretive methods that are subject to intense debate in 
the USA such as (though not limited to) originalism, textualism, and interpretivism.294  
However, the RoL and how it relates to the overarching objective of the primary duty of the 
law to be an instrument for justice has raised complex questions especially in the face of the 
practice of apartheid that was rooted in the legislation and constitutional amendments.295 
This has led to some courts holding that the ‘law exists for the protection of minorities’.296 But 
the RSA situation challenges that at its core- for in that case, it was the majority that needed 
protection against a powerful minority. Similarly cases in India point to the existence of 
powerful minorities whose source of power is economical.297 This highlights the need to 
watch against always portraying minorities as ‘powerless’ – for blindness to that reality may 
create or perpetuate a scenario where the majority are in fact reduced into the ‘vulnerable’ 
group and the minority are so ‘privileged’ that they are the ‘powerful’ (and hence oppressive) 
group.298  
This is the reason why any discussion on JA must avoid any essentialist approach for 
sources of power may vary considerably within different jurisdictions.299 Thus it is contended 
that in the interests of the rule of law the advantages of restricting the judicial interpretation 
of the constitutions to norms articulated or implied in the language of a given constitution in 
emerging democracy far outweighs the disadvantages.  
2.6.2        Constitutionalism and its effect on the practice of JA 
The mere existence of a constitution does not point to the existence of a constitutional 
democracy in a country. Thus a distinction can be made between a constitutional democracy 
(in the liberal democratic sense) and a democracy in which the constitution may actually be 
used to legitimise absolute rule.300 For instance, Malawi’s Kamuzu Banda’s dictatorship had 
a constitution which legitimated his single-party state and his life presidency.301 There is 
therefore a normative quality to constitutional democracy beyond the existence of a 
constitution as a legal document. The normative essence emanates from the fact that 
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underlying constitutional democracy are some fundamental values aimed at regulating the 
exercise of state power and its relationship with the citizens. These include fairness, justice, 
equality, separation of powers, due process of law, etc.; the antithesis of which is arbitrary 
rule where the state exercises its power without restraint or checks and balances.  It is 
generally acknowledged that the existence of ‘constitutionalism’ is the foundational stone for 
constitutional democracy without which there can be no ‘principled balancing of the exercise 
of state authority;’302 even though there’s no universally agreed definition of the term.303 
Constitutionalism according to liberal democratic discourse essentially revolves around the 
two issues of limited government and individual rights.304 In this context the focus is on 
safeguarding against arbitrary use of power by the executive and legislative branches as 
outlined below: 
The idea of constitutionalism involves the proposition that the exercise of 
governmental power shall be bound by rules, rules prescribing the procedure 
according to which legislative and executive acts are to be performed and 
delimiting their permissible content – Constitutionalism becomes living reality 
to the extent that these rules curb arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact 
observed by wielders of political power, and to the extent that within the 
forbidden zones upon which authority may not trespass there is significant 
room for the enjoyment of individual liberty.305 
Scholars have pointed out the deficiencies of the liberal democratic theory’s conception of 
constitutionalism in that it ignores the impact of sociological factors on the constitutional 
development of a nation.306  This thesis would also like to articulate an additional deficiency- 
namely that liberal democracy appears to exclude from its focus, the exercise of 
governmental power in the form of judicial acts. It appears liberal democratic discourse 
excludes judicial power from its assessment of ‘political power.’307 However, a broader 
understanding of ‘political power’ includes the exercise of judicial power especially in the 
context of judicial activism. That is, when a court makes determinations on matters of 
governmental policy as opposed to law, or in its interpretation goes beyond the shared 
understanding of the meaning of the text of ‘posited rules,’ it necessarily assumes political 
power. Further, as an arm of government itself under the doctrine of separation of powers, 
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the Judiciary should equally be subject to constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial 
power as it is itself state power that can be abused to the detriment of the rights of some 
individuals.308 
In order to bring judicial power within the ambit of state power that must be controlled 
therefore, there is need to articulate clearly – which power? It is arguable that the greatest 
power wielded by the judiciary is the power of interpretation of the written constitution for as 
it is aptly postulated by Whittaker and Zimmerman: 
[To date] we still have not managed to find a … formula which defines 
the line to be drawn between what may be properly classified as 
‘interpretation’ and what is usually referred to as ‘judicial development’ 
of the law.309 
The written constitution in most jurisdictions provides that it is the supreme law of the land 
hence the final arbiter.310 However, the judiciary is given the mandate to give effect to the 
provisions of that written constitution through interpretation.311 As a consequence, there’s an 
internal tension between constitutionalism and the judicial power of interpretation because 
constitutionalism’s greatest ‘virtue’ is ‘not merely in reducing [state authority, of which the 
judicial authority is one] but in effecting that reduction by advance imposition of rules.’312  
Constitutionalism requires that those prior rules be capable of being ‘rationally known’313 by 
‘the citizenry’ whose understanding of the Constitution and desire to enforce the legitimate 
use of state authority is ‘central to the entrenchment of constitutionalism.’314 In this context, if 
as argued by others, judges are to be at liberty to add norms or values beyond those 
articulated or implied by the language of the constitution as ‘rationally known’ by the 
citizenry, then constitutionalism cannot be said to exist.315 For in that case, there would be 
no regime of advanced rules regulating the judicial power of interpretation as de facto ‘in 
such regime there is no identifiable constitution at all, merely a practice of [subjective] 
constitutional interpretation.’316  
It is in this context that de Smith’s description of constitutionalism becomes even more useful 
even though he himself did not apply it to judicial power of interpretation in that 
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‘constitutionalism becomes living reality to the extent that … rules curb arbitrariness of 
[judicial] discretion [in the interpretation of the constitutional itself].’317 Therefore, the 
appropriate limit to judicial discretion in the interpretation of the written constitution becomes 
the shared understanding of the governed of the norms articulated or implied in its language. 
An autochthonous constitution by definition enjoys democratic legitimacy because of the 
element of public participation in its creation. For that reason, it has been observed 
elsewhere that ‘constitutionalism can never take root in Africa if there is no massive 
consultation with traditional culture, custom and legal precedents’ by the judges.318 
On that basis, this thesis submits that there is positive and negative JA even though all 
forms may involve the judge going beyond shared understanding of the limits of judicial 
discretion. Positive JA therefore occurs whenever the judge goes beyond the shared 
understanding of limits of judicial discretion within the fine subjective distinctions of 
law/policy, politics/legal, law/morality but still acts within the overall objective limits 
prescribed by the Constitution. Negative JA connotes that which goes beyond the shared 
understanding of the objective limits of judicial discretion as articulated or implied in the 
language of the Constitution- for it is that type of JA that undermines the RoL and 
constitutionalism. This becomes even more crucial in a state where the written constitution 
serves a transformational purpose marking the end of an era and the creation of a new 
one.319In that context fidelity to the shared understanding of the meaning of the constitutional 
text assumes a democratic imperative which should not be curtailed or otherwise 
compromised in the name of JA.  
2.7     Conclusion 
The power of the judicial branch of government to interpret laws, including the written 
constitution where that exists is itself a form of state power hence should be subject to 
restrictions independent of the judges themselves that are capable of being known by the 
governed. However, for as long human capacity to predict the future with certainty remains 
inadequate, judicial discretion in judicial decision-making is inevitable for purposes of the 
delivery of justice. Nevertheless, since the exercise of the judicial discretion may give rise to 
situations where judges fashion decisions that purport to expand the common understanding 
of certain fundamental values and rights under the guise of judicial activism, there is a 
compelling need to propose a principled approach within which such discretion is exercised. 
In the preceding discussion it has been shown that the twin mutually-reinforcing doctrines of 
rule of law and constitutionalism may offer democratically legitimate parameters for the 
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exercise of such judicial discretion. To that extent, such an arrangement would provide 
adequate safeguards against the inappropriate manifestation of judicial activism which may 
otherwise be counterproductive within certain situations of constitutional transformation. 
Above all it has been proposed that such a principled conception of the exercise of judicial 
discretion provides a more comprehensible definitional content to the otherwise unwieldy 
phenomenon known as judicial activism. In other words it may make more sense to discuss 
judicial activism from the premise of judicial discretion since all judges exercise one form of 
choice or another whenever they adjudicate over a given dispute or issue. It is the incidence 
of such judicial choice within the applicable constitutional parameters that determines 
whether one court is practicing judicial activism or not; the fidelity of that decision to the 
shared understanding of what is constitutionally permissible determines whether such 
judicial activism is negative or positive depending upon how each decision impinges upon 
the corresponding notions of rule of law and constitutionalism. Such a definition of judicial 
activism would facilitate the creation of a more coherent narrative about a subject that has 
hitherto been inherently discordant and conceptually ill-defined. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Historical Interaction between Constitutional Reforms and Judicial 
Behaviour 
 
‘Judicial decision making is not only affected by legal precedent, but also by 
changing political and historical trends’ 1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been acknowledged that legal culture has the potential to inhibit the transformative 
agenda of constitutional reforms. 2 In other words in order for one to fully appreciate the 
development of judicial power one needs to appreciate that it is affected by the historical 
path along which a given society has travelled. Thus it has been suggested that the 
decisions made and actions taken fifty or even one hundred years ago affect both the 
actions of and attitudes towards the judiciary.3 Therefore, besides the usual influence of 
legal precedent on judicial choices, a keen awareness of the underlying political and 
historical trends will aid in forming a clearer view of the behaviour of the courts within a given 
context.  
It is widely acknowledged that the governance, socio-economic and political problems of 
African countries like Malawi are ‘to a large extent rooted in [their] past’, especially colonial 
and several-decades-after-colonialism past.4 Similarly generally accepted is the crucial 
importance of a ‘national Constitution’ in providing a foundational structure for good 
governance, rule of law and the protection of human rights. Interestingly, as will be 
discussed below, Malawi in terms of both its colonial5 and even post-colonial past6 has at 
every stage had a national Constitution that provided ‘the basic framework for governance’.7 
Regardless of the presence of such constitutional documents, Malawi’s history is riddled with 
unbridled colonial and nationalist despotism. 
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This chapter therefore delves into the historical, political and legal developments in Malawi in 
order to provide the relevant background to the discussions in subsequent chapters. This 
chapter provides a definition of ‘elitism’ and discusses how colonial elitism divided Malawi 
(then Nyasaland) into two societies- urban and rural, which resulted in the rise of ‘nationalist 
elitism.’ The ensuing discussion aims to highlight how though different in form, the two types 
of elitism (i.e. colonial and nationalist) effectively disrupted and distorted African governance 
systems which were largely participatory and consultative, and replaced them with a 
paternalistic type of governance model that largely excluded the non-elites.  In appreciation 
of the fact that the sense of ownership and the corresponding feeling of identification with a 
national constitution on the part of the citizens is ‘central to the entrenchment of 
constitutionalism’8 the aim is to show how both colonial and nationalist elitism served to 
hinder the development of constitutionalism and the rule of law within the Malawian society. 
Specifically highlighted in this context is how the High Court system, with its purported 
unlimited jurisdiction and the incorporation and enforcement of human rights (albeit in varied 
forms within the different Constitutions) only existed on paper for the ordinary (and large 
majority) African citizen.  This further goes to show that the mere existence of a laudable 
Constitution is not sufficient to bring about the culture of the rule of law and constitutionalism 
as a democratic value.  
Consequently, it is hoped that the discussion in this chapter will provide a basis for analysing 
the development (if any) of constitutionalism and rule of law in Malawi post-the 1994 
Constitution. Further, since manifestations of ‘judicial activism’ have been related to 
‘constitutional elitism’ it is hoped that a discussion of the social transformative character of 
the 1994 Constitution and its emphasis on participatory democracy will provide an 
appropriate framework for an analysis of judicial (in)activism of the judiciary in Malawi by 
interrogating the impact of judicial decisions on the entrenchment of the rule of law and 
constitutionalism in Malawi.  
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3.2 The Colonial Constitutional Transformation Process in Nyasaland: The rise of 
Colonial elitism, and judicial consolidation of Executive, legislative and judicial 
powers without the consent of the governed 
3.2.1 The labelling of non-European societies as ‘savage’ and ‘primitive’  
When Europeans arrived in non-European lands like Malawi, they found human beings living 
within societies unlike their own and formed their own views about those new societies 
largely arising from what has been described as ‘excessive parochialism.’9 Within such a 
prejudiced context, the general conclusion of the European was that such non-European 
societies were ‘savage’ and/or ‘primitive’ because they lived in societies without ‘law’ and 
‘order’ and  were only governed by their custom and traditions which they followed 
‘slavishly’, ‘unwittingly’, through ‘mental inertia’ without ever desiring to break free.10 In this 
case, the western11 concepts of law, governance, government, etc. were taken to be the 
standard for ‘civilised’ so that in the end ‘the distinction between “civilisation” … and… 
“savagery” was not one of natures, but of laws, customs, or individual states of character.’12 
On that basis ‘civilised’ law and values were western law and values only and in order to be 
recognised as ‘law’ at all, the non-European systems had to ‘fit’ at least some basic criteria 
set by the Europeans in accordance with their ‘habits of thought and language…’13 Later, 
detailed studies by western anthropologists of the so-called ‘savage’ societies led them to 
conclude that indeed they had laws, governance structures and courts albeit being ‘primitive’ 
as opposed to ‘civilised’ and modern.14 However, it was argued that such ‘laws’, ‘governance 
structures’ and ‘courts’ were only classified as such because they were made to ‘fit’ wherein 
their ‘fitting’ into those descriptions was really ‘no more than the adoption of new 
terminology.’15  Further, that all ‘primitive’ societies could not be said to have ‘legal systems’ 
since the appropriate usage of that term required that it ‘be restricted to the small group of’ 
western nations ‘who have developed a well-defined, organised, continuous body of legal 
ideas and methods, reaching the dignity and solidarity of a legal system.’’16  
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It is in that context that colonial elitism developed and flourished. The word ‘elitism’ has been 
defined in various ways but this thesis will adopt the definition by Jaworski and Thurlow 
which is:  
Making a claim to exclusivity, superiority, and/or distinctiveness on the grounds 
of status, knowledge, authenticity, taste, erudition, experience, insight, wealth or 
any other quality warranting the speaker/author to take a higher moral, aesthetic, 
intellectual, material, or any other form of standing in relation to another subject 
(individual or group).17 
Europeans thus considered that the advancement of their laws, institutions of governance 
and customs rendered them fit to govern over Africans even without their consent since they 
felt that they (Europeans) knew better and had better capacity to know what was good for 
the African (even better than the Africans themselves).18 In that context, whereas the 
Europeans even in those days acknowledged that a ‘just government’ is one that derives 
power from the ‘consent of the governed’, this was not extended to the ‘savage’ because in 
their reasoning, ‘neither … savages, nor felons need be governed with anything 
denominated as their consent.’19 In this sense therefore, the ‘primitive’ laws were to be 
‘civilised’ through the adoption of western values systems, laws etc. For example, even 
though they claimed that the right to property was a fundamental value governing their 
‘civilised’ laws, they did not recognise the communal property ownership systems of the 
’savages’ and went on to forcibly take the land away for distribution among themselves.20 
Thus colonialism thrived on the elitism of Europeans who felt entitled to rule without the 
consent and participation of the governed. Such colonial elitism was practiced in Malawi and 
also made its way into decisions of colonial Courts as will be discussed below.  
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3.2.2 Colonial elitism and the colonial judiciary: the marginalisation of the governed 
African through judicial pronouncements 
3.2.2.1 Understanding the ‘governed’: the ‘governance’ and ‘judicial decision-making’ 
systems of pre-colonial Malawi21 
Even though much of Malawi’s history before the arrival of the Europeans remains unwritten 
and unknown,22 it is now beyond dispute that when the Europeans arrived in Malawi they 
found its African inhabitants organised in tribal groups under the ‘governance’ of chiefs who 
in turn had indunas (advisors) to help them govern. The chief and the indunas were 
simultaneously the executive, legislature and the judiciary of their respective communities.  
Depending on the particular community, some chiefs were designated as paramount, 
meaning they had authority over other chiefs. The African chiefs administered what is now 
referred to as ‘customary law’ which was not codified.23 Similarly, even though different in 
form from the European type of court system and judicial procedures, these tribal groups 
had their own court systems and procedures that applied the ‘unwritten customary law to 
settle disputes and punish the guilty.’24 The smaller disputes were initially heard by the family 
heads, and an appeal from that forum of first instance came to the village heads and 
subsequently to the chief where necessary. However, the village heads and/or chiefs did not 
exercise judicial power on their own but rather acted with advice from the chief’s body of 
advisors. In a way therefore, through the application of established procedures and 
processes (albeit unwritten), a decision affecting the community could only be made after the 
community had been fully consulted; this aspect points to a form of ‘democratic governance’ 
even in the very exercise of judicial power.25 As Nkhata has correctly pointed out, in this way 
judicial ‘decision making in most pre-colonial Malawian societies was characterised by 
consultation and was very participatory.’26  
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3.2.2.2  ‘Savages … need [not] be governed with anything denominated as their 
consent’?27 
The protectorate in Nyasaland was established without the full consent of those governed 
under it.28 Even though in international law ‘there is no single and unified type of 
protectorate’,29 for purposes of establishing a just government, however there is need for 
express authority to be given to the protecting State by the competent governing authority of 
the protected territory through a treaty.30 In the context of Malawi (formerly called at first 
British Central Africa {BCA} and later Nyasaland)31 despite the existence of paramount 
chiefs like the Chewa in the Central Region and the Ngoni in the North, there was no chief 
with overall authority over the whole territory. Nevertheless, although Harry Johnston (on 
behalf of the British government) only signed treaties with a handful of chiefs, a British 
Protectorate was nevertheless declared over BCA/Nyasaland including areas not covered 
under the existing treaties. 32  As Hara states, ‘the declaration of the protectorate (was) not 
based on some “social contract” among the various peoples in the territory.’33 This means 
that the British Government did not have the ‘consent of the governed’ to declare a 
protectorate on some of the areas that they did in Nyasaland since they had lacked express 
authority from the governing authorities, namely chiefs. In fact, the rest of the land was 
acquired through land grabs backed by either warfare or other forms of coercion.34 
The lack of consent however, did not end there as it extended to other crucial areas.35  
However, for present purposes the discourse will be restricted to ownership of land as it 
encapsulates and illustrates the problem adequately. Despite the existence of two distinct 
traditional governance systems in Malawi- the matrilineal and patrilineal systems-land 
ownership in both systems under customary law was (and still is) initially principally vested in 
the chief on trust for the entire community.36 In turn the land vests in the family head on trust 
for the whole family.37 In view of that, it could be argued that even those chiefs who signed 
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treaties with Harry Johnston did not intend to sign away their judicial jurisdiction over land 
matters among others.38 That however, did not stop the colonial British Government from 
appropriating for itself powers not contemplated or supported by the consent of the Africans. 
To put this within its legal and historical context, formal British jurisdiction in Nyasaland was 
first exercised under the Africa Orders in Council 1889-1898. However, the most important 
and enduring instrument around which the colonial constitutional framework revolved was 
the British Central Africa (BCA) Order in Council of 1902 (hereinafter the ‘1902 OIC’).39 This 
statutory instrument is widely acknowledged as the first Constitution in Nyasaland40 and 
although amended on several occasions, lasted in its application till 1961.41 The document 
conferred on the Commissioner both executive and legislative jurisdiction in the 
Protectorate.42 The 1902 OIC authorised the Commissioner to make Ordinances, inter alia, 
‘for the peace, order and good government of all persons in BCA.’43 However, it placed a 
limitation on the legislative powers of the Commissioner by stipulating that in promulgating 
the ordinances ‘the Commissioner shall respect existing laws and customs except so far as 
the same may be opposed to justice or morality (original emphasis).’44 Further, by its very 
nature as a protectorate, the true legal status of the territory of Nyasaland was that of a 
foreign territory and its inhabitants being foreigners for purposes of determining the scope of 
British jurisdiction in the territory. Strictly speaking therefore in law the British could not claim 
unlimited jurisdiction.45 However, the 1902 OIC set up a High Court of unlimited jurisdiction 
over all persons and all matters, even though as discussed earlier, some chiefs had not 
signed away their judicial mandate or jurisdiction.46 Clearly therefore, the constitutional order 
established by the 1902 OIC did not derive from the consent of the governed, especially the 
exercise of judicial power; rather it ‘was predicated on the objectives of the colonial 
regime.’47 
In the course of time, Harry Johnston successfully attracted ‘a … greater European 
presence’48 which gave rise to ‘the struggle for the control of’49 land and natural resources 
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for economic gain.50 The developments created a critical need among the European settlers 
for the introduction of private land, private goods and private property, 51 concepts which are 
alien to Malawian customary law even up to the present.52 Further, they pressed for the 
Crown to extend its jurisdiction beyond mere protection, to jurisdiction over all spheres of the 
Protectorate’s affairs.53 The greatest hurdle to this imperial ambition was the jurisdiction of 
chiefs over their respective communities and land.54  
The colonial authority therefore sought for ways in which it could alter the jurisdiction of the 
Chiefs and break their power over their subjects and land in order to enhance its own 
prestige and to consolidate its rule over Africans. This was however, done incrementally.55 
For instance, the Commissioner (later called Governor) was given authority to appoint and 
dismiss chiefs56 despite the fact that under customary law, chiefs inherited the throne 
through established systems of matrilineal or patrilineal heirs.57 That is to say, under the 
matrilineal system, the heir to the chieftaincy was the eldest child of the reigning chief’s 
sister and in a patrilineal society it was the son of the reigning chief. Further, within the 
districts, District Collectors substantially took over the administrative and executive functions 
of the African chiefs.58  
3.2.2.3  The role of the colonial judiciary in the marginalisation of the African: 
achieved by means of ‘judicial activism’? 
The chiefs’ jurisdiction over land however remained largely intact until the Consular Courts 
(precursor to High Court) had the opportunity to adjudicate on disputes relating to land in 
cases such as  Cox-v-African Lakes Corporation (1901); Paolucci-v- The Commissioner of 
Mines (1904); and Crown Prosecutor-v- The British Central Africa Company Ltd (1904), all 
decided by Justice Nunan.  
The learned judge declared in these cases that ‘all land in this country is held either 
mediately or immediately from the Crown’ and that the Commissioner as representative of 
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the King of Britain had the sole ultimate jurisdiction in all native affairs.59 Viewed within the 
context of land ownership and authority, it must be clear to see that the judgments of Nunan 
rendered nugatory the provision in the 1902 OIC which enjoined the Commissioner to 
‘respect existing native laws and customs....’60 Although as regards lands held in private 
hands Judge Nunan’s ruling on surrender of title by the natives to the colonial authority was 
rejected by the East African Court of Appeal,61 it has been proposed elsewhere that the 
decision of the court in Bechuanaland (another British Protectorate)62  on a provision 
identical to Article 12 (3) of the 1902 OIC significantly influenced the evolution of the conduct 
of the colonial government towards a heavy-handed treatment of natives in Nyasaland.63 
The case in point is that of Tshekedi Khama and Bathoen v. The High Commissioner;64 
where one of the main issues was what the meaning of a provision such as Article 12 (3) of 
the 1902 OIC was. In its decision the court held that the use of the word ‘respect’ did not 
mean that the High Commissioner was prohibited entirely from altering such law and 
custom, but only that he was required to treat it with some consideration.65 Incidentally 
another question raised by that case was whether the Crown’s jurisdiction was limited by a 
treaty; in answer to questions submitted by the Court, the Secretary of State stated that the 
Crown had unfettered and unlimited power to legislate. Oddly enough, the Court through its 
decision validated such powers66 and in so doing consolidated the illegitimate colonial 
appropriation of state authority contrary to the constitutional provision limiting such powers to 
the extent of their compatibility with existent native laws and customs. As Morris puts it: 
“... the judge, it would seem, found that the only ... course to follow was ... to 
evade the issue and to abandon any attempt to delimit the bounds of the 
executive’s authority in these spheres ...virtually the [entire] ... judicial ... 
opinion ... was prepared to justify an expansionist policy in the field of 
jurisdiction ...”67 
Some would describe the decisions of Judge Nunan and the court in the Khama Case as 
excessive judicial deference to the executive and as such would never fit the description of 
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judicial activism. However, other scholars like Campbell and Green disagree with the 
categorisation of excessive deference as ‘judicial restraint’ arguing rather that excessive 
judicial deference to either the executive or legislature is in actual fact judicial activism as it 
involves the court through judicial decree giving to the executive or legislature powers not 
envisaged by the express terms of a constitution.68 In this context, since there is ample 
evidence to show that where it was necessary ‘to annex African protectorates’69 judiciaries in 
both protectorates and ‘at the highest level in Britain’70 interpreted the law (whatever its 
terms) in a manner that rendered the law ‘sufficiently flexible to ensure full governmental 
powers in a protectorate,’71 then Campbell and Green’s characterisation of such judicial 
restraint as a form of judicial activism carries significant weight. Thus it is argued that the 
colonial courts through JA in the form of excessive deference to the Executive helped to 
consolidate the Executive and legislative powers of the colonial rulers.  
Even going by the definition of JA as proposed in this thesis, the judges in the cases cited 
went against the ‘shared understanding of the limits of judicial authority held by the 
governed’, since the governed in this case were the Africans and these had not ceded the 
chiefs jurisdiction over land and judicial matters to the colonial rulers. That is, the Nunan 
judgements undermined and foiled any claim by Africans that they had any jurisdiction left in 
them to exercise over their lands or in any other spheres. In other words the jurisprudence 
served to consolidate British colonial rule over all matters including land at the expense of 
the Africans and their rulers.72 The significance of this process is that it is the courts through 
their jurisprudence which seem to have substantially altered the applicable constitutional 
framework contrary to the initial protectorate agreements. Thus, original arrangements for 
the colonial rulers to respect native law and custom and to observe treaty terms were 
reduced to being binding in honour only. In fact, in Nyasaland, the colonial rulers went as far 
as stating that treaty obligations were not enforceable against the Crown if abrogated as a 
matter of an ‘Act of State.’73 
Even when the management of Nyasaland Protectorate ‘passed from Foreign Office to 
Colonial Office Management’74 in 1907, the plight of African chiefs did not improve.75 Despite 
the fact that the Governor76 (replacing the title of ‘Commissioner’) was to utilise traditional 
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leadership,77 he still wielded unlimited authority over chiefs because he was the appointing 
(and firing) authority78 contrary to traditional practice under customary law.  
Subsequent developments in Southern Rhodesia further had an impact on the colonial 
administration of Nyasaland through the application of the doctrine of precedent.79 That is, 
the highest court of appeal in Nyasaland at that time was the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in England.80 Several decisions of the Privy Council which applied under the settled 
doctrine of stare decisis and precedent elaborate the capacity of the courts to consolidate 
colonial jurisdiction beyond what was initially contemplated by the natives. Such 
developments are an interesting phenomenon in the context of constitution-making 
processes and the values which underlie the applicability and legitimacy of the governing 
authority as seen through judicial lenses. 
In one case the court held that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, which also applied to 
Nyasaland, gave the Crown absolute power to impose any law in a Protectorate as if the 
territory had been acquired by cession or conquest.81 In Re Southern Rhodesia82 it was 
decided that when the Crown as the protecting power became the conquering power in 1893 
after the defeat of the local chief and by the authority of Orders in Council established its 
authority, sanctioning a system of white settlement and native reserves, it thereby acquired  
and exercised the right to dispose of all the lands not then in private ownership; thus  by 
such acts the Crown appropriated to itself ownership of the land to all intents and purposes 
as completely as any sovereign could be owner of lands which were publici juris. In this way 
the Judicial Committee in effect sanctioned the breach of the initial agreements which 
conferred legitimate control to protect the natives in the first place. In the philosophy of the 
Privy Council, in Re Southern Rhodesia ‘ [some peoples] are so low in the scale of social 
organisation [that it] would be idle to impute to such people some shadow of rights known to 
our [English] law.’83 
In a subsequent decision the Privy Council held that the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act made 
the jurisdiction acquired by the Crown in a protected country indistinguishable in legal effect 
from what might be acquired by conquest.84 More significantly the court observed that it was 
implicit from its decisions in both Crewe and Re Southern Rhodesia that what was done by 
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the Crown could not be impugned since any Order in Council or proclamation made under 
that legislation was an act of State. Thus the Crown was not bound by any convention not to 
interfere with the rights, laws and customs of natives since such a convention could not 
legally interfere with the subsequent exercise of the sovereign powers of the Crown, nor 
could such a convention invalidate the subsequent Orders in Council.85 Finally, in The North 
Charterland Exploration Company (1910) Ltd-v-R 86 it was held that the legislative authority 
of the Crown over a protectorate was the prerogative of the Crown; this prerogative was 
deemed unfettered except by the Imperial Parliament.  
The impact of the judicial pronouncements was probably stronger in Nyasaland than in other 
places87 due to the absence of treaties with native chiefs88 which may have sought to restrict 
the exercise of the Crown’s jurisdiction.89 The legal position became abundantly clear since 
in the opinions of the Law Officers of 1895 and 1899 and the decisions of the Privy Council, 
the Government could deal with the land in any way it liked for the exercise of the 
Protectorate.90  
However, as far as the land issue was concerned, the interests of the natives were always in 
conflict with those of settlers.91 In this respect the British Government was faced with the 
delicate problem of reconciling its moral obligations towards the native populations and 
satisfying the expectations of the white settlers, most of whom wanted to emulate their kin in 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or even South Africa where native or aboriginal rights had 
been sacrificed in favour of the white settlers.92 That is, in spite of the judicial decisions, the 
opinions of the Law Officers of the Crown, and the language of the Orders in Council 
themselves, there were compelling moral (if not actually legal) limitations on the jurisdiction 
of the British in Nyasaland, which they appear to have become conscious of.93 The moral 
aspect was in relation to the question of the colonial government’s claim to alienate ‘Crown 
land’ to private owners. The problem here was whether the so-called ‘Crown lands’ were at 
the disposal of the Government or whether they were merely held by the Government in trust 
and for the benefit of the native inhabitants.94  
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It appears that in the final resolution of the land question, the moral obligation prevailed over 
the purely legal powers that the Crown might otherwise have exercised, and this moral 
obligation was translated into law in the form of the Nyasaland Protectorate (Native Trust 
land) Order in Council, 1936. This statutory instrument put it beyond doubt that what had 
been described as ‘Crown land’ over which the Government claimed to exercise unlimited 
jurisdiction, was in reality African trust land.95 In light of that position I would have to concur 
with Wanda’s view that the enactment of the African Trust Land Order in Council, 1936 
suggests that although the Crown had acquired the widest possible jurisdiction in the 
Protectorate which effectively placed its acts beyond question in any British Court, 
nevertheless the exercise of such broad jurisdiction was usually tempered by certain moral 
constraints. Indeed, in a rather curious state of affairs, in the 1920s and 1930s the moral 
constraint was probably the strongest force operating more on the policy makers than on the 
judges.96 
In fact, the position of judges did not change over time; it would seem that the courts of this 
period often championed the Crown’s exercise of the widest possible jurisdiction. In a 
decision that had an impact on other African British Protectorates such as Nyasaland, Judge 
Griffin (who had been a Judge of the High Court in Nyasaland between 1906 and 1914) in 
1930 when he was Chief Justice of Uganda, held that ‘the terms of a treaty [between 
Europeans and African rulers]  are not part of the municipal law’ and that the treaty was not 
the creature of the legislature and was not made by legislative authority so as to bind the 
subject or afford the subjects rights in a court of law.97 In a way, this decision can be likened 
to the US Dred Scott Case where the court stripped Scott of status under the Constitution 
since by refusing to acknowledge the legal validity of the treaties between the African rulers 
and European settlers, the judge in effect stripped Africans of status before the European 
laws that were enforceable in the High court. In essence, the judiciary adopted the position 
that matters relating to the treatment of natives by colonial authorities ‘were not to be the 
subject of judicial scrutiny and were dealt with administratively. Moreover, individuals that 
had been subject to mistreatment had no rights and were not (to be) protected by the 
courts.’98 
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Sadly, the culture endured and manifested itself even in the decision of a judge widely 
acclaimed as a champion of English judicial activism, Lord Denning.99 In 1956, in the case of 
Nyali Ltd-v-Attorney General,100 Lord Denning L.J. though affirming that the Crown’s 
jurisdiction in a protectorate ‘is limited to such jurisdiction as the Crown has acquired by 
treaty’ among other ‘lawful means’ nevertheless went on to hold that: 
Although the jurisdiction of the Crown in the protectorate is in law a limited 
jurisdiction, nevertheless the limits may in fact be extended indefinitely… 
[and when that happens,] The Courts themselves will not mark out the 
limits (for the Executive). They will not examine the treaty or grant under 
which the Crown acquired jurisdiction. The Courts rely on the 
representatives of the Crown to know the limits of its jurisdiction and to 
keep within it. Once jurisdiction is exercised by the Crown, the Courts will 
not permit it to be challenged. 101 
Even though the Nyali decision involved a Kenyan case, the principles pronounced in it as 
applying to the legal status of treaties vis-à-vis protectorates became of general application 
to all British Protectorates hence had an impact on Nyasaland as well. The treaties were 
thus, even by Lord Denning, stripped of any legal significance before British Courts. It is 
clear therefore that in Protectorates like Nyasaland, the Crown’s jurisdiction was made 
unlimited through judicial pronouncements rather than by the treaties or agreements from 
which the original jurisdiction was derived.102 The practical effect of such judicial decisions 
was that the colonial authorities could ‘break agreements with African rulers’103 and still 
‘avoid the embarrassment of having to justify (such) action in the court…’104 
It is not surprising therefore that along the same period, in Nyasaland, the Federation of 
Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland ‘was imposed on the people of 
Nyasaland and Rhodesia despite (the) opposition from both politicians and traditional rulers’ 
through the 1953 Federation (Constitution) Order-in-Council.105 Such blatant disregard of the 
express wishes of the natives carried on even after Nyasaland ceased to be a British 
Protectorate in 1961 when ‘the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference granted 
Nyasaland a responsible government.’106 In fact, according to the available contemporary 
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evidence, the people of Nyasaland were being described by the colonial rulers as ‘backward 
and underdeveloped’ and even ‘primitive’.107 The imperialist conduct of the colonial 
government in Nyasaland was justified by a reputable judge in England, Lord Devlin as 
‘benevolent despotism.’108 The view of Lord Devlin, which he asserted as being ‘sincerely 
held’ in England, was that the standards of rule of law and good government as ‘would be 
universally accepted as applicable’ when governing people in Britain ‘cannot be applied in 
the government of Africans’ because ‘the African … is not troubled if [brutal actions of 
colonial rulers, such as the burning of his house] are not sanctioned by strict legal 
authority.’109 Consequently, the express consent of Africans to be governed by the 
Europeans was not considered necessary since they considered themselves as ‘a kindly 
father’ [though despotic] who knew what was best for the Africans as opposed to the Africans 
themselves.110 Thus the exclusion and non-consultation of the Africans (including their 
bonafide chiefs) in Nyasaland was premised on their poverty, illiteracy and application of 
unwritten customary laws.111 
3.3 From Dependence to Independence: The subjugation of the post-colonial 
judiciary 
3.3.1 The Constitutional Interim Period (1960 – 1965): the replacement of colonial 
elitism with ‘nationalist elitism’112  
Natives of Nyasaland never relented in their rejection of the federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland and the opposition reached its climax in 1959.113 As a result, the colonial rulers 
conceded leading to the Lancaster House Constitutional negotiations in 1960.114 An analysis 
of the negotiations sheds a lot of light on the subjugating developments that surrounded the 
judiciary in later years; these matters in turn also played a significant role in shaping the 
legal culture within the jurisdiction. Before 1960, the emphasis of western education, values 
and systems as a criterion for ‘civilised’ and ‘elite’ status gave rise to African elites who were 
products of missionary education efforts and who came to occupy the position of 
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‘spokespersons to the colonial authorities and as representatives of their people.’115 Some of 
these were instrumental in the nationalist movement that led to the formation of the Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP), which became a symbol of the nationalist movement.116  The MCP 
members such as Orton Chirwa, Kanyama Chiume, and Aleke Banda formed the MCP 
under the leadership of Dr. Banda which later participated in the constitutional negotiations 
that heralded the advent of self-rule.117 Through the MCP these people ‘established 
[themselves] as the undoubted champion[s] of the nationalist movement ... (and) assumed a 
monopoly of negotiating on behalf of the nationalist movement at the Constitutional talks.’118 
As Kanyongolo observes, this ‘militated against the inclusion of wider civil society interest 
groups in the talks and reduced the talks to a bargaining session between two parties with 
relatively narrow vested interests.’119 For instance, despite their recognised socio-political 
role, the resulting 1961 Constitution made no specific provision for the role of chiefs with 
regard to their constitutional status or position, although some vague and meaningless 
tribute was paid to them at the 1960 Conference.120  
The main preoccupation of the ‘departing colonial administration’121 in the negotiations was 
to safeguard the property interests of the settler European population and ensure its 
protection ‘from possible oppression from unbridled African majority rule. [Whereas the 
nationalist elites were] keen to translate [the] almost unanimous public support [for MCP] into 
monopoly legal control of political, economic and social processes...’122 The resulting 1964 
Constitution therefore, was ‘a result of exclusive negotiations between the departing colonial 
administration and the MCP’ as represented by the nationalist elites.123 A classic example of 
what Cass Sunstein cynically describes as ‘the sharing of the spoils’124 in constitution-
making theory.  
The constitutional negotiations on the inclusion of a Bill of Rights for the protection of 
individuals and the political and economic stability of the territory appear to have proceeded 
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on the assumption that it was only the Europeans who needed their rights safeguarded. It 
was the United Federal Party (UFP) delegation, which urged strongly for entrenching a Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution and inclusion of a Council of State for the protection of European 
minority communities.125 The UFP even proposed constitutional safeguards on the lines of 
the Scandinavian ‘Ombudsman’ and the establishment of a Council of Chiefs.126 The MCP 
delegation on the other hand, and Dr. Banda as their leader personally opposed the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the new constitution though their objections did not carry the 
day.127  Dr. Banda’s argument that the minority communities had nothing to fear from an 
African Government128 shows that even he proceeded on the basis that the Bill of Rights 
was solely for the benefit of the Europeans. He further strongly opposed the suggestion of a 
Council of Chiefs which he regarded as a device likely to perpetuate racial divisions and 
undermine the responsibility of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly.129 For similar reasons 
he objected to the suggestion that there should be an Ombudsman on the Scandinavian 
pattern, or to any idea of a second chamber, which to him a Council of Chiefs seemed to 
imply.130 Regardless of Dr. Banda’s and MCP’s opposition, the 1964 Constitution did contain 
‘a comprehensive Bill of Rights.’131 Further, it provided for the three arms of government:  the 
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. By virtue of this new Constitution, Malawi 
attained self-rule on 6th July 1964. However, the Queen of England was the head of State 
and Dr. Banda was the Prime Minister (head of the executive arm of government).132 
The 1964 Constitution also established the High Court of Malawi,133 whose civil and criminal 
jurisdiction was ‘to be exercised in conformity with the Statutes of general application in force 
in England on 11th August 1902,’134 except where the parties were Africans.135 In the case of 
African parties, the applicable law was to be customary law provided ‘the same was not 
repugnant to justice or morality.’136 The jurisdiction of the High Court included: 
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• Determination of the validity of the elections of members of the Legislative Council 
and the vacation of seats therein.137 The decision of the High Court in these matters 
was to be ‘first and final (hence) not subject to appeal.’138 
• Sole jurisdiction over matters arising out of the Bill of Rights pertaining to ‘the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.’139 This meant that if 
in the process of hearing a matter by the subordinate courts, it was alleged that a 
violation of the provisions constituting the Bill of Rights had occurred the matter was 
to be referred to the High Court.140 
• Jurisdiction to ‘question or determine the legality or otherwise of any legislative 
enactment’141 and the actions of the Legislative Assembly. 
• Any such jurisdiction as the Legislative Assembly would ‘confer upon the High 
Court’142 to enable the High Court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction as was 
necessary under the same Section 15.143 
Just like the colonial rulers before him who had considered themselves in a position of 
‘father’ to the Africans, Dr. Banda appears to have considered himself in a similar position so 
that he could refer to his Cabinet colleagues as ‘his boys.’144 In his overall leadership over 
Malawians, Kamuzu Banda actually equated himself to God hence felt he should not have 
any opposition.145 The situation was further compounded by the sad reality that his own 
‘countrymen trust[ed him] … too much … [to a point where he] … believe[d] he is infallible’ 
so that eventually ‘he could not welcome alternative suggestions it [was] his idea or 
nothing.’146 As a result, despite the laudable Bill of Rights and the corresponding jurisdiction 
of the High Court to hear matters arising out of those provisions, Africans never benefited 
from them, such that many citizens who opposed Dr. Banda were forced into exile and 
effectively denied recourse to the courts for the protection of their rights. For instance, barely 
three months after independence when the 1964 Constitution was already in force, a cabinet 
crisis erupted as a result of cabinet colleagues’ criticism of Dr Kamuzu Banda’s autocratic 
tendencies and other fundamental ideological differences like the recognition of Communist 
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China over Taiwan.147 The irony of it all was that one of the cabinet ministers who fell out 
with Kamuzu in this crisis, Kanyama Chiume was part of the MCP delegation that had 
opposed the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.148 In an ominous foreshadow 
of his authoritarian governance model the Prime Minister promptly sacked the ‘rebellious’ 
ministers;  and they were either forced into exile or disappeared in mysterious circumstances 
like so many others after them.149  
By accepting the applicability of customary law to even criminal matters involving Africans, 
the colonial authority had arguably indirectly rendered the Bill of Rights inutile for affected 
Africans. Further, as already argued that their insistence on the inclusion of the Bill of Rights 
was only for the benefit of European settlers not Africans, it comes as no surprise that 
‘Banda's politics of intimidation and the country's drift into political violence and state-
sanctioned murder’150 during this period proceeded with hidden collusion from colonialists.151 
It is reported that ‘they were in it up to their necks and when time came to choose sides, they 
chose Banda ‘the dictator’ over Chipembere and Chiume, (proponents of the cabinet crisis) 
the ‘red’ menaces.’152 
It can thus be seen that for Africans, the High Court was available on paper and not in 
practice. There was a Constitution with a comprehensive Bill of Rights, nevertheless, 
Africans did not benefit from it, which points to a glaring absence of democratic cornerstones 
of the rule of law and constitutionalism in the nascent years of an independent Malawi.153   
3.3.2 The Post-Independence Constitutional/One Party Period (1965 – 1994): The 
systematic aggregation of ‘nationalist elitism’ into one ‘absolutist elite’ 
At this stage one would like to invoke the puerile wisdom of an old nursery rhyme that may 
sound childish on the face of it but which in the view of this thesis adequately captures what 
took place in the Malawian political arena between the years 1965 to 1994. The nursery 
rhyme is about ten (10) children who were in a bed that was obviously overpopulated. Then 
one of them devised a way of getting rid of all his friends in order that he could have the bed 
all to himself. So the rhyme starts from ‘they were 10 in a bed’ and goes all the way down to 
just one in the bed. The reduction in numbers is brought about because the cunning little 
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one continually says ‘roll over’ and as they do one by one falls out of bed until he is left alone 
in the now spacious bed- at which point he gleefully remarks ‘now that’s better!’ 
3.3.2.1 There were ten….  
The vanguard of Malawi’s nationalist movement and the rise of the MCP as a powerful 
opposition to colonial rule was not the work of Kamuzu Banda per se but involved people like 
James Sangala, Orton Chirwa, Masauko Chipembere and Aleke Banda among others, who 
were actually politicking on ground.154 The only challenge was that the vanguard nationalist 
leaders felt inadequate for the task of confronting the imperial authority and decided that: 
What was needed was a man of about fifty or sixty, an intellectual, with a 
character combining nationalism with honesty, self-denial and a spirit of 
cooperativeness.155 
At that stage they decided to draft Dr. Banda into their independence cause. It can thus be 
seen that from the onset Kamuzu Banda not only had won the political support, but also 
commanded absolute personal trust of the nationalist leaders.156Within such a heady 
scenario he was made the President of MCP.’157 
In that ‘spirit of cooperativeness’ (or appearances thereof) the constitution drafting process 
was conducted under the facade of consultation and consensus, and was subsequently 
passed off as modelled on African traditional forms of governance, yet nothing could be 
farther from the truth. Firstly in 1965, in order to foster the appearance of consultation and 
consensus, Dr. Banda as the Prime Minister appointed a Constitutional Committee with a 
mandate to research and consult on the Constitutional ‘form which would be most 
appropriate within the Malawian socio-economic situation.’158 However, chiefs and civil 
society were excluded from the membership of the constitutional committee, which was in 
fact comprised exclusively of MCP nationalist elites.159 Further, ‘the process of consultation 
was not significantly inclusive or comprehensive’ and the nationalist elites only used the 
process ‘to consolidate their power so that the power would be exercised without 
question.’160 Secondly, the draft proposals submitted by the Constitutional committee were 
subsequently unanimously adopted by delegates to the Annual Convention of the MCP in 
1965 after considering the whole draft for ‘only one day’ before receiving cabinet 
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approval.161 However, the unanimous approval should be taken in the context of the 
absolute trust spoken of by Dunduzu Chisiza, for had such trust not been reposed in Dr. 
Banda and the party elites, the misrepresentations of African governance models in their 
proposals may have been challenged or at least questioned along the way. 
For instance, the Committee rejected the system tenable in the 1964 Constitution where 
there was a ceremonial Head of State and another political Head of State, on the basis ‘that 
in African traditional systems, it was not usual to have one leader with purely formal and 
ceremonial powers and another leader with real executive authority: thus the new 
constitution would abolish the Prime Minister’s office and vest the power of Head of State 
and Head of Government in one person.’162  This was not an accurate representation of the 
position as it is common in traditional governance systems within Malawi (where the real 
chief is either a woman or a young child) for the indunas to appoint an uncle of the chief to 
exercise ‘the real executive authority’163 whilst the woman or child has the ‘purely formal and 
ceremonial powers.’164 Similarly, the Committee rejected proposals for the position of Vice-
President on the basis that it would ‘encourage an element of division’ and that there was a 
‘need for a strong executive leader who would have sufficient (unbridled) constitutional 
powers to ensure national unity.’165 However, as already discussed, there existed in Malawi 
some tribes who had paramount chiefs in authority over other chiefs and the existence of 
such divisions of power have not been shown to be prone to division; if anything, to date 
they tend to generate unity among people of even different countries.166 On that flawed 
philosophy, which was not supported by the cultural context alleged to be the basis for the 
proposals, the Committee asserted that such a ‘strong executive leader’ was essential for ‘a 
country comparatively undeveloped and inexperienced in nation-hood’ as Malawi in order to 
achieve the necessary degree of unity, resolution and stability to permit the maximum 
fulfilment of the country’s human and physical resources in the shortest period of time.’167 
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However, the considerations of the committee only served to ‘pave the way for authoritarian 
rule’168 contrary to the established African way of consultation and consensus. 
Further and very poignant for the present discourse, it was felt that ‘Constitutional provisions 
on human rights and fundamental freedoms tend to generate conflict and tension between 
the executive and the judiciary.’169 As such, the committee recommended the omission of the 
‘Bill of Rights and the whole jurisdiction of the High Court in this respect in the Republican 
Constitution of 1966.’170 Such a recommendation was also contrary to African values for 
though the term ‘rights’ may not have been used in Malawian languages, ‘umunthu’ which is 
a fundamental ‘African philosophy of life’ embodied all that and more.171 Even though 
‘umunthu’ as a philosophy considers the individual’s wellbeing as being closely tied to that of 
the community, it is not necessarily in the detrimental sense of ‘the privileging of the 
community over the individual’172 but rather the inclusive protection of ‘individual’s and 
society’s rights’ together.173 Such a conceptualisation of rights may be alien to liberal 
democratic ideology but that alone need not negate the fact that respect of individual or 
personal rights was actually practiced in societies like Malawi, previously regarded as 
‘primitive’ by Europeans during colonial times.174 In such societies where ‘umunthu’ was the 
underlying philosophical tenet, leaders were accountable to the people for the way in which 
they exercised their authority albeit through traditional systems which were again different to 
those conceived in western societies.175 Consequently, the assertion of the Committee for 
removing the Bill of Rights under the guise of avoiding conflict between the executive and 
the judiciary was in direct contravention of ‘umunthu’ as a democratic tenet and was really 
motivated by the elites’ desire to prevent judicial oversight of executive authority. 
3.3.2.2 … and they rolled over… 
The nationalist elites who made up the Constitutional committee succeeded in having the Bill 
of Rights previously entrenched in the Constitution of 1964 removed.176The MCP was 
established by the new Constitution as the only political party in the country thereby 
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introducing a one-party system of Government. Dr. Banda became the ‘strong executive 
leader’ the Committee had desired such that the constitution expressly provided that ‘except 
as otherwise provided by an Act of Parliament, in the exercise of his functions the President 
would act on his own discretion and would not be obliged to follow advice tendered by any 
other person.’177 Although the 1966 Constitution established a High Court with ‘unlimited 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law’,178 
nevertheless section 15(5) of the 1963 Constitution which had given the High Court power to 
question or determine the legality or otherwise of any legislative enactment was repealed 
under the 1966 constitutional amendment initiative.   
The 1966 Constitution entrenched the power of Dr. Banda as the President to the extent that 
he effectively ‘controlled all organs of government. Independence of the judiciary was an 
illusion, and the distinction between party and Government was at best extremely blurred.’179 
For instance, in relation to the Judiciary, the President enjoyed the exclusive mandate to 
appoint the head of the Judiciary (Chief Justice) 180and also had constitutional powers to 
dismiss any judge ‘where he considers it desirable in the public interest to remove him.’181 
This gave the president overriding power and discretion over the tenure of office of the 
judges. In relation to Parliament, the President had power to appoint and fire the Speaker of 
the National Assembly182 and even to appoint an unspecified number of people as members 
of Parliament.183 In that way, the President had power to interfere with the composition of 
Parliament through appointment of unelected legislative members. Dr. Banda further 
strengthened his grip on power through subsequent amendments to the Constitution, such 
as the one that made him a President for life.184 Thus through the work of nationalist elites 
the 1966 Constitution took the power from the many and transformed it into the power of 
one- the consolidation of powers of state in one man- Dr. Kamuzu Banda as the first 
President and subsequently life President of Malawi. 
3.3.2.3 … roll over still … 
The contemplated friction between the judiciary and the executive that was cited to justify the 
removal of the Bill of Rights from the1966 Constitution was in reality between Kamuzu and 
the courts as he later displayed an aversion to judicial supervision of executive authority. 
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Though even in that, he initially had the support of some of the leading nationalist elites such 
as Orton Chirwa and Aleke Banda.185 A quick look at the developments surrounding the 
establishment of the notorious Traditional Courts in 1970 fortifies this assertion. 
It should be remembered that much like the colonial set up the 1964 Constitution had also 
established a dual system of courts, one forum for non-Africans and another for application 
to Africans only.186 The 1966 Constitution maintained such dual system through the 
establishment of local Courts as Subordinate Courts with criminal jurisdiction on criminal 
matters involving Africans, parallel to the non-African Subordinate Courts applying English 
Law.187 Appeals from the Traditional Courts lay to the High Court of Malawi; 188 that was the 
position until the ‘Chilobwe Murders’189 of 1969.  
Chilobwe was and still is a suburb in the City of Blantyre where most of the murders 
(approximately 27 in total) took place.190 In those days it was believed that white men drank 
‘African blood and manufactured money from it.’191 So rumours were circulating that the 
Banda Government was responsible for the murders and using the blood drained from the 
victims as a loan repayment to South Africa.192 The Government therefore, was determined 
to bring the culprits to book and clear its name. Five people were charged with the murders 
before Justice Bolt of the High Court.193 At the conclusion of the case, Justice Bolt found that 
the evidence presented by the witnesses was ‘so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable 
jury could possibly convict’194 and accordingly acquitted the accused persons. This incensed 
the State President and his Government.  Now it must be explained that during this period 
(1969), all the judges of the High Court were expatriates (Europeans).195  It is clear that the 
State President and his Government were of the view that the expatriate judges were 
frustrating the Government because their notions of justice were not consistent with the 
African notions of justice.196 The President impliedly called for the resignation of the judge, ‘if 
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the judge had any conscience.’197 In the face of such overt attacks on the independence of 
the judiciary the judge and ‘all his brother judges resigned in solidarity.’198  
Aleke Banda was then made ‘in charge’ of the move by the Government to pass the Local 
Courts (Amendment) Act, 1969. He succeeded in doing so by arguing that the High Court 
system was ‘governed by the practice in Britain’ and that Malawians having gained their 
independence did not have to ‘slavishly copy’ such a judicial system.199 In the end the ‘local 
courts became Traditional Courts (and) the right of appeal to the High Court was 
abolished.’200  These courts had jurisdiction to hear all offences involving capital punishment 
such as homicide and treason cases involving Africans,201 and the President had direct 
supervisory powers over them.202 Almost all the major treason cases of the time were heard 
by these traditional courts. A number of these cases which involved Banda’s perceived 
political enemies (who were invariably former allies fallen from grace) such as Rep v. 
Muwalo et al203 and Chirwa et al v. Rep204 ended up in convictions being secured by the 
state on very tenuous evidence and capital punishments being pronounced. It must be 
emphasized that these courts were presided over by traditional authorities. These were 
appointed by the ‘Minister’ responsible for justice (in practice the President himself). They 
were also removable from office by the Minister. It is fairly clear from this constitutional and 
statutory arrangement that the tentacles of executive authority had at that stage no practical 
or legal limits whatsoever. 
In this context, the formal/common law courts (the High Court system) were completely 
sidelined by the executive in general and the President in particular and at times the courts 
were even verbally attacked in public by the President.  For example when Dr. Banda felt 
that the High Court was ineffective in dealing with cases of theft by public servants he 
attacked the judges publicly in the legislature:205 ‘If the judges who came from Lincoln’s Inn 
and Gray’s Inn and what not...quibble just because according to English law a man is 
innocent [until proved guilty] and all that, well, this is not England, Mr Speaker...English Law 
developed and evolved under very, very different conditions from which we live in this 
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country. Therefore we cannot judge cases here by the standards of English Common 
Law...And if those judges and magistrates quibble because they are trained in Gray’s Inn, 
then I will remove cases of this kind; when they fail to convict, I will send [the cases] to the 
local courts, [and] the local courts will do something.’206  Dr. Banda was not alone in his 
attack on the application of the ‘foreign English law’ and the call for the application of African 
law without the technicalities of English Common Law; he even had the support of 
nationalists such as Orton Chirwa (a barrister trained in England) and Aleke Banda.207 
However, what Orton Chirwa, Aleke Banda, Dr. Banda and many such party elites were 
doing was distorting the very nature of African customary law concepts of ‘crime and 
punishment’, what has been called elsewhere as ‘neo-traditionalism’.208 That is to say, the 
version of ‘customary law’ advocated by Dr. Banda and his party elites was in fact their own 
‘fabricated’ version with minor modifications on the previous distortions imposed on it by the 
European colonial rulers.209 Thus, Dr. Banda and his government distorted African law to 
serve their parochial interests just as much as the colonial rulers had done. What made the 
distortions of Dr. Banda and his government more reprehensible was the fact that they had 
the pretensions of authenticity (as it was being promoted by the nationalists who were 
actually displacing the imperialists in the name of self-rule). 
Thus Dr. Banda as the State President systematically emasculated the Judiciary initially with 
the help of nationalist elites who had purported to speak as representatives of the people.210 
According to the nationalist agenda the High Court system was portrayed as inimical to the 
African tradition and a symbol of Malawi’s colonial past.211 However, one must never lose 
sight of the historical oddity that the so-called local courts which had originally been put in 
place by the colonial government to serve the needs of access to justice for the indigenous 
population eventually paved the way for the institutionalisation of one of the most repressive 
regimes with a facade of indigenised judicial processes.212 It is a rather uncanny twist of life 
that nationalists like Orton Chirwa and Aleke Banda who were instrumental in the attack on 
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the High Court system and in the establishment of the traditional courts, became themselves 
victims of the monstrous judicial system they had helped to create.213 
In any event it is rather interesting that some current commentators would suggest that the 
existence of the traditional court system helped to ensure that the so-called formal court 
system was not tainted by the politicisation of law enforcement by the Banda regime. 214 The 
argument being that the regime processed all its politically motivated cases through the 
more pliant traditional court system; in that sense therefore the High Court stood aloof from 
the manifest abuses of the Banda autocracy. But this is not entirely accurate as ‘judges from 
the common law system did participate in the traditional court system’ in an ‘advisory 
capacity’ as lawyers and magistrates sitting alongside the traditional chairmen.215VanDoepp 
further asserts that in that role some judges participated albeit in a secondary role in some of 
Banda’s iniquitous decisions.216 The real issue is whether such silence was not maintained 
at great peril to nurturing a really robust judicial culture as well as the rule of law and 
constitutionalism.217 For instance, it is not in dispute that the 1966 Constitution incorporated 
as part of the Laws of Malawi, the ‘sanctity of the personal liberties enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’218 And it was the High Court system (as opposed to 
the traditional courts) which was mandated to apply those laws. Yet again by circumventing 
the formal judicial system this otherwise useful legal protection existed more on paper than 
in reality for the Malawian. In any case it has been proposed that the ‘judges had to align 
their legal thinking to dictates from on high’ since ‘subservience to executive was required in 
all matters [requiring] judges to operate with restraint’.219In summary the Banda regime 
fostered a legal culture that was characterised as compliant and not necessarily versatile in 
the face of constitutional subversions. 
 
3.3.2.4 … now that’s better? … 
They started off as a team of nationalists who had the best interests of their colonised nation 
at heart and became the self-appointed spokespersons and representatives of the people; 
then they unwittingly invited the power-hungry Dr. Banda to lead their nascent freedom 
movement. In their absolute trust in his ‘self-denial and cooperativeness’ they fought for and 
delivered to him the type of constitution that gave him absolute political power. Proceeding 
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as representatives of the people they distorted and misrepresented the nature of customary 
law in Malawi to suit their political purposes. They unwittingly helped Dr. Banda in excluding 
the majority of Malawians from participation in Government just as the colonial rulers had 
done. Then by means of the very systems they had helped to create and nurture, Dr. Banda 
through systemic intimidation, brutality and arbitrary arrests and detention and ultimately 
through the use of the traditional courts managed to eliminate from the political scene all the 
nationalist elites. The President thus consolidated his absolute power over all the other 
organs of the state, including the Judiciary. This arrangement was not compatible with some 
fundamental elements of constitutional law; namely separation of powers and the rule of law. 
However, it was the very provisions of the Constitution (1966) that undermined the 
separation of powers and everything that pertains to good governance, constitutionalism, 
and rule of law and was at odds with African governance systems that served ‘to prevent 
tyranny and insisted on consultation and consensus in decision-making.’220 Regrettably, the 
1966 Constitution was the work of the very nationalist elites who had formed the vanguard of 
the liberation struggle. 
3.4 The Rebirth of Multiparty Democracy: the need to avoid the rise of 
constitutional elitism 
3.4.1 The Constitutional Making Process in a Nutshell 
Until the early 1990’s Dr. Banda was able to run a very oppressive regime with the tacit 
approval of the western bloc because of his anti-communist stance. But with the demise of 
the Cold war came a change of political realities. Coupled with that was the publication of a 
pastoral letter by Malawian Catholic Bishops which for the first time dared to openly criticise 
the government for its abuse of human rights and disregard for the rule of law.221 Of course it 
was initially greeted with consternation from the ruling MCP stalwarts who had to relent 
under pressure from international donors. The pastoral letter galvanised public discontent 
against the regime, precipitating the eventual change of systems. The pressure mounted 
and Dr. Banda gave in and announced in October 1992 that there was going to be a national 
referendum for Malawians to choose between continuing with the one-party system and life 
presidency and adopting a multiparty system of government.222 In the referendum, 
Malawians voted by a majority of slightly over 63% for change from the one-party system to 
a multiparty system of government. Several legislative amendments were enacted to 
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liberalise the political space between then and May 1994 when the current constitution 
eventually came into force.223  
The newly formed opposition demanded greater participation in shaping the process of 
democratization following the defeat of the MCP in the referendum. Political parties 
registered in Malawi were admitted into the Presidential Council for Dialogue to create an 
institutionalised negotiating council to implement the transition to democracy.224 However, 
civil society organisations such as the churches, which had played a decisive role in the 
initial phase of democratisation and the public at large, were excluded from this subsequent 
process.225 Thus the National Consultative Council (NCC), consisting of seven 
representatives of each of the parties that were registered before 30 November 1993, was 
established by an Act of Parliament ‘to oversee the transition from the one party political 
system to a multiparty political system in Malawi.’226 Its mandate ranged from participation in 
formulating of policies, the initiation of legislative measures necessary for the transition, the 
drafting of new electoral legislation suitable for a multiparty political system, through to the 
drafting of a new multiparty Constitution  with a comprehensive Bill of Rights.227  
Thus the initial draft Constitution was produced by the NCC working alongside international 
experts with an advisory function.228 Under that arrangement the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) of the USA advised the NCC on formulating the Constitution, highlighting 
problems and citing examples and alternatives from other countries. However it has been 
observed that ‘the external influence in the writing of the Constitution was great, since many 
members of the NCC had no knowledge of Constitutional Law, and thus no basis for 
comparison.’229 In any case ‘the Constitution Committee had in its work oriented itself on the 
Constitutions of a number of Western countries (USA, the United Kingdom, Germany) as 
well as African models (Namibia, South Africa) because time was limited, and, because of a 
number of organisational problems, the Constitution was drafted in haste. The NCC 
approved the draft in a hurry; final changes were agreed a bare two weeks before the 
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Constitution was proclaimed. The MCP approved the draft with reservations. The 
Constitution was then to be passed by Parliament.’230 
However to the extent that the NCC membership was exclusive to nonelected political party 
representatives it could not sufficiently reflect the comprehensive views of the Malawian 
electorate. The significant influence of the ‘international experts’ in the drafting process 
substantially influenced the content of the Constitution.231 Some of the recommendations of 
the international experts seem to reflect the Western Donor’s views of the Constitution to be 
created.  
The NCC attempted to cure this deficiency by arranging a seminar in March 1994 attended 
by various social groups.232 The seminar was attended by various social groups, such as 
Churches, the Law Society, Trade Unions, Women’s groups, Traditional Authorities, the 
legal fraternity, the University and the armed forces.233 However, there was no ample time to 
meaningfully debate such an important document. One notable feature of this conference 
was that its focus was confined only to provisions of the Constitution that were perceived to 
be contentious.234 These included the question of retaining the Senate as a second 
legislative chamber, which delegates voted to retain in the Constitution along with the right to 
re-call members of Parliament. They also endorsed a limit on the size of the Cabinet 
(presumably to curtail Presidential patronage) and rejected the creation of the Office of 
Second Vice President (which was clearly aimed at appeasing coalition partners).235 At the 
end of the day, 43 out of the 63 resolutions were adopted unanimously.236 Unfortunately 
when the Constitution came before Parliament, they simply ignored all the resolutions of the 
consultative Conference –especially those that did not serve their political designs. Thus the 
ruling coalition implemented their own amendment proposals by suspending the Senate 
(which they later purportedly abolished) the recall provision was repealed whilst the office of 
Second vice President was created against popular dissent. Thereafter the Constitution 
came into force permanently on 18 May 1995. Since the parliament exercised unbridled 
power in deciding the final content of the Constitution ‘it can be clearly seen that the 
Conference, where the wider society had the opportunity to express their views on the form 
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the Constitution should take, had virtually no impact on the Constitution-making process.’237 
Thus the 1994 Constitution is largely the work of experts, mostly foreign, with input from the 
political parties that were actually the ruling parties then. But the question remains: Were the 
foreign experts’ recommendations applicable to the specific circumstances prevailing in 
Malawi? 
The 1994 Constitution of Malawi is said to be ‘among the world’s most liberal 
constitutions.’238 Malawian jurists however have pointed out that the decision to make liberal 
democracy the foundational principle for the 1994 Constitution ‘was not as a result of a 
conscious and collective reflection of the people of Malawi.’239 Thus the very foundations of 
the 1994 Constitution lack legitimacy and feelings of ownership in the majority of Malawian 
people.240 Further, Nkhata cautions on the potential capacity of the liberal democratic 
foundations of the 1994 to hinder any chances of entrenching constitutionalism in Malawi, 
especially ‘transformative constitutionalism’ which is urgently needed in a country with the 
history like that of Malawi.241 Nkhata explains the points very well242 and in summary they 
are as follows: 
a. The very concept of ‘liberal democracy’ embodies an internal tension in that the 
‘liberal … component’ epitomizes ‘a fear of collective power’ as a result of which 
‘liberals’ advocated for and ‘defended limited suffrage’ whereas ‘the democratic 
component’ requires ‘the promotion of majoritarian rule.’ 
How ably a society navigates and manages this internal tension is largely dependent 
on sociological and historical factors which vary amongst nations such that not even 
western nations themselves have one form of liberal democracy. In actual fact, some 
developed western democracies are themselves experiencing a citizen 
disenfranchisement because of their practice of liberal democracy.243 Given the 
history of marginalisation and exclusion of the majority of Malawians by colonial and 
one-party regimes respectively, liberal democracy unless modified to suit the 
sociological and historical factors in existence in Malawi therefore threatens to bring 
about a repetition of history hence abort the change promised by the 1994 
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Constitution. The general verdict seems to be that: ‘The liberal democratic paradigm 
has failed Africa and is currently failing Malawi.’244 
b. The promotion of liberal democratic values as the ‘true, immutable, timeless objective 
values for all men, everywhere and all times’ is antithetical to the establishment and 
entrenchment of constitutionalism, especially transformative constitutionalism which 
requires the Constitution and governance institutions to promote ‘ideas and values 
that the [relevant] society prioritises.’ It is therefore recommended that particular 
societies be allowed room to develop their own ideal form of democracy without 
having ‘a pre-fixed meaning [of democracy]’ imposed on them ‘loaded with particular 
[foreign imposed] values.’ 
 
3.4.2 The Transformative nature of the 1994 Constitution 
3.4.2.1 A new Era for the Judiciary and constitutionalism? 
In spite of the short-comings in the negotiations and drafting processes that led to the 
adoption of the 1994 constitution (hereinafter ‘the Constitution’), the Constitution has been 
widely acknowledged as representing the hope and promise of social, political and legal 
transformation in Malawi.245 For instance, in appreciation of how both colonial and nationalist 
elitism resulted in the political disenfranchisement of ‘the local population… almost 
completely’, the Constitution ‘has adopted the notion of participatory democracy, not simply 
representative democracy, as a fundamental constitutional principle.’246 The Constitution has 
also entrenched the separation of the powers of the Executive, the Legislature and the 
Judiciary.247 
In addition, the Constitution has ushered in a new era for the Judiciary in Malawi. In an 
obvious response to the inhibitive role of the first President and the Traditional Courts in the 
justice system prior to 1994, Section 103 of the 1994 Constitution provides that:  
(1) All courts and all persons presiding over those courts shall exercise their functions, 
powers and duties independent of the influence and direction of any other person 
or authority. 
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(2) The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of judicial nature and shall have 
exclusive authority to decide whether an issue is within its competence. 
(3) There shall be no courts established of superior or concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Supreme Court of Appeal or High Court. 
 
The most important introduction though, is arguably the role given to the judiciary as ‘the 
ultimate guardian of the Constitution’248 by S. 9 of the Constitution. This section provides 
among others, that ‘[t]he judiciary shall have the responsibility of interpreting, protecting and 
enforcing this Constitution…’249 Thus it is contended that the judiciary has a very peculiar 
role to play in ushering in constitutionalism and the rule of law in Malawi. 
3.4.2.2  An implied proscription of constitutional elitism? 
In the same way that an analysis of the impact of liberal democracy in developing countries 
has revealed the dangers of imposing a particular version of democracy ‘with a pre-fixed 
meaning’ and ‘loaded with particular [pre-determined] values’ as the only ‘immutable, 
universal, … objective … [type] for all men, everywhere and all times’,250 the same argument 
can be made within the context of the discourse on judicial activism. Judicial activism 
(however defined) can only make meaningful contribution to the knowledge of the judicial 
role if contextualised (situated within a particular constitutional framework in light of the 
attendant social, political and historical factors).251 This point can be illustrated with  the 
following example: while it took what scholars have described as judicial activism 
(understood as a rejection of positivist approach to constitutional interpretation) for the US 
Supreme Court to introduce judicial review of executive acts by its decision in the case of 
Marbury v. Madison, it actually required the Indian Supreme Court to adopt a positivist 
approach to constitutional interpretation for it to exercise the same function since in India, 
judicial review has been expressly provided for within their Constitution.252 Similarly, while it 
took what scholars have called JA (again understood as a rejection of positivist approach to 
constitutional interpretation) for the Indian Supreme Court to introduce public interest 
litigation within its courts, the South African Constitution contains express provisions for the 
same hence its Courts only need to take a positivist approach to attain a similarly beneficent 
result.253 Given such a scenario, to describe the rejection of a positivist approach to 
constitutional interpretation as an ideal form of JA and as the only ‘immutable, universal... 
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objective … [type] for all men, everywhere and all times’ could lead in some jurisdictions to 
courts depriving the majority of the citizenry from enjoying the full package of rights 
expressly accorded to them by the Constitution. In fact, some scholars have argued that this 
is the situation in South Africa despite the fact that the South African Constitutional Court 
has otherwise received ‘international acclaim’ as a court that practices judicial activism.254 
Further, it is noteworthy that despite the acrimonious debate on JA in the US, it is agreed on 
both sides that constitutionalism and the rule of law have not been undermined in the 
process.255 However, it is equally generally acknowledged that the various and contradictory 
forms of JA on the part of the Supreme Court in India have served to undermine the very 
constitution the institution was set up to uphold and enforce.256 This has occurred to such an 
extent that it is reported that the Supreme Court in India has actually lost legitimacy and its 
decisions carry the same weight as ‘a mere academic dissertation.’257 Such is the mixed 
story of JA; this necessarily points to the need to desist from loading the term with particular 
pre-determined values, especially when JA and its attendant discourse can so easily 
degenerate into constitutional elitism. 
There is no universally agreed definition of constitutional elitism but loosely defined, it refers 
to the attitude of those who by virtue of their education feel that they are the more 
appropriate persons to decide on all matters pertaining to the Constitution (such as judges 
and lawyers) to the exclusion of those they consider the lay.258 Constitution elitism, where it 
is practised, serves to exclude the majority of the citizenry from Constitutional discourse and 
hence serves to undermine the notion of participatory democracy.259 However, the actual 
impact of constitutional elitism on constitutionalism is determined by the social, historical, 
and political realities of a particular society. For instance, Chapter 2 discussed the type of JA 
advocated by the likes of Dworkin which calls for judges to be unrestricted even by the 
Constitution itself by having recourse to the express or implied language, and/or the values 
prioritised by the majority in the society in question, and how it has been demonstrated that 
such an approach is anti-democratic (as in anti-majoritarian); yet it has been justified by 
some on the basis that the US Constitution itself has an anti-majoritarian premise being 
rooted in liberalism.260 Further, as discussed also in Chapter 2, the USA Constitution does 
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not expressly provide for how its provisions should be interpreted by the Courts,261 whereas 
the Malawi Constitution does.262 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the debates on the role 
of the Courts in the USA in the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution and how 
these have given rise to concerns on the existence of constitutional elitism in the USA.263 
However it has been argued that where the citizenry is relatively well-educated and very 
aware of its rights and the duty owed by institutions such as the judiciary as in the USA, 
public scrutiny serves as a restraining force on the increase of constitutional elitism hence its 
inimical effect on constitutionalism is correspondingly contained.264 But what of a society like 
Malawi with high illiteracy and poverty levels and a prior history of different forms of elitism 
that led to the exclusion of the majority of the population from participation in democracy?  
Currently there appears to be no study in Malawi focusing on an analysis of whether 
constitutional elitism exists or not, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to do so. 
However, this thesis would like to argue that the 1994 Constitution contains an implied 
proscription of constitutional elitism by virtue of the terms of Section 12 which as argued by 
other jurists, also implicitly prefers participatory democracy over and above representative 
democracy for the post-1994 Malawi.265 Section 12 of the Constitution states that: 
 
This Constitution is founded upon the following underlying principles- 
(i)  all legal and political authority of the state derives from the people of 
Malawi and shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution solely to serve 
and protect their interests; 
(ii) all persons responsible for the exercise of powers of State shall do so on 
trust and shall only exercise such powers to the extent of their lawful authority 
and in accordance with their responsibilities to the people of Malawi; 
(iii) the authority to exercise the power of State is conditional upon the 
sustained trust of the people of Malawi and that trust can only be maintained 
through open, accountable and transparent Government and informed 
democratic choice; 
…. 
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(vi) all institutions and persons shall observe and uphold the Constitution and 
the rule of law and no institution or person shall stand above the law. 
 
It can be argued that the framers of the Constitution were mindful of the history of 
disenfranchisement experienced by the majority of Malawians on the basis of their 
circumstances of life hence decided to curb the phenomenon by creating a trust-based 
constitutional arrangement. Some scholars (especially in the US) have argued that issues of 
judicial accountability to and legitimacy before the citizenry must not be given pre-eminence 
in discussions of judicial activism since such an approach favours the majority.266 That line of 
argument cannot be sustained in similar discussions about judicial activism within the 
Malawian constitutional context. Section 12 specifically propagates a governance model that 
accords prominence to democratic accountability and sustained trust of the ‘governed’ for 
the ‘governors’. Indeed that provision applies equally to all branches of government, the 
Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. That is, it binds the judiciary to accountability to 
the people of Malawi, and premises judicial legitimacy on sustaining that popular (not 
populist) trust. This leads to the conclusion that although the constitution gives the judiciary 
the role of being the ‘ultimate guardian of the Constitution’ it nevertheless proscribes the 
cultivation of an attitude on the part of judges and other legal experts that by virtue of their 
position and/or education, they are entitled to impose their views, ideologies, philosophies 
etc. on the people of Malawi (constitutional elitism). Rather, the Constitution binds the 
judiciary to ensure that in interpreting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution, it should 
have recourse to the values that the Malawian society prioritises.267  
 
The implied proscription of constitutional elitism by Section 12 attains peculiar significance in 
Malawi where there is an urgent need to entrench transformative constitutionalism 
specifically.268 ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ is another term that is nebulous. This thesis 
adopts the definition used by other scholars in the context of Malawi as originally defined by 
Klare:269 
[Transformative constitutionalism is] … a long term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of 
course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to 
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transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction.  
In this context, the judiciary can act as a facilitator of transformative constitutionalism if it 
subjugates its jurisprudence ‘to ideas and values that the [majority of Malawians] 
prioritises.’270 The emphasis on majority in this case emanates from the fact that currently, 
the very liberal democratic foundation of the 1994 Constitution is not owned by Malawians 
resulting from short-comings in its negotiation and drafting process as discussed previously.  
In appreciation of the fact that constitutional interpretation is inevitably ‘a political process … 
[which] involves value judgments’ Section 12 binds the Court in the exercise of such ‘political 
powers’ to act as the servants of the people of Malawi and not as their superiors-a position 
assumed for instance by Kamuzu Banda and other nationalist elites who defined African 
tradition and customs according to their own notions of what was for the good of Malawi and 
not what the people themselves considered good for themselves. The provision is thus a 
strong proscription of constitutional elitism and offers an innovative break with the country’s 
hitherto exclusive politics and governance arrangements. 
3.5 Conclusion 
A careful historical study of jurisprudential developments within Malawi clearly shows that 
courts are an important agent for transformation of a legal order. It is hoped that the 
preceding discussion has amply shown that sometimes an activist judiciary may perpetrate 
injustice within a society if its jurisprudence is premised within an elitist model of 
governance. This was evidenced by the ‘illegitimate’ manner in which the courts 
appropriated land rights from the traditional leaders into the hands of the Crown in clear 
breach of the relevant legislative instruments upon which the colonial mandate was initially 
assumed in Nyasaland. In a similar vein it has been argued that such elitism was not 
confined to the imperialist government in the then Nyasaland; rather even the nationalist 
movement which negotiated the independence constitution displayed similar undemocratic 
tendencies once they assumed the reins of power. With respect to this phenomenon of 
nationalist elitism the whole transformative agenda of the independence constitution was 
subsequently perverted by Dr. Banda and his lieutenants who imposed their interpretation of 
local governance models in order to curtail genuine democratic participation of the ordinary 
populace. Thus the constitution was amended with the result that an autocratic regime was 
legitimised through legal means and on the pretext of promoting a ‘Malawian form of 
democracy’. However, it is the conclusion of this discourse that contrary to prevailing wisdom 
democracy as a concept has a deep resonance with indigenous governance models. In that 
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regard it is proposed that the founding principles of a trust-based governance model 
espoused within the new constitution need to be adequately reflected upon by the courts as 
they perform their judicial function as mandated under the constitution in order to display 
fidelity to the notions of democratic governance aspired for by the people from whom the 
democratic mandate to govern originates.  
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Chapter 4 
Judicial Activism in Malawian Courts: Using Old Forms of Expression  
4.1 Introduction 
We all must be conformists of some kind to old forms of expression if we seek to be 
understood by the wider audience.1 As has been discussed in chapter 2, the term JA has 
contradictory and irreconcilable definitions as well as results, which necessitated the 
proposal of a new definition in this thesis. However, the usage of the new definition proposed 
in this thesis to assess whether Malawian Courts have practised JA or not, would hinder 
comparative analysis. For this reason, this chapter will analyse whether the Malawian Courts 
have practiced JA or not using the ‘criteria’ discussed in chapter 2.2 The aim is to situate the 
behaviour of the Malawian courts on a comparable basis to Courts in other jurisdictions 
before proceeding to analyse the impact of such JA (if any).  
4.2 If Judicial Activism was …. 
4.2.1 The Superior Court overturning its previous decisions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, court’s that have ‘ignored precedent’ have been described as 
courts that practise JA. This is especially the case for courts in a common law system where 
decisions of a superior court are binding on the superior court itself and lower courts.3 Thus 
the ability of a superior court to depart from its previous decisions has been construed as a 
sign of JA on the part of that Court.4 Whereas the House of Lords in the UK came out with a 
Practice Direction to authorise a departure from previous decisions, the Supreme Court of 
Malawi (‘SC’) did so through a subsequent judgment. The issue concerned the interpretation 
of Section 42 (2)(e) of the 1994 Constitution (providing the right to bail for detained or 
accused persons) vis-à-vis persons accused of murder. The section provides that: 
Every person arrested for, or accused of, the alleged commission of an offence shall, in 
addition to the rights which he or she has as a detained person, have the right- 
To be released from detention, with or without bail unless the interests of justice so 
require otherwise. 
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In one of the earlier cases which was decided soon after the adoption of the 1994 
Constitution (MacWilliam Lunguzi v. The Republic)5 the Supreme Court stated that the right 
to bail provided for under Section 42 (2)(e) was not an absolute right hence the judge had 
discretion on whether or not, having regard to the ‘interests of justice’, bail was to be 
granted.. In the case of murder suspects, due to the seriousness of the offence among other 
factors, the SC held that bail should only be granted in very rare circumstances. The SC 
subsequently confirmed that position in another decision involving a murder suspect: that 
was the case of Amon Zgambo v. The Republic.6 However, in doing so the SC expressly 
declared its reliance on a common law principle to the effect that bail in serious offences 
must be granted ‘with extreme care and caution,’ and further that in homicide cases the 
discretion was ‘very unusual and rarely exercised.’ Consequently, the apex court held that 
bail in Malawi was to be granted to a capital offender ‘only in the rarest of cases and only on 
proof of exceptional circumstances.’ Further, that the burden was on the accused person to 
prove the existence of such ‘exceptional circumstances’. The principles enunciated in Amon 
Zgambo case were predominantly the law in Malawi for almost a decade,7 until the case of 
Fadweck Mvahe and others v. The Republic.8 
In that latter decision the three applicants who were charged with the offence of murder 
appealed against High Court decisions refusing to grant them bail on the ground that they 
had failed to show exceptional circumstances to entitle them to such bail. The SC in this 
case took the approach that the case had presented the court with an opportunity to‘re-
examine’ its previous decisions on the subject. Even though the SC affirmed most of the 
principles enunciated in the Lunguzi Case, it also observed that ‘the common law did not 
provide the right to bail as our [the Malawian] Constitution does.’ For that reason, the SC 
overruled its earlier decisions in the Lunguzi and Amon Zgambo cases vis-à-vis the burden 
of proof being on the accused in a bail application. Thus the court stated that: 
…we hold…that the requirement of proof of exceptional circumstances by a 
murder suspect applying for bail in the High Court is not the correct approach, 
and should no longer be followed. 
In so doing, the SC has set a novel precedent to the effect that it can, where necessary, 
indirectly hear an appeal against its own ‘erroneous’ decisions. Though this appears to be 
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the only instance where the MSCA overturned its own decision in part, the decision 
revolutionised the right to be presumed innocent and the right to be released from bail in a 
country where long periods of detention before trial are a common experience. To the extent 
that such a judicial approach towards its own precedents was in fact unprecedented on the 
part of the SC it could be safe to describe the outcome as a manifestation of judicial activism 
of an interesting type. 
4.2.2 The Court resolving disputes of a political nature 
Even though it has been asserted elsewhere that the distinction between the legal and the 
political is often times blurred especially when it touches on the right to political activity, that 
has not stopped some from asserting that courts that have been keen to adjudicate on 
issues of a political nature are practising judicial activism.9 The judiciary in Malawi has not 
shied away from adjudicating on matters that were largely political in nature since the 
adoption of the 1994 Constitution such that it has been called the ‘democratic stronghold’ of 
Malawi.10 
Malawi has even had a case that others have argued led to a presidential candidate 
securing his electoral victory more by the actions of the judiciary rather than by electoral 
votes.11 The decision arose in the case of Chakuamba, Kalua and Mnkhumbwe v. Attorney 
General, the Malawi Electoral Commission and the United Democratic Front (UDF).12 The 
case arose from the results of the 1999 general elections in Malawi whereby less than 100 
per cent of registered voters had voted, and the leading presidential candidate (Muluzi) got 
51% of the votes cast which in effect meant that less than 50% of the whole electorate had 
voted for him. The main question posed by the petitioners to the court was whether Muluzi 
had secured the vote of ‘a majority of the electorate’ as provided for under Section 80 (2) of 
the 1994 Constitution so as to warrant his ascension to the presidency. The Malawi 
Electoral Commission (‘MEC’) construed that phrase to mean the majority of the voters who 
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actually cast their vote on polling day as opposed to the majority of the total number of 
registered voters (as was contended by the petitioners); the MEC therefore proceeded to 
declare Muluzi the winner of the 1999 elections. The petitioners, themselves presidential 
candidates in the contested elections, challenged the decision of MEC since they were of 
the view that ‘majority of the electorate’ should be construed to mean ‘an absolute majority 
of all registered voters.’13  It has been argued elsewhere that JA courts when interpreting the 
Constitution tend to reject narrow, legalistic, or pedantic approaches in favour of broad and 
purposive approaches;14 the High Court in this case arguably fits that description since it 
held that in interpreting provisions of the 1994 Constitution, the right approach required that: 
…a Malawian Court must first recognise the character and nature of our 
Constitution before interpreting any of its provisions. ... [Since] 
Constitutions are drafted in broad and general terms…they call…for a 
generous interpretation avoiding strict legalistic interpretation. [Thus] the 
language of a Constitution must be construed not in a narrow legalistic 
and pedantic way but broadly and purposively.15  
The High Court (HC) therefore, after analysing the ordinary meaning of the terms, and 
pointing out the need to avoid absurdity and to read the constitution as a whole made 
comparisons with other provisions in the Constitution which contained the requirement for 
‘majority’. The court then asked among other things- ‘why should any weight at all be 
attached to a vote that will not have been cast?’ Consequently, the HC held that the 
‘majority’ in Section 80 (2) referred to the larger number of people who had actually cast their 
vote and not that of registered voters. The petitioner’s appealed to the SC, which upheld the 
decision of the HC. Even though both the HC and the SC have been criticised for their 
decision in this case, other scholars have pointed out that ‘the judicial reasoning in this case 
is technically sound and legally defensible.’16 Indeed, by adopting a purposive interpretation 
and rejecting a legalistic interpretation of the Constitution, this case falls into the definitions 
of JA preferred by scholars in other jurisdictions. The fact that others strongly criticised the 
result only lends credence to the arguments advanced in chapter 2 about the contested 
nature of JA and the controversy generated by judicial outcomes premised upon apparent 
activist reasoning. 
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The Courts in Malawi since 1994 to date have adjudicated on political disputes involving 
almost every stage of the electoral process and beyond. The picture has been aptly captured 
by Gloppen and Kanyongolo: 17 
• In the pre-election battles over ‘the rules of the game’ – the legal 
framework and institutional set-up for elections;18 
• In the registration and education of voters and compilation of the voters 
roll;19 
• In the nomination of candidates;20 
• In disputes relating to political campaigning;21 
• In relation to the conduct of the polling process on actual election day;22 
• With regard to the vote count and integrity of the results;23 and  
• In the process of converting electoral mandate into political positions.24 
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It must be appreciated that describing the hearing of political disputes of the nature above by 
Malawian courts as a form of JA is motivated by the need to communicate using old forms of 
expression since it could otherwise be argued that the language of the 1994 Constitution 
expressly confers upon the courts the mandate to do so. Section 10 (1) of the Constitution 
provides that: 
In the interpretation of all laws and in the resolution of political disputes the 
provisions of this Constitution shall be regarded as the supreme arbiter and 
ultimate source of authority.25  
The resultant effect of the judicial involvement in such political disputes has been that in 
addition to the courts carrying out their ‘constitutional mandate to provide horizontal 
accountability’ they have also performed a very crucial social function: the judiciary has 
served as ‘a safety valve’ within an otherwise tense political environment. 26 As Gloppen and 
Kanyongolo’s research has revealed, by hearing and disposing of political disputes the 
Courts in Malawi have served to ‘diffuse tension’ whereby the lengthy court procedures and 
processes in practice served as cooling off periods for the warring factions and prevented 
the eruption of violence.27  
4.2.3 The Court expanding its jurisdiction and mandate into areas not traditionally 
considered the jurisdiction of the judiciary 
Where the Court in a particular jurisdiction has extended its powers beyond what is 
considered as the traditional reserve of the judiciary, some scholars have called that JA.28 In 
that context, it could be argued also that the Courts in Malawi have practised that type of JA 
since the judiciary has expanded its mandate over political disputes to include ‘intra-party 
disputes’ in a manner described by Gloppen and Kanyongolo as ‘unusual in comparative 
terms.’29 The unusual nature of these disputes vis-à-vis judicial adjudication is that their 
resolution depended on the courts construing the constitutions of the relevant parties as 
opposed to the national Constitution.30 It appears however that just like in India, where 
substantial failings in political and governance institutions led the people to turn to the 
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judiciary,31 the absence of robust dispute settlement mechanisms and intra-party democracy 
within political parties in Malawi among other reasons ‘facilitated the tendency towards 
taking intra-party disputes to courts for resolution.’32 And these disputes mostly were on the 
selection of candidates to represent the various parties in the general election (‘primary 
elections’) where others complained of unfair processes.33 The primary elections for the 
2004 elections alone generated not less than ten (10) such cases involving all of the three 
major parties at the time, United Democratic Front (UDF), Malawi Congress Party (MCP), 
and National Democratic Alliance (NDA).34  
Statements made by the judges in some of the cases involving intra-party disputes show 
their appreciation of the fact that such disputes are not within the traditional jurisdiction of 
the judiciary. One case in which the court was of the view that there were some intra-party 
disputes that were better resolved by the membership was that of Re Constitution of Malawi 
Congress Party and Re Convention and Part 4 Article 40 of the Constitution of the Malawi 
Congress Party.35 The case arose out of divisions in the MCP over the leadership of the 
party (which had direct implications on who would be the presidential candidate in the 
impending national polls). On one side was Gwanda Chakuamba who had contested as the 
Presidential Candidate of MCP in the 1999 general elections, and on the other was John 
Tembo who had been the right-hand man of Dr. Kamuzu Banda and who most likely had 
considered himself the likely ‘heir’ to the leadership of MCP.36 In the ensuing tussle for the 
mantle of leadership, instead of holding one convention and contesting against each other, 
the two sides held separate conventions purportedly under the party constitution; the 
resulting dispute inevitably ended up in the High Court. Even though the judge in that case 
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declared the two conventions void ab initio he nevertheless declined to make any finding 
about who was the legitimate leader of MCP and directed that the leadership wrangle be 
resolved by the party itself. One of the leaders of MCP lodged an appeal in the Supreme 
Court which was unsuccessful. In dismissing the appeal, the SC affirmed the position taken 
by the HC in these terms: 
The issue of who is the legitimate leader of the MCP is a political question 
which must be resolved by the generality of the membership of the MCP. This 
court can’t be the proper forum to resolve the deep divisions that exist in the 
MCP.37 
The MCP membership however failed to resolve the issue amicably resulting in the court 
getting involved in the case again on the same matter in 2002 though under different legal 
issues resulting finally in John Tembo (as the leader of his side) and Kate Kainja (as MCP 
Secretary General) being found guilty of contempt of court.38 This case will be discussed in 
detail subsequently. Suffice to say at this juncture that the extended powers of the judiciary 
into intra-party political disputes has evoked alarm from some political observers who argue 
that the development ‘makes the courts vulnerable’ as ‘the more major political battles are 
channelled into the legal arena, the more important it becomes to have control over the 
judicial branch.’39  
4.2.4 ‘Result-Oriented Judging’40 
Though there is no agreed definition of what constitutes ‘result-oriented judging’ it could 
loosely be described as ‘the actions of judges who do whatever is necessary to rule as they 
personally prefer’ in a manner that ‘departs from some “baseline” of correctness.’41   The 
nature of this definition however, introduces significant subjectivity. That is to say, it is very 
difficult ‘to establish a non-controversial benchmark’ for ‘correctness’.42 In addition, it is 
equally difficult to distinguish between inadvertent errors in legal analysis and a deliberate 
departure from the ‘correct’ legal position in order to arrive at a desired result on the part of 
judges. Some decisions which would raise this difficulty in Malawi are the contradictory 
decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Malawi in the cases of Malawi 
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Congress Party & Others v. Attorney General & Another (Press Trust I)43   and Attorney 
General v. Malawi Congress Party & Others (Press Trust II)44 respectively. The two cases 
will be discussed in detail in a subsequent chapter. However, for this section, it is proposed 
that both the HC and the SC practised JA to arrive at their divergent decisions. 
The Press Trust was a trust that had tentacles in almost every part of the Malawi economy.45 
It was created and incorporated at the initiative of Kamuzu Banda for the benefit of 
Malawians at the time when there was a thin line between the Government of Malawi and 
MCP as a party. The trustees of the Press Trust therefore, largely came from the MCP. In 
the multi-party dispensation therefore, the ruling party enacted legislation to reconstruct the 
Press Trust and replaced the old trustees with new ones. The displaced trustees and MCP 
challenged the Press Trust (Reconstruction) Act for being unconstitutional. The main legal 
question at trail seemed to revolve around the issue as to whom the right to property of the 
Press Trust was vested in view of Section 28 of the Constitution which protected that right 
by proscribing arbitrary deprivation of property without compensation.  
The HC found that the Press Trust was a private trust though charitable and that since the 
legal title vested in the trustees, the right to property that had been breached was that of the 
trustees; further that since the charity had been private not public, the State could not 
reconstruct it without being guilty of arbitrary deprivation of property. Thus the HC found the 
Press Trust (Reconstruction) Act to be unconstitutional among other reasons for being an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. Chirwa has ascribed the incorrect position taken by the HC 
on the vesting of the constitutionally protected right to property in the Press Trust to ‘a 
misunderstanding of the term “property”.’ 46 This thesis argues however, that the analysis of 
the HC on ‘property’ is technically justifiable hence does not point to a misunderstanding of 
‘property.’ The HC’s result-oriented activism, it is contended, emanates from the manner in 
which the trial court preferred to place emphasis on a liberal conception of the right to 
property in the face of evidence to the contrary requiring a different and more historically 
nuanced approach. That is, a liberal conception of the right to property emphasises on 
individual ownership and is blind to other forms of ownership hence attaches undue 
importance on due process of the law (ownership of legal title). The HC judge chose to 
ignore the true nature of the Press Trust in the context of Malawi’s troubled and 
economically exploitative political past- how its establishment had its genesis in the 
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investment of public funds, and its economic hegemony achieved through the utilisation of 
government subsidies among other things.47 Further, the HC chose to attach no weight to 
the stated objective of the Press Trust, that of bringing about the economic development of 
the nation of Malawi and its people. In these stated instances, it is argued that the HC 
departed from the baseline correctness in determining property ownership in fact in order to 
arrive at its preferred conception of the right to property, the more liberal-oriented position. 
The SC on the other hand, found that the Press Trust was a public trust held for the benefit 
of the people of Malawi. The SC found for the public nature of the Trust by attaching weight 
to its historical establishment through the use of public funds and the fact that it attained the 
economic hegemony through government subsidies among others. However, the SC itself 
departed from the baseline of correctness in its determination of the right to property by 
attaching weight to the beneficial interest to the exclusion of any other form of title.48 Even 
though Chirwa yet again ascribes this departure from ‘correctness’ to ‘a misunderstanding of 
the term “property”,’49 it is arguable that the SC chose to attach very little weight to the legal 
title that vested in the trustees in order to arrive at their preferred conception of the right to 
property in view of the unique circumstances of the Press Trust. The emphasis the SC 
placed on the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Press Trust, it is 
submitted, supports this argument. That is, in a bid to ensure that a Trust that was for all 
intents and purposes public should not become private by a positivist approach to the ‘right 
to property’, the SC chose to render the vesting of legal title in the trustees of no 
consequence.50  
4.2.5 Invalidating Legislation 
In Malawi, the Constitution expressly provides for the power of a court of law to declare ‘any 
act of Government or any law’ invalid if it is found to be ‘inconsistent with [its] provisions.’51 
However, since the mere decision to invalidate a legislative enactment by the court has 
been described as JA by a considerable number of scholars from various jurisdictions,52 this 
section will highlight the cases in which Malawian Courts have invalidated a whole statute 
and specific provisions in some Statutes in order to place those decisions within 
comparative terms. 
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The first example of such cases is that of Sidik Aboobaker v. Attorney General.53 The case 
dealt with the Forfeiture Act,54 which like so many Acts enacted in the one-party regime, 
contained a provision which provided that any order made under it could not be challenged 
in any court of law. The 1994 Constitution most likely with the aim of curtailing such 
legislative practices in Section 11 (4) provides that ‘[a]ny law that ousts or purports to oust 
the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain matters pertaining to this Constitution shall be 
invalid.’ On that basis, the Court declared the Forfeiture Act unconstitutional. It appears that 
this case is the only one so far, in which the Court has declared a whole Statute invalid; in 
the subsequent cases, it has only been dealing with specific provisions in some statutes. 
In the case of Rep. v Chinthiti and Others (1),55 several accused persons were charged with 
theft by servant among other offences. The suspects raised preliminary objections including 
the admissibility of confession statements in criminal trials in general. In his analysis the trial 
judge focused on the law that governed the admissibility of confession statements in Malawi, 
namely Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence code (CP&EC); especially 
subsections (1) and (3) that allowed the admissibility of involuntary confessions including 
those that may not have been given freely (such as where the suspect was under 
compulsion to give a confession statement). Before the 1994 Constitution, jurisprudence 
from the court developed principles upon which statements obtained by compulsion could 
be admissible upon establishing that the said statement was made by the accused and its 
contents were materially true.56 The court in the Chinthiti case upheld the constitutionality 
and admissibility of voluntary confessions in criminal trials but pointed out that ‘confessions 
obtained through compulsion are a thing of the past’ and that Section 42 (2)(c) of the 1994 
Constitution expressly provided that every accused person had a right ‘not to be compelled 
to make a confession or admission which could be used in evidence against him or her.’ 
Therefore, to the extent that Section 176 (1) and (3) allowed the admission of involuntary 
confessions, the court declared those provisions invalid. This case marked a significant 
break from the past- where the one party regime thrived on involuntary confessions obtained 
from accused persons. Similarly, in the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kamuzu 
Banda and Others,57 the SC invalidated Sections 313 and 314 of the CP & EC ‘to the extent 
that they [did] not recognise the right of an accused to remain silent as provided for by 
                                                          
53
 Civil Cause No. 964 of 1994 (unreported). 
54
 Act No. 1 of 1966. 
55
 (1997) 1 MLR 59 
56
 For example, Chiwaya vand Another v. Rep. (1966 - 68) 4 ALR MAL 64; Chiphaka v. Rep. (1970 - 72) 6 ALR 
MAL 214; and Rep. v. Nalivata and Another, (1970 - 72) 6 ALR MAL 101. 
57
 [1997] 1 MLR 7 
132 
 
section 42(2)(f)(iii) of the 1994 Constitution.’58 The SC found that Sections 313 and 314 of 
the CP&EC authorised the prosecution to comment on the decision of the accused person 
not to testify in a manner that was prejudicial to his right to remain silent. To that extent 
therefore, they were found to be unconstitutional and declared invalid. It is ironic that 
Kamuzu Banda, the authoritarian leader who had denied others access to the High Court, 
had recourse to that judicial forum when he found himself in conflict with the law and 
successfully challenged the very law his government had enacted. 
Initially, cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes of their respective provisions were 
heard before a single judge of the High Court. Subsequently, the practice was amended to 
provide for the empanelling of a ‘Constitutional Court’ by the Chief Justice comprising of 
three judges of the High Court.59 Thus subsequent cases in which provisions in statutes 
were invalidated emanated from the Constitutional Court. For instance, in the case of Friday 
Jumbe & Humphrey Mvula v. Attorney General,60 the court invalidated Section 25B (3) of the 
Corrupt Practices Act (‘CPA’) on the ground that it violated the right to be presumed 
innocent and to remain silent as enshrined in Section 42 (2)(f)(iii) of the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court (by a majority decision) determined that the provision could not be 
saved by Sections 42 (2) and (3) of the Constitution, which allowed for constitutional 
limitations to the rights enshrined in the same Constitution.61 Section 25B (3) of the CPA 
created a reverse onus burden of proof for a person accused of corruption.62 The decision of 
the Constitutional Court was a majority decision of 2-1.  A detailed discussion of the case 
will follow in a subsequent chapter. Suffice to say at this juncture that the precedential value 
of the case may be limited due to the fact that the two judges who found unconstitutionality 
of the section substantially varied in their legal reasoning which though admirable in terms of 
judicial diversity, arguably introduces inconsistencies and uncertainty as to the ratio- 
decidendi for such a conclusion. 
Another case decided by the Constitutional court is that of Francis Kafantayeni and Others 
v. Attorney General.63 In that case, six prisoners who had been sentenced to death following 
a conviction for murder challenged the constitutionality of section 210 of the Penal Code 
which provided for death as a mandatory sentence in the event of a conviction for murder. 
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Since Section 16 of the 1994 Constitution which provides the right to life has a proviso 
allowing for the imposition of a death sentence by ‘a competent court of law’ the Court found 
that indeed the Constitution permitted the death penalty in criminal proceedings ‘not its 
mandatory imposition.’64 Instead the Court held that the right to fair trial enshrined in Section 
42 (2)(f) of the Constitution entailed a corresponding authorisation for judicial discretion in 
the determination of an appropriate sentence in the event of a conviction, and a subsequent 
right of appeal before a superior court against the sentence imposed by the trial court. The 
Court therefore observed that the imposition of a mandatory death sentence removed such 
discretion from both the trial court and the appellate court hence was to that extent, 
inconsistent with the right to fair trial.65 Thus the court declared section 210 of the Penal 
code unconstitutional hence invalid. The Supreme Court has gone on to confirm the 
Kafantayeni case in subsequent cases.66 
4.2.6 Ignoring precedent from a superior court 
Ignoring precedent on the part of a common law court has generally been described as JA 
even though distinctions are not usually made between horizontal and vertical precedent.67 
In this section we will restrict the discussion to incidents of ignoring vertical precedent 
(decisions of a superior court) since such decisions are binding upon the lower courts as 
distinguished from the discussion in section 4.2.1. above.  
The jurisprudence from Malawian Courts on the issue of locus standi has attracted a lot of 
debate and controversy especially among Malawian scholars where most have argued that 
the courts have adopted a restrictive interpretation of the constitutional provisions on 
standing.68 The Constitution provides for standing in two sections, namely Sections 15 (2) 
and 46 (2) respectively: 
Any person or group of persons with sufficient interest in the protection and 
enforcement of rights under this Chapter shall be entitled to the assistance of 
the courts, the Ombusman, the Human Rights Commission and other organs of 
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Government to ensure the promotion, protection and redress of grievance in 
respect of those rights. 
And 
Any person who claims that a fundamental right or freedom has been infringed 
or threatened is entitled- 
a. To make application to a competent court to enforce or protect such a right or 
freedom; and 
b. To make application to the Ombudsman or the Human Rights Commission in 
order to secure such assistance or advice as he or she may reasonably 
require. 
One of the earliest jurisprudence that came from the SC on this issue arose in the case of 
President of Malawi and another v. Kachere and others.69 In this case, several individuals 
styled as ‘citizens of Malawi’ brought an action in the HC70 against the President and the 
Speaker of the National Assembly challenging the constitutionality of several of their actions 
carried out both in their official capacity and individually. Among the issues raised, was the 
issue of the appropriate procedure for amending the Constitution, the constitutionally 
appropriate candidates for the position of cabinet ministers (specifically whether Members of 
Parliament were not ineligible) and whether it was not a violation of the Constitution for the 
President and his cabinet not to declare their assets. The Attorney General raised 
preliminary objections in the matter including the issue of the standing of the ‘citizens of 
Malawi.’ The AG argued that ‘citizens of Malawi’ had no locus standi in the matters. The HC 
found that they had locus standi and the AG office appealed against that order before the 
SC.  
Even though the ‘citizens of Malawi’ based their action on the provisions of the Constitution, 
the SC declared that the type of remedy sought (declaratory order) had its roots in English 
law and proceeded to apply English precedents to the dispute. As a consequence, the SC 
construed the issue of standing as requiring that the person(s) bringing the action must 
demonstrate ‘a real interest which he wants to protect.’ In order to qualify as ‘real interest’ 
the SC pronounced that the interest must not be ‘too indirect and insubstantial [as to] give 
him any relief in ‘any real sense.’ Therefore, it was held that ‘sufficient interest’ is the one 
‘which is over and above the general interest.’ To that end, the SC found that the ‘citizens of 
Malawi’ had no locus standi in the matter since they had ‘not shown that their individual right 
ha[d] been infringed.’ In effect, the SC construed ‘sufficient interest’ in a matter as requiring 
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that a claimant must demonstrate that ‘he or she had suffered a particular harm as a result 
of alleged breaches of the Constitution.’71 Many Malawian scholars have criticised this 
decision of the SC for setting a precedent which constitutes a restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of standing under the Constitution,72 even though the SC recognised 
representative action.73  
Not only scholars had problems with the restrictive approach adopted by the SC but even 
the HC bench; for contrary to established rules of precedent the HC (in some cases) 
proceeded to disregard the Kachere case and similar decisions.74 In a jurisdiction which 
follows the common law doctrine of precedent that is rare and warrants close attention in 
this discussion. In order to show that this was not inadvertent, we will quote extensively from 
the judgments concerned. One such case was Thandiwe Oleke v. Minister of Home Affairs 
(Controller of Immigration).75 The HC did not even conceal its resolve to disregard SC 
precedent: 
The matter of locus standi has been to the Supreme Court of Appeal…It is 
the conclusion [of the SC] that our citizens have no right under our 
Constitution to question fundamental human rights violations unless they 
have a sufficient interest in the matter that future generations may find very 
difficult to comprehend or justify.76   
In a clear criticism of the SC’s reliance on foreign jurisprudence on locus standi the judge 
highlighted the uniqueness of the Constitution thus: 
It is fundamental therefore to consider the Constitution’s wording, drawing 
much one can reasonably draw from what happened around constitutional 
change and what it brought out. A country’s constitution must be understood 
in the wider context of the country’s aspirations.77 
Before proceeding with this particular case, it is worth noting that this particular judge made 
reference to the need for historical considerations and national aspirations when construing 
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the Constitution yet he ignored the peculiar historical situation of the Press Trust when 
construing the ‘right to property’ in the Constitution in an earlier decision. The judge went on 
to denounce the SC precedent by stating that: 
Suggesting that only the person whose rights are violated has sufficient interest 
in the protection and enforcement of rights…is a restrictive and unjustified 
interpretation of Section 15 (2)…[and] is non sequitur.78 
Accordingly, had they intended such a restrictive reading ‘the framers would have used 
words like ‘sufficient interest in the promotion and enforcement of “his or her”, “ones or 
their” rights. Consequently, the judge concluded that S. 15 (2) confers standing before 
the court to ‘any person or any group who [can] establish a sufficient interest in the 
protection and promotion of rights under [the] Constitution.’79  
In another case, a different judge departed from the SC decisions in the Kachere and Press 
Trust Cases though for reasons different from the Okeke decision. In recognition of the 
implicit reliance which the SC placed on common law jurisprudence, the lawyers who argued 
for the case in Registered Trustees of the Public Affairs Committee v. Attorney General & 
Another80 decided to highlight new developments in such jurisprudence with a view to 
inviting the HC to appreciate the evolving principle of standing before the common law 
courts. The plaintiff, a civil rights organisation, sought to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Act which purported to amend a constitutional provision on crossing the floor. The Attorney 
General yet again raised the preliminary issue of locus standi. Commenting on 
developments in the common law on standing, the HC observed that the position had 
significantly changed: 
… at least as regards constitutional rights cases as opposed to ordinary 
cases…From the originally very strict common law position that locus standi only 
goes with possession, on a complainants part, of a personal grievance over and 
above that of the general public to a more liberal grant of standing.81  
After such reflection, the judge made these observations on the previous SC precedents on 
standing: 
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I…will…definitely dare to think that if this new regime of case authorities had 
been put to the SC…as it has been…in this case, that Court might not in the 
famous Kachere and Press Trust cases have pronounced and maintained the 
inflexible…views they issued on locus standi in regard to Sections 15 (2) and 
46 (2) as they did. In short… [I have] genuine reasonable doubts…whether 
our SC would stick to its current position on the issue…when fully exposed to 
the impact of these authorities.82 
Thereafter the judge dropped the subtle approach of criticising the methodology adopted by 
the SC in its interpretation of the Constitution and became more overt in his dissent: 
In Malawi, it is my view…that the Constitution is far from [being] ambiguous in 
its prescriptions on matters of standing in relation to presentation of 
complaints of violations of fundamental rights under it. It speaks so directly, 
and I believe without equivocation, that I tend to think that it is the style in 
which our Courts [read Supreme Court] have approached it that have 
complicated things. It strikes me that instead of being patient and sincerely 
listening to its direct message, Courts have rushed to put on old common law 
spectacles, and so to dig up ancient case law, before getting convinced that 
they can even begin to understand the document before them. This, with due 
respect, is what has tended to cloud the otherwise clear document and I think 
it is a fallacy.…I find it difficult how in the Kachere and Press Trust cases [the 
SC] could have ended up with a narrow and legalistic, if not also pedantic, 
version of locus standi …83  
And in a style reminiscent of a superior court setting aside lower court decisions, the judge 
clarified how the SC had erred in its legal reasoning: 
To begin with…the court in its interpretation…clung so unduly hard to strict 
old common law position and did not have a chance to note that even that 
position has somewhat changed. Secondly, it appears to me that no real 
effort was employed by the SC to first try and understand the plain wording of 
the provisions for what they truly stood for. Thirdly, it appears to me that 
undue attention was given to foreign precedents, which were not after all 
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directly interpreting this Constitution, to impose on the provisions under 
interpretation values [that] this Constitution [does not] propound.84  
He thus went on to agree with the HC decision in the Okeke case discussed earlier and 
concluded that:  
…with the greatest respect to my Superior Court…I have opted to differ from 
those two authorities as I believe them to harbour some serious faults.85  
The fact that judges in the HC had ignored (distinguished?) binding precedent was not lost 
on the SC. The apex court used a subsequent decision of Civil Liberties Committee (CILIC) 
v. Ministry of Justice & Registrar General86  to reassert its views in no uncertain terms. The 
plaintiffs in this case are a registered human rights organisation in Malawi; they were 
challenging the decision of the Registrar General (Ministry of Justice) to cancel the 
registration of an organisation called Chikonzero Communications and to ban its publication, 
the National Agenda. The HC (the same judge who had decided the Okeke case), dismissed 
the preliminary objections of the defendants which included that CILIC had no locus standi in 
the matter and granted CILIC leave for judicial review. The defendants appealed to the SC. 
The SC disagreed with the HC and held that CILIC had no locus standi, observing: 
It may be pertinent at this juncture to comment on a recent HC decision in 
which [the court] deliberately refused to follow local case authorities…bearing 
on issues of locus standi…The first observation we wish to make is that it is 
unclear what standard for locus standi was the learned judge…advocating. 
We do not wish to believe that because of the wording of section 46 (2) of the 
Constitution it can be said that the Malawi Constitution totally removed the 
requirement for a plaintiff to establish standing before commencing a 
suit.…We take the view that [the HC]’s interpretation of section 46 (2) of the 
Constitution in the Public Affairs Committee case was too simplistic and 
casual that it could not be correct. By destroying the concept of locus standi 
and rendering it totally irrelevant the learned judge’s construction of the 
section produced a result which, we strongly believe, was not intended by the 
distinguished women and men who drafted our Constitution.87 
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In this disagreement between the HC and SC Chirwa points out that both courts have erred 
in some respects.88 The SC’s position errs for leaving no room for representative action or 
actions in the purely general public interest.89 For instance, where it would not be reasonably 
possible for any specific individual to adduce evidence of having ‘suffered a particular harm 
as a result of alleged breaches of the Constitution’, such as when challenging the 
constitutionality of proposed constitutional amendments.90 The HC on the other hand has 
erred in that it has incorrectly presented the position as an unconditional opening for any 
person or organisation, to ‘claim standing in every case disclosing a violation or threat of 
violation of a human right or other constitutional provision.’91 Regardless of the patent error 
on the part of the HC, if as some scholars argue that disregarding superior court precedents 
is JA, then in that sense the HC has practised JA in the two cases discussed. 
4.3 Appreciating the problem 
The preceding discussions show that courts in Malawi have made decisions in a manner 
described by scholars in other jurisdictions as JA.  
4.3.1 Inconsistencies, contradictions and other incompatibilities  
Furthermore the decisions also show inconsistencies, contradictions and/or possible 
injustice of JA similar to those highlighted in chapter 2 of this thesis. For instance, even 
though the HC (Okeke and PAC cases) ignored vertical precedent (JA) to expand the 
category of individuals and organisations with standing to protect and promote fundamental 
human rights, they did so by mostly invoking what they considered the plain meaning of the 
terms used in the constitution (legal positivism) and the intention of the drafters of the 
Constitution (originalism). Thus, while there appears to be a general presumption among 
most scholars who discuss JA in positive terms that JA requires a rejection of legal 
positivism and originalism, both the Okeke and PAC cases rebut that presumption; which 
rebuttal is consistent with the analyses in chapter 2 of this thesis. Similarly, often, it is 
adherence to ‘legal positivism’92 that is ‘held responsible for … the insensitivity of judges to 
the … social realities’ that should inform the just resolution of disputes in their courts;93 it is 
thus presumed that judges who are sensitive to those social realities are activist judges.94 
                                                          
88
 Chirwa (n 46) 75 – 76. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Generally understood as the judicial approach that emphasises adherence to the language and terms of ‘the 
law previously laid down by other decision-makers’ as opposed to attaching meaning to it that may have been 
prior to the relevant decision, ‘unsuspected.’ See TD Campbell, ‘Preface’ in T Campbell, and J Goldsworthy, 
Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal Positivism (Dartmouth, 2000) xiii. 
93
TD Campbell, ‘Democratic Aspects of Ethical Positivism’ in Campbell & Goldsworthy (ibid) 3. 
94
 See discussion in chapter 2. 
140 
 
However, as a detailed discussion in a subsequent chapter will show, the HC decision in the 
Press Trust I though fitting that description of JA proceeded from a point of insensitivity to 
the socio-historical realities of the Press Trust that should have been taken into account by 
the judge in order to reach a just resolution of the case. 95  
In addition, the decision denounced as expressing a narrow view of the right to property for 
attaching importance to the beneficial interest, the Press Trust II, is the very decision that 
offers hope to many rural Malawians who only have a beneficial interest to customary land 
which has under liberal conceptions of land rights been considered insecure and not entitled 
to the same ‘constitutional protection as ownership of registered or private land.’96 Thus 
Press Trust II introduces another contradiction in that although the decision has been 
described as narrow and reserved (judicial restraint) in its approach to the interpretation of a 
constitutional right to property, 97 it nevertheless displays a peculiar sensitivity to the socio-
historical realities within Malawi, a phenomenon which is principally associated with JA 
judges. This analysis points to the conclusion that it must not be presumed that a liberal 
interpretation of rights would necessarily lead to a just outcome in all circumstances. 
Further, it must also not be presumed that JA on one hand, and legal positivism and 
originalism on the other are always mutually exclusive and incompatible.    
4.3.2 Judicial Activism: A Matter of form over substance? 
The preceding discussion raises the question whether, in general, discourse on JA does not 
exhort its form over its substance.  In 1992, the Chief Justice of India, Justice Bhagwati 
spoke in glowing terms about JA by the Indian Supreme Court.98 As an example, he 
discussed the JA of the India SC on the development of public interest litigation, he 
expressed pride in how the Indian SC ‘started wielding judicial power in a manner 
unprecedented in its history’ to bring about a revolution in the judicial process’ and 
innovatively developed the ‘strategy of Public Interest Litigation [PIL].’99 According to him, 
the purpose of the JA on PIL was to make ‘human rights meaningful for the large masses of 
people in the country and making it possible for them to realise their social and economic 
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entitlements.’100 And in response to those who argued that JA could lead to ‘judicial 
arbitrariness culminating in judicial tyranny’ he dismissed those fears as baseless since 
there were ‘inbuilt restraints which keep the judges from straying away from their proper 
judicial function.’101 Thus he defined JA in terms of the judiciary ‘appropriat[ing] increased 
power [for itself] … as well as … creati[ng] new concepts, irrespective of the purpose which 
they serve.’102 Eleven years later, in 2003, as discussed in chapter 2, research shows that 
though ‘court induced’ PIL has created work for opportunistic human rights activists in India, 
as far as   people who should have benefited are concerned, JA in India has just shown 
them that judicial power manifesting itself as JA is itself a form of state power that can be 
used to oppress and marginalize people.103 This has occurred to such an extent that the 
masses have since cried out to the Indian SC ‘Physician heal thyself’;104 and others have 
stated that the Indian SC has shaken the foundations of ‘the 1950 Indian Constitution.’105 It 
can be proposed in this context that may be Justice Bhagwati’s speech had focused on the 
‘form’ taken by JA in India, whereas the subsequent research a decade later has disclosed 
the real ‘substance’ of JA in that jurisdiction. In this sense therefore, even though in legal 
terms ‘form’ often pertains to the procedural aspects of the law whereas ‘substance’ often 
pertains to the substantive content of laws this section will deliberately adopt a simplistic 
definition of the terms. Consequently, ‘form’ will be taken to refer to ‘what something looks 
like, its external characteristics, its packaging’ and ‘substance’ will be taken to refer to ‘what 
it actually is, its essentials, what’s inside’ and what purpose it actually serves in the end.106 
So, using the Indian example where JA is defined as the appropriation of extensive powers 
by the judiciary or the creation of new concepts, an analytical approach that emphasises 
form will only consider whether it can be observed that the judiciary has appropriated for 
itself such extensive powers and has developed any new legal concepts. An approach that 
emphasises the substance however will focus on the content of the decisions and the 
decision-making process using the applicable Constitution as a basis for such analysis, 
without neglecting the social, economic and/or historical circumstances of the relevant 
society.   
In this context, it is submitted that most discourse about JA in emerging democracies tends 
to exalt the form over the substance. That is, whereas there appears to be a general 
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agreement in developed countries that the term JA is a term a judge in those nations would 
hate to be attached to them,107 it appears that articles pertaining to JA in emerging 
democracies tend to exhort judges in those nations to practice JA, even though the 
definitions in those calls are as varied as they are inconsistent.108 It is appreciated that these 
calls are often made in the face of general abuse of power by the legislative and executive 
arms leading the population/scholars to look to the judiciary to remedy/check those abuses. 
This thesis if of the view that as noble as that may be, unless care is taken to interrogate the 
substance of JA as it currently stands, Malawi could end up with the Indian situation where 
the population has become cynical towards the court due to the perception that even the 
Indian SC has become part of the problem for abusing its power.109  
It is with the aim of contributing towards avoiding the Indian scenario that this section is 
pointing out that the calls for JA appear to proceed on a basis that might be blind to the 
reality that judicial power is itself political power and is liable to abuse. By exalting form over 
substance, this thesis argues that the scholars are repeating the same mistake made by 
proponents of liberal democracy in Africa as discussed in chapter 3. In such a context the 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to JA discourse could serve to undermine some constitutional 
frameworks; and in the case of regime change constitutions, such jurisprudence could undo 
the work that such a document aimed to accomplish in the first place. 
Thus while some countries have ‘independence constitutions’,110 others like Malawi have 
‘regime change constitutions’111 instead. By its very nature, a regime change constitution not 
only aims to mark a new beginning, but seeks to break from the past hence often adopts a 
‘unique constitution’ which represents the unique circumstances of the relevant country.112 
The uniqueness of the constitution emanates from the fact that it is not built on a pre-
existing model, but rather borrows creatively from different jurisdictions in order to produce a 
document capturing the concerned country’s peculiarities.113 For example, a regime change 
constitution could specify certain values intending them to be taken literally, as per their 
plain, ordinary or natural meaning. However discourse on JA tends to denounce the 
constitutional interpretation methodology that emphasises plain, ordinary or natural meaning 
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of the terms of the constitution as out-dated and having no place in modern constitutional 
jurisprudence (a phenomenon otherwise known as ‘legal positivism’).114 This 
characterisation of JA thus creates the incorrect impression that legal positivism can never 
lead to justice and/or promote constitutionalism. An analysis of some of the Malawian cases 
discussed above could help to clarify this point further.  
Table 1 below intends to facilitate that analysis by providing a synopsis of the attributes 
attached to JA judges in comparison to those considered as practising ‘judicial passivity’, 
otherwise described as judicial conservatism or restraint.    
 
Table 1115 
Type of 
Issue/Category 
What has been labelled 
as Judicial ‘Activism’ 
 
What has been labelled as Judicial 
‘Passivity’/’Conservativism’/’Restraint’ 
Constitutional 
Interpretive 
Methodology116 
-  Liberal 
-  Purposive 
-  Conceptual/contextual 
- Conservative (more appropriately ‘non-
liberal’)117 
- Ordinary, plain or natural meaning  
- Originalism, legal positivism 
Law-making - makes law 
- invalidates legislation 
- do not make law (leaves that to 
legislatures) 
- declines to invalidate legislation 
Policy choices - where appropriate 
willing to adjudicate on 
matters of policy 
- unwilling to adjudicate on matters of 
policy since considers questions of policy 
strictly the ambit of other branches of 
government not the judiciary 
Political disputes - entertains political 
decisions in their courts 
- do not entertain political decisions in 
their courts 
Creativity - creative/innovative 
(develops new concepts) 
- not creative/innovative (unwilling to 
develop new concepts) 
Sensitivity to social 
realities 
- are sensitive to social 
realities (concerns 
themselves with the 
ends of the law) 
- are not sensitive to social realities (do 
not concern themselves with the ends of 
the law) 
 
Using the attributes outlined in Table 1 above to analyse some of the Malawian cases 
discussed earlier would illuminate the inadequacy of using form to define JA. For instance, 
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the Press Trust I has been applauded by many for its adoption of a liberal conception of the 
right to property as well as for ‘representing the right approach [when] construing a 
constitutional provision.’118 To that extent, the Press Trust I would fit into the JA form as far 
as constitutional interpretive methodology is concerned. However, the Press Trust I as 
already highlighted in this chapter and by other Malawian scholars, was insensitive to the 
socio-historical realities surrounding the establishment and growth of the Press Trust itself, 
such that had it been allowed to stand, it would have occasioned considerable injustice. To 
that extent, the Press Trust I fails the ‘form’ of JA in the sensitivity to social realities category 
and would need to be categorised as ‘legal positivism’. While the converse is true of the 
Press Trust II; it fits the ‘form’ of judicial passivity/conservatism in the constitutional 
interpretive methodology category but fits the form of JA in the sensitivity to social realities 
category. What lessons can be drawn from this simple illustration? Should it be said that the 
judges displayed both JA and judicial restraint? It would be logical if one was to pay 
attention to the ‘form’ to state that indeed the lesson to be drawn is that some cases will 
represent a fusion of the two. However, it is argued that the more pertinent lesson to learn is 
that focusing on the ‘form’ when discussing JA can not only be very misleading, but may 
actually result in the promotion of injustice if such forms were allowed to carry the day. For 
instance, a liberal conception of the right to property has led to a failure on the part of the 
HC which disregarded the precedent set119 in Press Trust I to confer constitutional protection 
to the ‘right to property’ of the beneficiaries’ customary land.120 Such a denial prejudices the 
rights of many rural Malawians since most of the rural land is under customary ownership. 
Consequently, though the HC decision qualifies as JA since it used a liberal approach to 
constitutional interpretive methodology as illustrated in Table 1, in reality, such jurisprudence 
would have perpetrated the same injustice that was occasioned on rural Malawians by the 
colonialists.  
To illustrate the point further consider the case described above as an example of JA (in the 
sense of ignoring precedent of a superior court): when it came to interpretive methodology 
the judge impliedly propagated a fusion of the legal positivism (literalism), originalism and 
purposive constitutional methodologies when he stated among other things that: 
It is the court’s duty to interpret this Constitution understanding it ascribes to 
itself a potency and uniqueness not to be overshadowed by general 
considerations in other constitutional arrangements. It is fundamental 
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therefore to consider the Constitution’s wording, drawing much one can 
reasonably draw from what happened around constitutional change and what 
it brought out. A country’s constitution must be understood in the wider 
context of the country’s aspirations. … The words actually used are ‘sufficient 
interest in the protection and enforcement of rights’. … If they intended the 
interest to be in the protection and enforcement of’ one’s rights, the framers 
would have used words like ‘sufficient interest in the promotion and 
enforcement of “his or her”, “ones or their” rights.121 
Such a fusion of interpretive methodologies leads to a situation where it would be difficult to 
cast Malawian cases into JA definitions from other jurisdictions which presuppose the 
incompatibility of legal positivism (literalism) and originalism with the very notion of JA. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The discussion points to the conclusion that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to calls for JA in 
a country like Malawi based on pre-existing definitions from other countries with different 
constitutional frameworks must be abandoned. Instead there must be a ‘substantive’ 
approach to JA reflecting the uniqueness of the relevant constitutional framework; 
recognising the social, historical and economic circumstances of the jurisdiction. In actual 
fact, the uniqueness of the Malawian Constitution demands that the courts develop an 
equally unique and truly indigenous constitutional jurisprudence, and constitutional 
interpretive methodologies suited to the Malawian context.  This may actually necessitate the 
adoption of an unprecedented fusion of constitutional interpretive methodologies including 
those described elsewhere as out-dated such as legal positivism, originalism etc. in order to 
achieve justice.  
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Chapter 5 
Judicial (In)Activism In Criminal Law 
5.1 Introduction 
The 1994 Constitution expressly included the Bill of Rights, effectively placing it at its 
centre.1 As a consequence, post 1994 has seen a surge in Constitutional cases where the 
applicants sought to protect their rights as enshrined in the Constitution.2 This development 
has encompassed rights and freedoms of significance to criminal law such as presumption 
of innocence and personal liberty. The developments appear to have led some scholars to 
assert that the 1966 Malawi Constitution is a document which ‘did not guarantee human 
rights.’3 It will be argued herein that such a description does not represent the true legal 
position. Within its second schedule the 1966 Constitution contained Section 2 (1)(iii) 
stipulating that ‘…Malawi shall continue to recognize the sanctity of the personal liberties 
enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights...’ In essence, this provision 
the UDHR part of the law of the nation of Malawi.4 It was now the duty of the courts to 
protect ‘fundamental human rights’ under that provision.5 
The earliest case to discuss that provision was Mwakawanga and Seven Others v. The 
Republic.6 The appellants were charged with preparing or conspiring to overthrow the 
government of Malawi by force or other unlawful means. The evidence before the court was 
that the appellants had met in a refugee camp in Tanzania with Malawian ex-ministers who 
told them of the plan to overthrow the Malawi government, to which they agreed. The 
appellants were convicted by the HC of treason and they appealed to the SC. Among other 
grounds of appeal it was alleged that the trial court had erred in not allowing Counsel for the 
defence to question the fitness of assessors to sit in the trial. However, none of the grounds 
of appeal directly referred to the rights of the appellants under the 1966 Constitution. 
Interestingly, Counsel for the State among other things argued that because the appellants 
had breached the trust of the Republic to which they owed allegiance they had thereby 
forfeited the right to claim any protection under its laws. In its judgment the SC held that in 
keeping with S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution even a foreigner who ‘violates allegiance he 
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owes to the State,’ is entitled to ‘the benefit of due process of law and his person and 
property continue to be protected by law.’7  
Even though it is beyond dispute that the Court in the Mwakawanga case applied S. 2(1)(iii) 
of the 1966 Constitution, it may be debatable which legal authority the SC applied to  afford 
equal protection to foreigners since the court did not expressly state which provision of the 
UDHR it was enforcing. This thesis submits that despite that omission, it was the provision 
on equal protection before the law. Thus the Court implicitly gave effect to article 7 of the 
UDHR which provides that ‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law…’ Thus by virtue of a provision in the 1966 
Constitution, the right to equal protection before the law was enforced in favour of 
Mwakawanga and others. 
Further, albeit the Mwakawanga case being the only reported Malawian case that expressly 
applied S. 2 (1)(iii) between 1966 to 1989,8 there are other decisions where other rights were 
enforced, although yet again the judges did not cite the particular law they were construing. 
For example, in Saidi v. Republic9 the applicant was arrested on a charge of theft by servant 
and initially kept in custody for five weeks before being brought before a court. Upon being 
brought before the magistrate for plea taking, he applied for bail which was denied. Before 
trial could commence, the case was adjourned on several occasions at the instance of the 
prosecution team and on all those occasions’ applications for bail were denied by the 
magistrate. The case was later referred to the HC for trial and the applicant once again 
sought bail pending trial. The HC held that ‘every citizen has an inherent right to the freedom 
of his movement [and] the right can only be interfered with after certain matters have been 
proven.’10 Further, even though the commission of an offence merited the limitation of the 
freedom of movement, the presumption of innocence called for a continuation of such 
freedoms provided certain conditions were met.11  
It cannot be accurate therefore to assert categorically that the 1966 Constitution did not 
guarantee human rights. Nevertheless, a pertinent question arises – to what extent are the 
scholarly assertions that the 1966 did not guarantee human rights a reflection on the role of 
the Judiciary in the interpretation and enforcement of S. 2 (1) (iii) of that Constitution? 
Therefore, given such confusion from the commentators, it is imperative for judges to 
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appreciate that their approach to constitutional adjudication in any one particular case has 
far reaching ramifications. That notwithstanding, it is equally imperative for 
academics/scholars to accurately diagnose the problem if effective solutions are to be 
identified. In chapter 1, this thesis discussed how scholars have identified problems in the 
current constitutional praxis and called on the judiciary to practice JA in order to remedy the 
constitutionalism deficiency. However, in chapter 4, this thesis demonstrated how (using the 
comparative framework developed in chapter 2) it is inaccurate to assert that the judiciary in 
Malawi has not practised JA: it is therefore proposed that the source of the problem might lie 
elsewhere. 
In order to highlight where the problem emanates from, this chapter will analyse the 
development of constitutional jurisprudence in the context of criminal law. The chapter is 
divided into three main sections. This first section has discussed the jurisprudence prior to 
the constitutional reforms of 1994 to show that in some way the lack of robust human-rights-
orientated jurisprudence has more to do with the judicial approach the political realities than 
the law itself. Building on that theme, the second section focuses on one particular case 
which epitomizes that proposition. The significance of that decision lies in its precipitous 
influence on political transition in Malawi; but more significantly using the same legal 
instrument which had hitherto been considered as not protecting fundamental human rights 
the SC decided in the Chihana trial that the 1966 Constitution in fact incorporated the UDHR. 
The discussion further highlights the application of foreign case law and questions the tools 
with which such comparable jurisprudence can properly be exploited to enrich and not inhibit 
or subvert Malawi’s peculiar jurisprudence.  The third section zeroes in on the court’s 
engagement with the fundamental tenet of criminal justice, namely the presumption of 
innocence within the context of our current constitution. The defining theme being how much 
there is any discernible principle (or set of principles) which the courts have or are 
developing in seeking to interpret the more patently benign human rights guarantees. The 
lingering question being whether there is any philosophical framework that takes full account 
of the democratic imperative which informs the entire reconstituting project embodied in the 
1994 Constitution.   
5.2 Pre-1994 Cases: The Chakufwa Chihana Case as a Turning Point? 
The lack of judicial elucidation on the rights espoused in S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution 
in the cases of Saidi and Mwakawanga  discussed earlier is arguably hard to account for in a 
jurisdiction exercising common law traditions as Malawi. As per Justice Kirby, the obligation 
on the common law judge to furnish reasoned decisions by providing ‘legal reasoning’ 
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attached to ‘legal authority,’ is one of the fundamental tenets of the common law.12 It is 
postulated that the phenomenon (of lack of elucidation) reflects the influence of legal training 
on the judge’s reasoning.13 As has been discussed in previous chapters, the parliamentary 
supremacy model of the United Kingdom legal system has heavily impinged on 
Constitutional jurisprudence in Malawi Courts.  However, as the Malawi political landscape 
opened up, the legal reasoning of the Courts appears to have been responding positively 
displaying greater boldness.14  
Arguably, the most significant pre-1994 case is The Republic v. Chakufwa Tom Chihana.15 
That case marked a turning point in constitutional jurisprudence emanating from Malawi 
Courts; paradoxically it could also be the reason why scholars assert that the 1966 
Constitution failed to guarantee human rights. The case came before the HC in the first 
instance and went on appeal to the SC. The case is significant because of its chronological 
place in the political transition of Malawi. It has been proposed that at the time the societal 
demand was for more openness which in turn meant that the SC felt emboldened to take a 
more rights based approach (albeit very minimal) in criminal law adjudication.16 On the other 
hand, the return of a guilty verdict by the HC for sedition despite making a finding that 
Chihana’s publications were factually true and made in the context of discussions on 
democracy could be the reason why scholars have concluded that the 1966 Constitution did 
not guarantee human rights.  
Mr Chakufwa Chihana, a Malawian Trade Unionist, was the face of the transition movement 
in the early 1990s. In March 1992 he was the keynote speaker at a conference in Zambia on 
Multi-Party Democracy. Whilst there he made a press statement and subsequently gave four 
interviews on the BBC about Malawi’s state of democracy. Upon his return home he was 
apprehended at the airport in April 1992 and subsequently charged.  
The High Court Determination 
In the HC, Chihana faced three counts: (1) importing seditious publications; (2) unlawful 
possession of seditious publications; and (3) doing an act likely to be prejudicial to public 
order. The main issues that the court had to address were – (1) whether the materials were 
seditious, (2) whether the statements made by Chihana fell within the defences provided 
under S. 50 of the Penal Code, (3) whether the relevant provisions of the Penal Code were 
inconsistent with S. 2 of the 1966 Constitution. The charges were brought under Section 51 
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as read with Section 50 of the Penal Code; the law, among others, defined as seditious any 
intention to incite contempt or excite disaffection against the President or government. 
Significantly the law stated that ‘an act, speech or publication is not seditious by reason only 
that it intends to show that the President has been misled or mistaken in any of his 
measures; or to point out errors or defects in the Government or Constitution or in legislation 
or in the administration of justice with a view to the remedying of such errors or defects.’ 
 
The HC concluded that the material objects of the case were documents carried by Mr 
Chihana. Interestingly Chihana’s assertions have subsequently have been well 
documented.17 S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution made article 19 of the UDHR applicable 
in Malawi. That right however is limited under article 29 (2) and (3) which provides that: 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society. 
Despite the defendant’s argument that the offence charged was inconsistent with the 1966 
Constitution ‘which guaranteed various rights and freedoms’ the HC made no attempt to 
discuss the implications of the UDHR provisions on the case. The HC never addressed its 
mind to questions such as the essential content of the right to freedom of expression and 
opinion and its justifiable limitations. As a result, it never discussed the seditious-limitation 
and its compatibility with S. 2(2) of the 1966 Constitution which allowed limitations ‘to the 
extent that the law in question is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order or the national economy.’ 
In fact, the HC applied foreign case authorities inconsistently. For example, when the 
defence cited the English case of R. v. Bow Street Magistrate’s Court, exparte Choudhury18 
to propose the failure of the charge for lack of proof of intention to incite violence, the HC 
distinguished it on the basis that in England sedition is a common law offence whilst in 
Malawi it is statutory. Curiously, the court invoked English authorities to conclude that 
truthfulness of Chihana’s statements was ‘immaterial in so far as guilt is concerned.’19  The 
HC never explained why one case was inapplicable and another applicable when both 
discussed the common law offence of sedition and not a statutory one.  In addition, the HC 
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never discussed whether S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution impacted on the applicability of  
such common law decisions in the Malawian scenario. That is, whether the provision could 
be a ground for distinguishing English cases.  
Further, the HC invoked the Ghana case of Wallace Johnson v. The King20 on the 
understanding that the Ghanaian Criminal Code was ‘mutatis mutandis, in pari materia with 
the provisions of Sections 50 and 51 of the Malawi Penal Code.’ However, the court did not 
consider whether the applicable Ghanaian Constitution contained a provision comparable to 
S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution of Malawi. If not, then arguably the Wallace decision 
should have been distinguished for not bearing upon the limitations espoused under the 
Malawian law. Instead, it was invoked to conclude that lack of intention to incite violence was 
immaterial as far as guilt was concerned.  
Similarly, the HC cited Malawian cases as binding authority for the proposition that violence 
was immaterial. However, the two decisions used, namely Banda v. Regina21 and 
Chipembere v. Republic22 were decided prior to the 1966 Constitution which made the 
UDHR part of the law of Malawi. Arguably, had the HC addressed its mind to that issue, it 
might have concluded that Chihana’s statements fell within the defences created under S. 50 
of the Penal Code. For instance, the defence of pointing ‘out errors or defects in the 
Government or Constitution or in legislation or in the administration of justice with a view to 
the remedying of such errors or defects;’ would arguably include all the publications that 
Chihana produced highlighting the abuses of human rights and calling on Malawians to 
demand democracy. However, the court disqualified these statements from that particular 
defence on the basis that they were full of ‘mud-throwing and condemnation.’ The HC then 
convicted Chihana of importing seditious publications and being found in possession of 
seditious documents and acquitted him on the charge of doing an act likely to be prejudicial 
to public order.  
The Supreme Court Determination 
Chihana appealed his conviction. The main argument on appeal ‘was that criticism of 
Government which calls for peaceful and democratic change cannot be contrary to the law of 
Malawi,’ especially in view of S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution. In marked contrast to the 
approach of the HC, the SC concluded that ‘the UN UDHR is part of the law of Malawi and 
that the freedoms which that Declaration guarantees must be respected and can be 
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enforced in our Courts.’ Arguably, that was a bold step in the right direction and others have 
ascribed it to the changing political landscape.23 
Nevertheless, the SC also failed to engage in an extensive elaboration of S. 2 (1)(iii) of the 
1966 Constitution in relation to article 19 of the UDHR. The SC simply applied and 
distinguished several foreign cases in the process of determining whether or not S. 50 of the 
Penal Code was a justifiable limitation to the liberties enshrined in the UDHR. The cases 
were from the USA, Bermuda and Antigua, Nigeria and the UK. The SC held that S. 50 and 
S. 51 of the Penal Code were not inconsistent with the Malawi Constitution. In determining 
whether Chihana had indeed committed the offences he was accused of, the SC used a 
combination of the literal interpretation, history of the legislation, purpose and the mischief 
method of statutory interpretation.24 Interestingly, in response to argument from defence 
Counsel that the court should disregard a particular decision for being decided during 
colonialism – presumably when white justices were more prone to convict Africans of 
sedition – the SC declined saying ‘it is a species of judicial activism which must be 
resisted.’25 
The SC did not elaborate what it meant by judicial activism and which type (if any) would be 
acceptable. The court simply proceeded to hold that though true Chihana’s utterances aimed 
at inflaming or inciting ‘feelings of hatred and disloyalty … against the person of the 
President’ hence were seditious.   
The manner in which both courts, 1) omitted to analyse the contents of the relevant rights 
protected under S. 2 (2)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution; 2) applied foreign case law 
inconsistently- adopting decisions favouring the prosecution and distinguishing those 
exculpating the defendant; and 3) excluded the statutory defence of democratic justification 
under S. 50 of the Penal Code because they took great exception to the manner in which 
Chihana had spoken against Dr. Banda,26highlights the persisting disagreement among 
scholars on whether excessive subservience/deference to the Executive is judicial restraint 
or judicial activism.27   
As discussed in chapter 2, some scholars propose that it is more accurate to describe 
excessive subservience to the Executive as JA instead of judicial restraint since it influences 
the manner in which the court deals with precedent (‘ignoring precedent’ strategically), 
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and/or aims at a particular result (‘result-oriented judging’).28 As pointed out by Campbell, 
this type of JA results in the Court failing to give effect to constitutional provisions.29 This 
thesis proposed that such JA occurred in the Chihana case.  Though the UDHR was law in 
Malawi, it had little (or no) impact on both the initial and appellate decisions. In essence the 
courts declined to confer the UDHR and statutory defences onto Chihana’s statements 
because of the political connotations of the criticism. The SC observed that ‘the appellant’s 
statements had crossed the line between political criticism and insult;’ the HC dismissed 
Chihana’s truthful statements30 as not being constructive criticism for being ‘full of rancour.’  
Such jurisprudence led commentators to conclude that the 1966 Constitution did not 
guarantee human rights. 
5.3 Post- 1994 Cases: Presumption Of Innocence (‘PoI’) Brought Home? 
There is no area of law that threatens an individual’s rights as criminal law since it has the 
power to deprive an individual of liberty –with liberty comes the ability to enjoy all other 
rights. Criminal law also amplifies the conflict between rights and competing values –
‘balancing the defendant’s rights and community interests.’31 The purposes of criminal law 
are complex, ranging from deterrence of offences through punishing wrongdoers whilst 
simultaneously ‘avoiding the conviction of the innocent,’ rehabilitation of offenders, and 
promoting the security of individuals and society.32 Arguably these purposes may be 
simplified by describing the aim of criminal law as promotion of the peaceful co-existence of 
individuals through the proscription of certain actions or omissions classified as crime or 
offences and ascribing attendant punishment for disobedience.33 
In order to strike the right balance between an individual’s rights and public interest, the 
overarching principle of criminal law is the presumption of innocence.34 However, the 
practical application of this principle depends upon the constitutional framework within which 
the criminal law operates.35  
The 1994 Constitution of Malawi ‘marks a break with its predecessors by placing the Bill of 
Rights at its fore.’36 In Section 42 (2)(f)(iii) it provides the right to a person accused of crime 
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to be presumed innocent. The operation of this principle has come before the courts in 
Malawi in several cases. In order to appreciate the courts’ interpretation of its scope and 
content, our focus will be on bail pending trial, and reverse onus provision cases. An 
examination of such jurisprudence may disclose whether Courts have progressed from the 
judicial methodology adopted in the Chihana decisions. 
 
5.3.1 Rationale for Presumption of Innocence and Attendant Limitations 
The principle of presumption of innocence has attracted extensive debate from practitioners, 
scholars and judges alike over the centuries and yet has eluded a comprehensive and 
concise definition.37 The analysis has been from both a procedural and substantive 
perspective, as well as from a normative and descriptive position – illustrating its conceptual 
complexity.38 Further, the complexity is compounded by the principle’s intricate connections 
to standard and burden of proof in criminal proceedings.39 Regardless, the principle is 
essentially an enquiry ‘into the fundamental nature of criminality.’40 Consequently, the 
rationale for the presumption of innocence is the need to protect the individual from wrongful 
convictions whilst at the same time enhancing the security of individuals in society through 
the effective identification and conviction of offenders.41 Arguably, the practical application of 
the presumption of innocence involves an intricate combination of law, policy and fact hence 
its scope and content is heavily reliant on judicial interpretation.  
As already indicated, the principle is intricately related to standard and burden of proof in 
criminal proceedings, the practical application of which is not free from complexity. For 
instance, the presumption of innocence has not stopped courts worldwide from authorizing 
the pre-trial incarceration of suspects in the interests of justice.42 Further, the standard of 
criminal proof required is merely beyond reasonable doubt and not absolute certainty.43 In 
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this sense, pre-trial detention and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt (and not 
absolute certainty) limit the principle. Arguably, the principle ‘aims to achieve a fair balance 
between a defendant’s rights and the public interest’44  – the courts have the responsibility of 
striking that delicate balance appropriately in any given case.  
5.3.2 Presumption of Innocence in Pre-trial Detention Cases 
The application of the principle of PoI in criminal proceedings in Malawi predates the 1994 
Constitution.45 Accordingly, bail to suspects pending trial was provided for in the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Code (CP & EC). The Courts therefore had to develop the law 
regarding the applicable considerations when determining whether to grant or deny bail. 
Prior to the 1994 Constitution, the general rationale for bail was to release the accused from 
‘physical confinement’ whilst binding him to appear at the time and place set for trial.46  
 
It appears that in most common law jurisdictions, there are some common factors that courts 
usually consider in determining whether the ‘interests of justice’ would justify pre-trial 
detention such as the nature of the offence, the likelihood of abscondment by the accused 
person, and possible interference with police investigations or witnesses.47 In most 
developed common law countries the likelihood of abscondment or interference with 
investigations or witnesses by suspects on bail is low. However, in Malawi, where there is no 
‘system of personal and physical identification’ the likelihood (and instances of 
abscondment) of suspects on bail is very high.48 Further, even where ‘an individual commits 
a crime … he or she is extremely unlikely to be caught’ due to inadequate human and 
financial resource capacity of the police service.49 Consequently, ‘the interests of justice’ in 
Malawian bail applications took on factors that are far removed from the situation tenable in 
developed common law systems. Presumably, that could help explain the development of 
jurisprudence in Malawi that advanced the general principle that caution was to be exercised 
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when considering the granting of bail to persons accused of serious crimes since they are 
more likely to abscond and/or pose a threat to society.50  
5.3.2.1 The development of post-1994 jurisprudence on pre-trial detention: the nascent 
stages 
One of the earliest cases post the 1994 Constitution is Daniel Tanganyika v. The Republic.51 
The suspect was detained for two weeks before trial and later charged before a magistrate 
for making documents without authority contrary to S. 364 (a) of the Penal Code. The trial 
however could not commence since the prosecution were not ready and the defendant 
applied for bail. The magistrate denied him bail and he appealed to the HC. The HC in its 
determination discussed S. 118 (1) of the CP & EC under which the relevant offence was 
bailable. In addition, the HC discussed S. 42 (2)(e) of the 1994 Constitution which provided 
that any arrested or accused person has ‘the right to be released from detention, with or 
without bail unless the interests of justice require otherwise.’ Thus the HC decided that the 
detention of the defendant was lawful since it was at the instance of the magistrate court. 
However, the HC also considered whether indeed the interests of justice justified the denial 
of bail by the magistrate. 
In making that determination, the court made reference to the PoI without citing the pertinent 
Constitutional provision.52 It concluded that ‘an innocent citizen is born with his freedom and 
meant to stay with it.’ For that reason, ‘an accused person until proven guilty is presumed 
innocent.’ Thus the HC thought that ‘provided the court is satisfied that an accused will 
appear for trial as and when he is required to do so,’ it will grant bail. By necessary inference 
therefore, the court will deny bail if not so satisfied. The HC also stated that in determining 
that question, regard will be had to the gravity of the offence, and whether the accused 
would interfere with investigations or witnesses among other factors. Since the prosecution 
had not adduced any evidence to establish any of those factors, and as the initial fortnight 
sought for investigations had elapsed, the defendant was granted bail.  
Arguably, despite coming post-1994 Constitution the Daniel Tanganyika decision applied 
similar principles to previous cases. Significantly, in MacWilliam Lunguzi v. The Republic53 
the SC categorically stated that: 
                                                          
50
 See Republic v. Allen (1966 – 68) ALR Mal 549; Njoloma v. Republic (1971 – 72) ALR Mal 393; MacWilliam 
Lunguzi v. The Republic, MSCA Crim. App. No. 1 of 1995 (unreported); Amon Zgambo v. The Repubic, MSCA 
Crim. App. No. 11 of 1998 (unreported). 
51
 Misc. Crim. App. No. 1251 of 1994 (unreported) per Nyirenda J. 
52
 Section 42 (2)(f)(iii). 
53
 (1991) 1 MLR 632. 
157 
 
S. 42 (2)(e) of the 1994 Constitution does not create a new right … and … does not 
create an absolute right to bail. (Emphasis supplied) 
The SC repeated that pronouncement in Amon Zgambo v. The Republic.54 There the SC 
reaffirmed the defendant’s right to PoI and stated that ‘the courts should therefore grant bail 
to the accused, unless this is likely to prejudice the interests of justice.’ In determining 
whether the interests of justice would require a denial of bail, the SC referred to the following 
factors, the seriousness of offence, the likelihood of reoffending or abscondment or 
interference with investigations and the health and safety of suspect if released on bail, 
among others.55Interestingly the court also invoked a common law principle that bail in 
serious offences must be granted ‘with extreme care and caution,’ and in homicide cases the 
discretion was ‘very unusual and rarely exercised.’ Consequently, it held that bail was to be 
granted to a capital offender ‘only in the rarest of cases and only on proof of exceptional 
circumstances.’  It can thus be seen that yet again the common law principles heavily 
impinged on Constitutional adjudication by the SC in Malawi. 
In the Amon Zgambo case the SC did not distinguish its decision in John Tembo and Others 
v. DPP56 where bail was given to murder suspects. Therefore, subsequent cases invoked 
either the Lunguzi or the Tembo decisions haphazardly.57  Regardless, there were positive 
developments in the jurisprudence on circumstances justifying pre-trial detention, even 
though the principles enunciated in Amon Zgambo case were predominantly the law for 
almost a decade.58 The positive developments included pronunciations in subsequent cases 
that the mere fact that the police had not concluded investigations was not proof that the 
accused was likely to interfere with witnesses;59 and that where the incarceration is unlawful 
in the first place, the courts will dismiss the case in its entirety and not require bail.60 
5.3.2.2 Mvahe v. The Republic: A unique approach? 
The Mvahe case represents a unique approach from the SC: the court was self-critical and 
overruled itself (another form of JA).  The SC acknowledged that the Lunguzi and Tembo 
decisions had given rise to confusion in Courts when hearing bail applications for homicide 
suspects. Therefore, it proposed to clear the confusion and provide a ‘clear authority on the 
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subject.’ First, the SC reaffirmed some principles from both cases, which represented 
common ground, including that the HC had authority to grant bail in all cases (including 
homicide), that the right to bail under S. 42 (2)(e) was not absolute but discretionary. In 
addition, the SC stated that the relevant factors when determining the interests of justice 
outlined in the Tembo case and comprehensively expounded in Amon Zgambo represented 
the accurate position of the law.  
 
Further, the SC decided that the burden of establishing the interests of justice to deny bail 
fell upon the prosecution at all stages in the bail proceedings and did not shift to the accused 
person. Consequently, the SC overruled its own position in the Lunguzi and Amon Zgambo 
cases to the effect that a homicide suspect bore the responsibility of establishing exceptional 
circumstances when seeking pre-trial bail. The court observed that those decisions had 
erroneously followed a common law principle when the common law ‘did not provide the 
right to bail’ as the 1994 Constitution did. This is unique in that arguably, the SC has set a 
precedent to the effect that it can indirectly hear an appeal against its own decisions. This 
represents a rare and proactive approach to constitutional adjudication.  
 
That said however, the SC adopted a rather pragmatic methodology and arguably omitted to 
articulate a more nuanced approach to determining the requirements of justice in different 
cases. For instance, are all factors to be given equal weight? If all but one of those militating 
factors is present, should the court deny or grant bail? For instance, the SC cited the safety 
of the suspect if released as a legitimate factor: yet, some have criticized the Magistrate’s 
court in The Republic v. Steve Monjeza Soko & Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa for denying 
the suspects bail on that account.  Further in Willy Sambo & Edward Anafi v. The Republic  
(decided after the Mvahe case), the HC denied the suspects bail on the ground that they 
were likely to commit similar offences since they were answering to other (similar) charges 
simultaneously.  It is proposed that in the absence of a HC or SC decision articulating the 
appropriate significance of the various factors, both decisions in the Monjeza/Chimbalanga 
and Willy Sambo cases comply with the Mvahe position. This still leaves considerable room 
for inconsistency as much rests on the discretion of the presiding judge/magistrate. 
 
5.4 Presumption of Innocence in Reverse Onus Provision Cases 
The ‘golden thread’ running through criminal law is the prosecution’s duty to prove the guilt 
of a person accused of crime beyond reasonable doubt and that at no time does that burden 
ever shift to the accused during trial.61 However, in some jurisdictions like Malawi, legislation 
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contains what are referred to as ‘reverse onus’ provisions. A distinction is made between a 
reverse evidential burden and a reverse legal burden,62 where the former ‘only requires the 
defendant to a raise a matter of exculpation as a genuine issue’ and the latter ‘to prove his 
innocence on the balance of probabilities.’63 It is the latter that patently falls foul of the right 
to PoI and warrants a determination of justifiability in different jurisdictions.64 Whether or not 
such provisions are compatible with the Constitution depends on the wording of the relevant 
provision of the document in issue.65 The HC constituted as a Constitutional Court66 has had 
opportunity to consider a reverse onus provision vis-à-vis the right to fair trial in the 1994 
Constitution which includes the right to be presumed innocent.67 
 
5.4.1 Friday Jumbe & Humphrey Mvula v. Attorney General68 
The Jumbe & Mvula case is ground-breaking since it is the first reverse onus provision case 
decided by the ‘Constitutional Court.’69  The Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of S. 
25B (3) of the Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) for violating their right to a fair trial (PoI and the 
right to remain silent) as enshrined in S. 42 (2)(f)(iii) of the Constitution. S. 25B (3) of the 
CPA was not a standalone provision, rather it went alongside any of the subsections of S. 
25B CPA.  
In this case S. 25B (1) was in issue, and it provided that: 
Any public officer who uses misuses or abuses his public office, or his position, 
status or authority as a public officer, for his personal advantage or for the 
advantage of another person or to obtain, directly or indirectly, for himself or for 
another person, any advantage, wealth, property, and profit or business interest 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
And S. 25B (3) provided that: 
Where in any proceedings for an offence under this section the prosecution 
proves that the accused did or directed to be done, or was in any way party to the 
doing of, any arbitrary act which resulted in the loss or damage of any property of 
the Government or of a public body, or the diversion of such property to or for the 
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purposes for which it was not intended, the accused shall, unless he gives proof 
to the contrary, be presumed to have committed the offence charged.70 
 
There was agreement that S. 25B (3) was a reverse onus provision. The difference arose 
because the plaintiffs understood it as a legal burden (hence unconstitutional) while the 
Attorney General (AG) argued that it was an evidential burden (permissible under the 
limitation clause S. 44 (2) and (3) of the Constitution).  
  
The final decision was by a majority of 2-1. The majority decided that S. 25B (3) CPA was 
unconstitutional for breaching S. 42 (2)(f)(iii) and was not saved by S. 44 (2) and (3) of the 
Constitution. However, the two judges who found unconstitutionality differed considerably in 
their legal reasoning which though admirable (in terms of diversity of approaches), arguably 
introduces inconsistencies and uncertainty inimical to principled constitutional jurisprudence.  
 
5.4.1.1 Interpretation of a Statute and Its Compatibility with the Rights in the 
Constitution 
Kapanda J and Katsala J declared that S. 25B (3) CPA was a ‘reverse legal burden’ 
provision since it relieved the prosecution of proving all elements of the offence and created 
the possibility of an accused person being convicted despite the existence of reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt. Interestingly, Kapanda J cited the history of forced confessions during 
the despotic era as a context for the fair trial rights in Malawi. Both judges concluded that the 
provision violated the right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent as enshrined in S. 
42 (2)(f)(iii) of the Constitution. 
In spite of such agreement in outcome the two judges varied in their approaches for arriving 
at that conclusion. For example, their use of comparable foreign cases was decidedly 
different. Kapanda J applied South African (‘SA’) cases only since its constitutional limitation 
clause (S. 36 (1)) was ‘in pari materia’ with S. 44 (2) of the Malawi Constitution.71 However, 
he expressly excluded the applicability of cases from ‘other so-called commonwealth 
countries … cited by the AG…’ (including Canadian cases) on the basis that their 
constitutions were different from the Malawian Constitution.72 In direct contradiction, Katsala 
J found both Canadian and SA cases quite persuasive since S. 11(d) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, S.25 of the SA Constitution, and S. 42 (2)(f) of the Malawi 
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Constitution (all on fair trial rights) were similar. These contradictory approaches raise a 
poignant issue: when examining the applicability of foreign cases, what establishes the 
comparative nexus, the substantive provision creating the right under consideration (Katsala, 
J) or the limitation clause (Kapanda, J)?  
Further, how do you determine that two constitutional provisions (from different jurisdictions) 
are in pari materia as pronounced by Kapanda J?73 There was no clarity as to whether the 
subject was simply that they are both limitation clauses? If that were the case, then most 
commonwealth countries have constitutions with limitation clauses and yet those were held 
inapplicable. Could it then be the wording of the provisions? Despite having similarities, 
arguably the two sections contain substantial differences. S. 36 (1) of the SA Constitution 
provides that: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
into account all relevant factors, including   
a.    the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c.    the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e.    less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
S. 44 (2) and (3) of the Malawian Constitution on the other hand provides that: 
2) No restrictions or limitations may be placed on the exercise of any rights and 
freedoms provided for in this Constitution other than those prescribed by law, 
which are reasonable, recognized by international human rights standards and 
necessary in an open and democratic society; 
(3) Laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not negate the essential 
content of the right in question, shall be of general application. 
A question might well arise: is there any legal significance to the manifest differences 
between the two limitation clauses? For example, on the authority of SA cases, Kapanda, J 
decided (among others) that in order to prove the legitimacy of the statutory aim, the State 
must produce empirical evidence before the courts, hence to allow S. 25B (3) CPA would 
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promote laziness in investigations. The SA (and not the Malawian) Constitution catalogues 
the factors to consider when assessing the constitutionality of a proposed limitation – such 
as ‘the relation between the limitation and its purpose’ and the presence of ‘less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose expressed.’ It is arguable therefore, that whereas empirical 
evidence might be necessary under the SA Constitution to address those express 
stipulations, it may not be imperative under the corresponding Malawian provision.  
Further, Kapanda J arguably failed to consider whether the nature of the offences (in this 
case corruption) might raise grounds for distinguishing the situation. For instance, the AG 
raised the issue of the mental element in offences of abuse of office being hard for the State 
to prove. The judge did not undertake an analysis of what elements of S. 25B (1) CPA the 
State must establish vis-a-vis S. 25B (3) to appreciate whether it would be mental element or 
not. If it were, international conventions such as the UN Convention on Corruption arguably 
permit reverse onus provisions hence further judicial analysis should have yielded more 
apposite jurisprudence.74 In addition, Kapanda J held that ‘in this day and age one cannot 
use a statute to water down civil liberties so that the State is given an easier option of 
proving corruption cases. That thinking is of the old order. It is dead and buried.’75 In 
essence, he appears to categorically declare any reverse legal burden provision as 
impermissible and wholly unjustifiable without qualification – which arguably is at odds with 
international standards76 and ignores the fact that the pertinent rights can be limited 
anyway.77 Ironically, compatibility with international standards is one of the criteria for 
justifiable limitation under the Malawi Constitution. 
Katsala J on the other hand addressed the question not from the need for empirical evidence 
from the State but rather by examining the principle of ‘rational connection between the 
proven facts and the presumed fact.’78 To determine whether there was a rational connection 
between S. 25B (3) and the elements the prosecution would need to establish under S. 25B 
(1) to trigger the presumption, the judge was persuaded by comparative case law from 
several jurisdictions including the USA, Europe, SA and Canada. From his analysis the 
judge concluded that the presumption was ‘overbroad and over-inclusive’79 hence fell afoul 
of S. 44 (2) of the Malawi Constitution (having considered all the elements of the limitation 
clause). Significantly, Katsala J also did not discuss international conventions that arguably 
allow for such reverse onus provisions 
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The absence of agreement in the legal reasoning of the two judges arguably creates a gap 
in several substantive principles:  
i. There are lingering questions whether any reverse legal burden is wholly 
unconstitutional (as per Kapanda J) or the issue depends on the wording of the 
relevant provision – that is should not be ‘overbroad or over-inclusive’ (as per Katsala 
J). Further what are the criteria for permissible limitation–is there a general 
proposition or each case will be determined on its particular circumstances? 
ii.  There is no discernible judicial principle on the criteria to use when determining the 
applicability of foreign cases – is it the wording of the substantive provision or the 
limitation clause, or both? 
iii. There is awkward silence on the adjudicative relevance of international conventions 
permitting reverse onus provisions in cases of corruption and whether those should 
not distinguish the applicability of cases on offences without similar international 
instruments such as possession of Indian hemp.80 
This lack of clarity attains heightened significance in light of the dissenting judgment of 
Mkandawire J who firstly recited the applicable principles of Constitutional interpretation in 
the Malawi Constitution and expounded by the SC81 - including that ‘the language of a 
constitution must be construed not in a narrow legalistic and pedantic way, but broadly and 
purposively.’82  Thereupon the judge analysed the content of the right to be presumed 
innocent (being persuaded by cases from several jurisdictions including Ghana, SA). His 
conclusion on the content of the right to be presumed innocent was similar to the other two 
justices: it is meant to protect the individual from conviction ‘despite existence of reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt.’83 He likewise found that S. 25B (3) CPA creates a reverse legal burden 
which palpably breached the right to PoI and to remain silent. 
 
Mkandawire J (like Katsala J) thought the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
SA Constitution cases were instructive for the particular case. Interestingly, he discussed the 
very same decisions applied by Katsala J such as Regina v. Oakes,84   S v. Bhulwana and S 
v. Gwadiso,85 and State v. Zuma, among others but arrived at a different conclusion to the 
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one reached by Katsala J. He ascribed the difference to the ‘fine differences’ between the 
Malawi Constitution and the Canadian Charter and SA Constitution respectively.86 He went 
on like his brother judges to state that the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that 
the limitation complied with S. 44 (2) and (3) of the Constitution rested on the State.  
 
The differences between Mkandawire J and Katsala J were their treatment of the policy 
objectives of the reverse legal burden. Mkandawire J, invoked Sections 13 (o) and 14 of 
Constitution in recognising the ‘pressing’ importance of the legislative objective to curb 
corruption through the enactment of S. 25B (3) CPA. Section 13 (o) enjoins the State to put 
in place measures that ‘will guarantee accountability, transparency, personal integrity and 
financial probity and which by virtue of their effectiveness and transparency will strengthen 
confidence in public institutions.’ He took judicial notice of the epidemic nature of corruption 
in Malawi and also referred to UN and SADC declarations on the State of corruption in 
African countries (including Malawi). Consequently he found that there was sufficient proof of 
the democratic importance of the objective of ensuring successful prosecution of corrupt 
public officials. It bears highlighting that Mkandawire J applied one of the provisions (S. 13) 
which introduces a ‘social-trust based governance’ framework in the 1994 Constitution.87  
Furthermore, the dissenting judgment proposed that the next stage would be to examine the 
means adopted by parliament to achieve its objective to determine whether the same was 
reasonable. It proposed that the test is one of proportionality as discussed in Canadian 
cases: there must be a rational connection between the proven fact and the presumed fact. 
In determining rational connection, the judge considered S. 25B (4) CPA which defined an 
arbitrary act thus: 
For purposes of this section, ‘arbitrary’, in relation to actions of a public officer 
concerning the duties of his office, includes the doing, or directing of doing, of 
anything contrary to – 
(a) procedures prescribed by or under any written law; or 
(b) established practice or any agreed rules or arrangement which is known or 
ought to be known to him or is, in relation to the matter under consideration, 
brought to his attention in writing or other sufficient means. 
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The judge held that where a public officer conducts himself in a manner described above 
‘then obviously that person is misusing or abusing his/her office.’88 Mkandawire J, found a 
rational connection between the proven fact of an arbitrary act (as defined by S. 25B (4)) and 
the presumed fact of abuse of office (the offence under S. 25B (3)). He further held that the 
presumption could not be said to force an accused person to testify since even where he did 
not speak, the judge would need to determine whether the prosecution had proven its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. In this Mkandawire J differed with his brothers who held that the 
presumption would force the court to convict even if there was reasonable doubt as to the 
guilt of the accused person. Consequently, he held that the proportionality test was satisfied. 
Further, Mkandawire J undertook the other tests including ‘recognized by international 
human rights standards’ and not negating ‘the essential content of the right,’ and found S. 
25B (3) CPA compatible with all those. He finally concluded that S. 25 B(3) was 
constitutional as it complied with the limitation clause of the Constitution of Malawi.  
In summation - Kapanda J, purportedly proceeding on the basis that reverse legal burden 
provisions were anachronistic legal devices completely dismissed the AG’s arguments 
concerning the rational connection between the offences of corruption and the pertinent 
reverse onus provisions. Katsala J, seemingly proceeding on the basis that reverse legal 
burden provisions may be constitutional depending on whether the State can prove a 
rational connection between the proven facts and the presumed fact, found that the State 
had failed to show such a connection. Mkandawire J, also proceeding on the basis that 
reverse legal burden provisions may be constitutional depending on whether the State can 
prove a rational connection between the proven facts and the presumed fact, found that the 
State had succeeded in proving that rational connection. 
As a consequence, The Jumbe and Mvula case arguably leaves unanswered questions such 
as: which principles to apply when interpreting a particular statute and/or a constitutional 
provision, the principle to use when discussing/distinguishing constitutional jurisprudence 
from other jurisdictions – is it the substantive provision or the limitations clause? What weight 
to attach to the phrasing differences in constitutional provisions, and the nature of probative 
material (empirical evidence or policy statements?) necessary to explain the legislative 
justifications for a given limitation? What are the criteria for finding that a reverse legal 
burden provision complies with the limitation clause – is it the objective of the legislation and 
the proportionality test? Malawi is not alone in contending with these questions – though 
others seem to have made some headway.89 
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5.4.1.2 Lessons that may be drawn  
Exhorting form over substance in JA discourse in Malawi may leave substantial 
issues unaddressed 
As discussed in chapter 4, the Jumbe & Mvula decision is an example of JA (‘invalidation of 
legislative enactments’). To that extent Justices Katsala and Kapanda may be described as 
progressive or judicially active judges by some commentators, whereas Mkandawire J, 
maybe described as a conservative judge because he upheld that legislation. This thesis 
argues that such descriptions conceal the problems faced by Malawi in the entrenchment of 
constitutionalism and rule of law- in actual fact they may detract from the identification of 
appropriate responses and solutions. To illustrate, Chirwa expressing disappointment on 
how Malawian Courts have  relied ‘on foreign decisions too eagerly, often at the expense of 
express provisions of the Constitution and local jurisprudence’, commended the approach 
taken by Mkandawire J, in the Jumbe & Mvula case.90 Chirwa applauds that methodology as 
a valid response to concerns about Malawian courts displaying ‘an inclination to focus 
merely on textual and semantic comparisons, without … examin[ing] carefully profoundly the 
function that specific legal rules in issue serve in a particular legal system and understand 
the underlying doctrinal, institutional, legal and cultural contexts in which those rules apply.’91  
As indicated above, it is only Mkandawire J who applied one of the social-trust based 
framework provisions of the 1994 Constitution in his legal analysis. Consequently, it is 
arguable that at the heart of the divergent judicial conclusions lie differences of a more 
fundamental nature: pertaining to the respective conceptual visions of the Constitution itself, 
the appropriate interpretive methodologies that reflect the uniqueness of the Malawian 
Constitution (as contrasted with other Constitutions), and the permissible bounds of judicial 
discretion in the choice of applicable precedent, especially foreign precedent, as well as the 
applicable methodology in assessing all the aforementioned issues altogether.  
In that vein, the words of Justice Kirby are quite insightful: 
Legal reasoning unlike political activism, must always remain attached to 
legal authority. Consistency and avoidance of purely personal idiosyncrasies 
require that tasks of interpretation commence with any relevant text and 
proceed with the assistance of any applicable history. [Inevitably], in 
important constitutional cases, and especially where novel issues are 
presented, such sources are insufficient. They do not take the mind of the 
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decision-maker far enough along the journey to the decision.92 [Hence] … in 
construing the words of a constitutional document judges have choices.93 
This statement is very apposite to the Malawian situation since constitutional 
litigation/adjudication is still in its nascent stages necessitating the use of comparative 
foreign case law for purposes of drawing ‘philosophical insights, underlying principles, and 
rationales which’ might help judges in resolving novel cases. The main question therefore 
remains: how should the judges exercise that discretion/choice? 
To recapitulate, all the three justices in Jumbe & Mvula competently attached their 
reasoning to legal authority within the context of what they deemed applicable history. 
However, as discussed earlier they differed significantly in their choice of what constituted 
applicable legal authority and relevant history. Thus this thesis submits that the foregoing 
discussion unearths fundamental jurisprudential issues demanding the development of 
Malawi-centric theoretical and/or philosophical frameworks to guide the exercise of judicial 
discretion on the part of judges.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The constitutional jurisprudence in Malawi in the area of criminal law has come a long way -
from outright subservience to the government to bold declarations of unconstitutionality of 
penal provisions. A lot however, remains to be done in the articulation of guiding principles 
to inform the assessment of limitation of the rights of persons accused of crime. This lacuna 
has been consistent throughout all the legal areas examined so far.  
In response to those who have proposed JA as a panacea to the problem, this chapter 
demonstrates that both outright subservience to government and the bold declarations of 
unconstitutionality would qualify as JA under the various definitions of that term. Further, the 
fact that those contrasting judicial behaviours can make use of the judicial discretion in the 
choice of applicable precedent does not help matters. In that context, using criminal 
judgments as case studies, this chapter has brought out one particular area for attention, the 
exercise of judicial discretion in the choice of applicable legal authority, history, facts etc. in 
the adjudication of constitutional cases. This finding supports the necessity of applying a 
definition of JA that zeroes in on judicial discretion as has been proposed in chapter 2 in 
order to author home-grown solutions to the judicial role in constitutionalism and rule of law. 
Further, this chapter has made reference to a study by Hansen that pointed to a lack of 
judicial training in human rights as one of the main reasons why judges fell short of what had 
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been expected of them in their enforcement of human rights provisions of the constitution. 
Thus the lacunas identified in this chapter strongly point to a similar need for training in legal 
theory specifically developed to assist the Courts to interpret the Constitution in a manner 
that reflects its uniqueness.94 
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Chapter 6 
 
The Mixed-Bag of Malawian Judicial Activism? The Impact of Judicial Deference on 
Legislative Developments 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The Malawi Judiciary has been described as being ‘probably the most credible branch of 
government in Malawi’1 for displaying remarkable independence ‘in spite of many political 
and economic pressures and constraints.’2 Thus the independence of the judiciary in Malawi 
is now widely acknowledged.3 This discussion will nevertheless propose that in spite of such 
demonstrable judicial independence the constitutional jurisprudence still bears remarkable 
signs of ‘inappropriate deference’ to the executive arm of government, which has in turn had 
an impact on legislative developments in Malawi. As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, 
excessive deference is itself a form of JA as it can be a strategy deliberately chosen by a 
result-oriented court to produce a decision that represents its preferred sense of justice. This 
chapter seeks to show that the apex court in Malawi has in the past resorted to 
excessive/inappropriate judicial deference to effectuate the transformative potential of the 
Malawian Constitution; and further, that such deference has had a negative impact on 
subsequent constitutional legislative developments.  
The work in this chapter aims at emphasizing the point that calling on the Malawian judiciary 
to practise JA without first identifying and addressing underlying factors that may impact 
upon its (JA’s) manifestations in practice may be counter-productive to the search for 
solutions to the lack of constitutionalism in Malawi. For instance, Nkhata in his thesis4 
proposes that ‘the courts should make better use of opportunities that exist within the 
Constitution and other laws to actualise the transformative potential that the Constitution 
contains. [However he adds that] where the matter at issue intimately involves questions that 
are better resolved by the executive or the legislature, the judiciary must be cautious in such 
matters.’5 In proposing how, Nkhata suggest the ’reasonable test’ approach to enable the 
courts to review the manner in which the executive or legislature has conducted itself 
‘without necessarily substituting its own preferred’ solution.6 In essence, despite calling on 
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the courts to employ an ‘innovative and expansive approach to [constitutional] adjudication’,7 
Nkhata nevertheless also calls on courts to exercise judicial deference/restraint where 
appropriate.  
Judicial deference to the executive or legislative arms of government has drawn conflicting 
academic reactions: while some scholars consider it a legitimate ‘form of judicial restraint,’8 
others describe it as a doctrine that elevates executive or legislative decisions to a level of 
‘de facto non-justiciability.’9  Commentators from different jurisdictions have ‘examine[d] the 
role of judicial deference in specific contexts,’10 including legal interpretations of the 
executive11 and legislative enactments.12 No similar studies appear to exist on Malawi. 
Consequently, in this study it is pertinent to consider the notion of ‘judicial deference’ in the 
context of judicial (in)activism in Malawi in order to explore the approach of the courts to their 
constitutional function of constitutional interpretation (and enforcement).  
It must be conceded at the outset that a comprehensive analysis of judicial independence 
and judicial deference lies beyond the scope of this study. However, by demonstrating how 
the transformative potential of the Constitution can be actualised by resort to excessive 
judicial deference, this chapter will illustrate the existence of a more urgent need, namely to 
initially identify and address the factors that may impinge upon the ability of judges to employ 
appropriate deference in constitutional adjudication.  
 
6.2 The compatibility of judicial deference with judicial independence and/or 
judicial (in)activism 
6.2.1 Benchmarks for measuring the existence of judicial independence 
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Despite the obvious definitional challenges surrounding the concept of judicial 
independence,13 a number of scholars have propounded some useful attempts in light of its 
widely acknowledged importance in the consolidation of democracy.14 Despite such laudable 
efforts however, it is still worth remembering that ‘judicial independence is a dynamic 
concept that may be defined in different ways.’15 In an attempt to find a common ground 
within the divergence of views on the meaning of ‘the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary,’16 the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) developed the 18 
‘Judicial Integrity Principles (JIP)’17 which were endorsed in ‘virtually all regions of the world.’ 
These encompass matters of institutional and personal independence of judges, provision of 
adequate professional and infrastructural resources, security of tenure and clarity of 
jurisdiction as well as objective and transparent appointment processes, besides advocating 
high ethical standards for judicial office and access to judicial information by the judiciary as 
well as the public.18 The observation that these principles ‘capture the current state-of-the-art 
meaning of the term “judicial independence,”’19 serves only to highlight the complexity of the 
term. Assessed on these standards, the Malawi Judiciary passed the test of ‘judicial 
independence’.20 
6.2.2 Judicial Deference in Judiciaries with Judicial Independence 
Since ‘the intricate interaction between a principle and its embodiment in practice most 
completely reveals all the shades and contours of its meaning;’21the assessment of the 
prevalence of judicial deference in Malawi cannot be made in isolation, without first learning 
from its manifestations within other jurisdictions. 
Definition of judicial deference 
Despite attracting significant scholarly attention and having ‘profound effects and … wide 
scope in modern judicial review’22 the concept of judicial deference ‘remains malleable, 
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indeterminate, and not well-defined.’23 According to Cory, J ‘judicial deference’ means that 
‘the courts … in carrying out their duties … are not to second-guess legislatures and the 
executives.’24 In other words ‘they are not to make value judgments on what they regard as 
the proper policy choice’ as that is the province ‘for the other branches.’ Thus while ‘the 
courts are to uphold the Constitution’ as expressly mandated therein ‘respect by the courts 
for the legislative and executive role is as important as ensuring that the other branches 
respect each other’s role and the role of the courts.’25 Solove suggests that the idea of 
judicial deference dictates that ‘the Court should not attempt to "second-guess" or 
"substitute" its judgment for the judgment of another decision-maker or pass on the "wisdom" 
of a policy or law.’26 
According to Lord Hope there will be instances where ‘it will be appropriate for the courts to 
recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on 
democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or 
decision is’27 under review. Thus there is a democratic imperative underlying judicial 
deference. This view seems to resonate closely with that of Lord Steyn who propounded that 
‘just as there are circumstances in which an international court will recognise that national 
institutions are better placed to assess the needs of society, and to make difficult choices 
between competing considerations, so national courts will accept that there are some 
circumstances in which the legislature and the executive are better placed to perform those 
functions.’28 
Clearly, despite such attempts to explain the concept, there appears to be no universally 
agreed definition of judicial deference. Nevertheless, as Edwards puts it, ‘few would doubt 
that in a constitutional democracy there will be times when it is appropriate for a court … to 
defer to the judgment of the other branches of government.’29 The obvious point of 
agreement in this formulation of judicial deference (by the different proponents) is that such 
instances do not necessarily represent the norm of judicial review, rather an exception 
(sometimes made necessary by the functional competence realities as well as a democratic 
imperative premised on separation of powers). 
Evidence of Judicial Deference in the USA and UK 
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It needs no mention that judicial review in the UK is very different from judicial review in the 
USA, the former being founded on parliamentary supremacy and the latter on constitutional 
supremacy. However, judicial deference though manifesting in different forms, is said to be 
‘the central principle of judicial review’30 in both jurisdictions.31 
In the UK, the principle of judicial deference has its foundations in ‘principles of 
administrative law.’32 However, even when deciding matters under the Human Rights Act, 
which has been deemed as having constitutional status,33 the UK courts have adopted a 
‘deferential approach’ without necessarily using the term ‘deference’. For example in the 
case of Brown v Stott Lord Bingham said:  
Judicial recognition and assertion of the human rights defined in the Convention 
is not a substitute for the processes of democratic government but a 
complement to them.  While a national court does not accord the margin of 
appreciation recognised by the European Court as a supra-national court, it will 
give weight to the decisions of a representative legislature and a democratic 
government within the discretionary area of judgment accorded to those 
bodies.34 (Emphasis supplied) 
In the case of Bellinger v Bellinger the House of Lords declined to reconsider birth as a 
determinant of sex on the basis that ‘(that) would represent a major change in the law, 
having far reaching ramifications’ (because) ‘it raises issues whose solution calls for 
extensive enquiry and the widest public consultation and discussion.’ In the opinion of the 
court ‘questions of social policy and administrative feasibility’ would ‘arise at several points, 
and their interaction’ would have ‘to be evaluated and balanced.’ In the wisdom of the Law 
Lords ‘(such) issues are altogether ill-suited for determination by courts and court 
procedures. They are pre-eminently a matter for Parliament.’ 35 (Emphasis supplied) 
Another instance of a deferential approach to the executive arose in Secretary of State for 
the Home Office v Rehman where the House of Lords was confronted with an issue touching 
on terrorism and counter terrorism strategies. In conceding the democratic imperative as well 
as the functional competence of the executive the court observed that where: 
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‘… the cost of failure can be high. [It] underline[d] the need for the judicial arm of 
government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown on the 
question … It is not only that the executive has access to special information and 
expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential 
results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by 
entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic 
process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, they 
must be made by persons whom the people have elected and whom they can 
remove.’ 36 (Emphasis supplied).   
In the context of the USA, Solove succinctly captured the manifestation of judicial deference 
in judicial review cases before the USA courts thus: 
‘It has become almost commonplace for the Court to declare that it will "defer to 
the expert judgment" of a government official,37 that it will not "interfere" with the 
"internal operations" of an institution,38 that it will not "substitute its judgment" for 
that of another decision-maker,39 that it will not examine the "wisdom" of a 
regulation or law,40 that the matter is within the "professional expertise" of 
another  decision-maker, or that the matter is within a government official's 
"domain," "province" or "discretion."41’42 
Therefore, judicial deference seems to be an accepted principle43 of judicial review within 
‘well established’ common law jurisdictions such as the USA, and the UK.44 Case law from 
these jurisdictions appears to ‘demonstrate that there is no jurisprudential contradiction 
between the courts adopting a deferential approach’45 in one area of the law, and ‘a more 
rigorous hard edged one’46 in another. 
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6.2.3 Judicial Deference and Judicial (In)Activism 
Judicial deference is ‘one of the most powerful normative guideposts of the judicial 
function’47 in judicial review. On the other hand, ‘judicial activism is inherent in judicial 
review. Whether it is positive or negative activism…’48 However, ‘judicial activism also has to 
operate within limits’49 because ‘constitutional dangers exist no less in too little judicial 
activism as in too much.’50 Judicial deference therefore may arguably provide the 
jurisprudential boundaries within which ‘appropriate’ judicial activism operates without losing 
the democratic legitimacy inherent in a constitutional democratic order.  
6.3 Manifestations of Judicial Deference in Malawi 
6.3.1 The Press Trust Case 
The SC judgment in the case of Attorney General v. Malawi Congress Party and Others51 
(Press Trust II) arguably laid the foundations for judicial deference in post-1994 Malawi. The 
brief facts of the case were that on 6 November 1995 the government circulated to members 
of Parliament (“MPs”) a bill entitled ‘the Press Trust (Reconstruction) Bill.’ The next day the 
Minister of Finance put a motion to the MPs to dispense with the usual 21 day notice and 
proceeded to debate the bill. Despite strong opposition from the Malawi Congress Party 
(“MCP”)-which until 1994 was the only political party recognised under the 1966 Constitution 
but had now become the main opposition party-the motion was carried. A tea break followed 
from which the MCP MPs never returned (in protest). The subsequent debate and passage 
of the bill in the house was therefore done without them. The President promptly put his 
assent on the Bill despite applications for a HC injunction to stop him. The MCP and two of 
its MPs made an application to the HC for a declaration that the Act was null and void on 
grounds that the law was enacted without the requisite parliamentary quorum, the bill was in 
breach of the constitutionally prescribed notice and that parliament lacked the mandate to 
expropriate private property without compensation anyway. The HC (Mwaungulu, J) found in 
favour of the plaintiffs on all grounds and declared the Press Trust (Reconstruction) Act null 
and void. The AG appealed to the SC against the decision and succeeded. 
6.3.1.1 The Ownership of the Trust 
One of the issues before both courts was the ownership of the Press Trust. It is this issue 
that adequately illustrates the complexity of deciding cases within the context of transitioning 
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from patrimonial politics – where previously there was no ‘difference between the private and 
public sphere’52 and where the President was the Government.53 The HC found that the 
Trust belonged exclusively to the first plaintiff the MCP and that those who had since left the 
party to join other parties had forfeited any rights they had in the property that they might 
have otherwise been entitled to as its members.  
The SC on the other hand faulted the finding of the HC on all material points of ownership of 
the Trust. Even though (within its subsequent reasoning) the SC displayed ‘inappropriate’ 
judicial deference to both the executive and legislature its determination on the point of 
ownership of the Trust arguably reflects a more judicially active approach that resonates well 
with the transformative agenda underlying the 1994 Constitution. To that extent theirs would 
(as is being proposed in this study) represent the more just decision on the point as they 
articulate a social-trust based construction of the Press Trust (as opposed to the ‘exclusively’ 
liberal democratic conception of private property rights underlying the contested 
determination of  the HC). 
The evidence as to the background of the Press Trust was contained in the affidavit of the 
then Minister of Finance, Mr Aleke Banda, who had also been very instrumental in setting up 
the Press Trust and related companies during the MCP era. The SC criticised the decision of 
the trial judge for relying solely on affidavit evidence. The appellate court felt that ‘the 
[disputed facts] … would have been properly and adequately dealt with if the proceedings in 
this case had been commenced by writ of summons or at least if the deponents of the 
affidavits used in this case had been cross-examined.’54 
Indeed, contrary to Mwaungulu J’s assertions otherwise, his own reasoning would suggest 
that his conclusions on those factual matters formed the very basis of his determination on 
the constitutionality of the Act. In other words, the resolution of the question of the ownership 
of the Press Trust -which necessarily predicated how the trial court viewed the proposed 
‘reconstruction’- was heavily dependent on some factual conclusions the court made about 
its historical genesis (and subsequent evolution).  
Pre- 1994 MCP same as pre-1994 Government of Malawi?55  
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The SC and the HC came to different conclusions on this question despite relying on the 
same affidavit evidence. The historical summary to the genesis of Press Trust was that the 
initial capital of £30 000-00 was raised from members of the MCP in 1960 as the vanguard 
for political agitation in pre-independence Malawi. Over the years Press Holdings Ltd (with 
Dr Banda holding majority of the shares) enjoyed preferential monopoly status in the 
Malawian economy (being touted as a vehicle for national development) and even had its 
loans guaranteed by the State. Eventually (in 1982) Dr Banda (having been paid a sum of 
K999 998-00 for the 499 999 shares he held in Press Holdings Ltd) created the Press Trust 
‘for the benefit of the people of Malawi’ and the Minister of Finance was an ex officio 
trustee.56 The contested legislation purported to ‘reorganise’ the trust to ensure continued 
government oversight of the beneficial interest (for the nation of Malawi). 
In court the main issue for determination (though not acknowledged as such by both the HC 
and SC) was whether the pre-1994 MCP could in law and in fact be held to be the same as 
the post-1994 MCP (and therefore entitled to the trust by necessary continuance). 
As Mtegha JA (pronouncing a unanimous appellate decision) observed, the HC appears to 
have ‘go[ne] on to great lengths’57 to find that the MCP had at all times been a political party, 
separate and distinct from the Malawi Government despite evidence to the contrary.58 Firstly, 
contrary to recorded history,59 the trial judge observed that the fact that the pre-1994 
Constitution declared Malawi a one party State ‘conferred no uniqueness on the first plaintiff 
[pre-1994 MCP].’60 Whether unwittingly or not the trial judge seems to have glossed over the 
fact that the 1966 Constitution expressly provided that ‘the MCP was to be the only legally 
recognised political party in the country.’61 Secondly, the trial judge acknowledged that the 
post-1994 MCP was legally incorporated under (new) applicable statute at the time of the 
judgment (1996). At the same time the court observed that there was no evidence to 
establish that it (the MCP) had been so incorporated before 1994.62Nevertheless, 
Mwaungulu, J still concluded that the pre-1994 and the post-1994 MCP were one and the 
same legal entity. 
Thus the trial judge ignored the fundamental legal reality (which under established principles 
of evidence is a matter of judicial notice) that prior to 1994 the MCP had de jure 
                                                          
56
 As outlined in AG v. MCP and Others (n 51) 185 – 187,  but reflecting the same facts outlined in MCP and 
Others v. Attorney General [1996] MLR 244, 251. 
57
 See (n. 54) 208. 
58
See Venter (n 53) 156, 225.  
59
 See generally, KM Phiri and KR Ross eds., Democratization in Malawi: A Stocktaking (CLAIM, 1998). 
60
 MCP and Others v. Attorney General [1996] MLR 244, 251. 
61
 Section 4 of the 1966 Constitution as cited in Kanyongolo Ch. 1 (n 12) 359. 
62
 See (n 60).  
178 
 
constitutional status in terms of Section 4 of the 1966 Constitution. Further, he neglected to 
consider the legal implications of incorporating the MCP post-1994 under an Act of 
Parliament as removed from its pre-1994 constitutional status – whether the incorporation 
did not in law create a new MCP distinct from its national predecessor. Thirdly, despite the 
fact that prior to 1994, ‘the distinction between … the State and … the party [pre-1994 MCP] 
became increasingly diminished,’63 the HC still concluded that ‘whether a political party 
embraces everybody in a country, it is no more than an association of members’64 hence not 
government. Fourthly, the trial judge further omitted to address the legal implications of the 
fact ‘that the person holding the position of the Minister of Finance was made the ex-officio 
trustee of the Press Trust.’65 
Because he ignored significant historical and legal facts surrounding the dispute Mwaungulu 
J made an incorrect judicial conclusion, namely that the pre-1994 and the post-1994 MCP 
(the first plaintiff) were one and the same legal entity. This finding was clearly fundamental 
to the Constitutional questions before him since the main question was whether the Press 
Trust was a public or private trust.66 In so doing, the trial judge contradicted himself since he 
had previously asserted that ‘the background to these institutions [The Press Trust] has little 
bearing to the questions that have to be determined in this application, questions of the 
constitutionality of the Press Trust Reconstruction Act.’67 Subsequent statements in the HC 
judgment belie these sentiments:  
 The Minister of Finance traces the origin of the Trust to the first plaintiff [post-
1994 Malawi Congress Party]. In his affidavit it is very clear that whatever the 
financial arrangements or organisations, they are at the aegis and interest of the 
first plaintiff. It is the first plaintiff that obtained the funds and authorised all 
transactions, no matter how diverse, on the funds. The origin of the Press Trust 
is the first plaintiff.’68 
The HC unquestioningly proceeded on the basis that the pre-1994 was the same as the 
post-1994 MCP hence ownership of the Press Trust had at all times vested in the MCP (pre- 
and post- 1994). However, in the same judgment, the judge places the ownership of the 
Press Trust in Dr. Banda – despite the fact that he had found as a matter of fact that some of 
the property that constituted the Press trust e.g. Malawi Press Ltd, was owned by the pre-
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1994 MCP and its members (the Malawi nation). Here the judge failed to distinguish 
between Dr Banda and pre- 1994 MCP – not surprising seeing as even the distinction 
between Dr Banda and MCP could have been said as being de facto non-existent.69 
‘Ownership’ Analysed Further – MCP or Kamuzu Banda? 
Without expressly articulating the legal distinction between the pre-1994 and post-1994 MCP 
the appellate court in its judgment alluded to the fact that only ‘an outsider’70 would construe 
the shareholding of Dr Banda in the Press Trust as his personal property.71 Throughout its 
decision the SC made constant reference to the shareholding of Press Trust by the pre-1994 
MCP officials (1969, 1970, 1974, 1980, and 1984) as being ‘on behalf of the Malawi 
nation.’72 In the final analysis that would prove decisive in its conclusion about the 
constitutional validity of the ‘reconstruction’ efforts reflected in the challenged piece of 
legislation.  
It would appear from a close reading of their judgement that the SC proceeded on the 
premise that the pre-1994 political entity was congruous with the government (and people) of 
Malawi; this legal reality was markedly different from the post-1994 MCP which was not only 
one of several political entities but was now the sole opposition party in the legislature (i.e. 
they no longer were in a position to ‘administer’ or ‘safeguard’ the ‘national interest’ 
embodied in the Press Trust). According to this view therefore the central role played by 
Kamuzu Banda in the Press Trust arose directly from him being ‘President of MCP’73 and not 
as a private investor. On that basis the appellate court (without expressly stating so) places 
the continuation of the pre-1994 MCP role in Press Trust in the government of Malawi (which 
status the pre-1994 MCP had assumed de facto74). 
Indirectly, the SC reproached the HC for taking an ‘outsider’s viewpoint’75in approaching the 
dispute. The significance of the trial court’s failure to address the issue of ownership 
appropriately was further manifested in that it even neglected to consider the ‘… issue of the 
locus standi of Dr Ntaba, Mr Chimango and the MCP to these proceedings’ even though ‘the 
erstwhile Attorney–General,’76 had raised the issue in argument.  In its determination the SC 
concluded that the post-1994 MCP lacked locus standi to raise issues of the property of the 
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Press Trust before the courts of Malawi. Among the reasons cited was the fact that the 
plaintiffs were neither trustees nor directors/representatives of the Press Trust and hence the 
mere fact that the pre-1994 ‘MCP had a significant role historically in the creation of the 
press group [did not] give them ... “sufficient interest.”’77 
Ironically, neither the SC nor the HC drew out the legal distinction between the pre-1994 
MCP and Dr. Kamuzu Banda. Both courts did not take the time to analyse whether any 
property in the Press Trust could be said to have been ‘jointly’ or ‘severally’ owned by pre-
1994 MCP (and its members) and/or Kamuzu Banda in his personal capacity. On the one 
hand, the HC held that the Press Trust was owned by MCP (fusing pre-1994 and post-1994 
MCP into one legal entity) and Kamuzu Banda – without elaborating any possibility of 
separate legal existence. On the other hand, the SC concluded that the Press Trust was 
owned by the pre-1994 MCP (synonymous with the pre-1994 Government of Malawi) on 
behalf of the Malawi Nation (its members) and to the extent that Kamuzu Banda held any 
shares, he did so as President and not as a private individual. The obvious point to make 
here is that neither court (at trial or on appeal) seems to have been alive to the patrimonial 
dynamics of the Banda regime and were thus unable to articulate a judicial commentary that 
could adequately account for the apparent ‘confusion’ surrounding the ownership of the 
Press Trust.  
It may be argued therefore that the factual conclusion of both courts (the SC and the HC) on 
this most important point ‘tainted’ their judicial conclusions on the rest of the constitutional 
issues. It will be shown in the subsequent discussion that in exercising their judicial review 
function both the SC and the HC were consciously engaged in a process of righting (what 
they perceived to be ‘constitutional’ or ‘historical’) wrongs. The HC assumed the noble role of 
‘disciplining an unaccountable executive’ by reference to ‘constitutional’ norms that 
‘exclusively’ preserved the liberal democratic values of property. However, the trial court 
seems to have paid no regard to the ‘historical peculiarities’ of the creation of the Press Trust 
and thereby compromised the ‘legitimacy’ of its determination in the context of the social 
trust thesis espoused in sections 12 and 13 of the 1994 Constitution.  
On the other hand the SC appears to have conceived its constitutional function as ‘judicially’ 
righting the ‘historical injustice’ of what has been termed ‘eating from the State’ or ‘politics of 
the belly’.78 However, in discharging that function the appellate court appears to have been 
unduly deferential to both the executive and the legislative arms of government; in other 
words they failed to display ample fidelity to the ‘constitutional parameters’ of accountability 
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and constitutional supremacy espoused in sections 5, 8 and 9 of the 1994 Constitution. 
Thus, in different ways, both the SC and the HC display an ‘unsatisfactory’ approach to 
constitutional adjudication. That said the SC approach at least took cognisance of the 
‘pervasiveness’ of MCP as a socio-political entity with ‘exclusive’ economic hegemony prior 
to 1994. On that important score therefore, the appellate decision would pass the test of 
‘transformative constitutionalism’ to the extent that the law was employed to rectify and not 
consolidate ‘socio-economic’ hegemony as a legacy of 30 years of autocratic rule. 
6.3.1.2 Supreme Court: ‘The Executive Knows Best’ – Notice of Legislative Proposals 
The Press Trust Case occurred as Malawi was still in the early stages of transitioning from a 
‘totalitarian rule,’79 where ‘checks and balances were very limited and ineffectual. Absolute, 
unquestioning loyalty … was expected of everyone who participated in public life.’80 The 
President and (by necessary implication) the executive arm of government was deemed to 
know best and parliament agreed with all that the executive set as an agenda. According to 
Denis Venter ‘the Malawian state was a strong and authoritarian state, dominated by a 
small, autocratic...political clique...an archetype of the “Leviathan” state [where] the 
ministerial and parliamentary structures were purely nominal and had the facile function of 
rubber-stamping and rationalising handed down policies.’ 81This is the ‘autocratic’ 
environment in which the Press Trust (and its legal predecessors) had been birthed and 
nurtured. Incidentally, it was within the same political reality of ‘executive hegemony’ that the 
appellate justices had come to first practice the law (and later assumed judicial office).82  
The Press Trust case tested the willingness of the court to enforce constitutional 
accountability of the executive in the latter’s exercise of its mandate to initiate legislation in 
Parliament.83Essentially the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the Press Trust 
(Reconstruction) Act (“The Act”) on the basis that the executive had failed to give MPs 
adequate notice prior to tabling the antecedent Bill in violation of section 96 (2) of the 
Constitution which required such notice to enable ‘canvassing’ of ‘public’ as well as ‘expert’ 
opinions. In arguing this point it was conceded by the plaintiffs that the procedure followed 
by the Minister of Finance in introducing the Press Trust (Reconstruction) Bill (“The Bill”) 
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before the National Assembly ‘was permitted by the standing orders’ (“SO”) which allowed 
for ‘dispensing with notice’.’84  
Specifically, Standing Order 114 provided for publication of a public Bill in the Gazette at 
least 21 days prior to first reading, unless in the opinion of the responsible minister the 
urgency of matter warranted a waiver of such notice.85In this instance the Minister of Finance 
had purported to act on the basis of this SO when he introduced the Bill in Parliament. The 
question then became which takes precedence, SO 114(4) or S. 96 (2) of the Constitution? 
The High Court Determination 
The MCP argued before the HC that SO 114 (4) was inconsistent with S. 96 (2) of the 
Constitution because it allows the Minister to give no time at all; to that extent it should be 
declared null and void. Section 96(2) stipulated that ‘in performing the duties and functions 
referred to in this section the cabinet shall make legislative proposals available in time, in 
order to permit sufficient canvassing of expert and public opinion.’86The respondent replied 
that SO 114 ‘was made under the (authority of) the Constitution’ empowering ‘the National 
Assembly to make rules to govern its own procedure’. This authority is elaborated in Section 
56(1) of the Constitution to the effect that ‘the National Assembly or the Senate may, by 
Standing Order or otherwise regulate its own procedure.’87Rather significantly as we shall 
see later, that rule making power to regulate procedure is given ‘subject to this 
Constitution’.88  
In addressing this axiomatic constitutional question, the HC employed an approach 
antithetical to that taken when determining the issue of ownership of the Press Trust by 
appealing to the ‘historical realities’ of Malawian politics in order to elucidate the democratic 
significance of the constitutional requirement for ample notice of legislative business. It was 
therefore observed that: 
The framers of our Constitution … were mindful of the history of our beloved 
country and the prospect of abuse. Our history shows that very onerous and 
unconscionable legislation had been rushed and passed through the National 
Assembly, with disastrous results to the ethos of our nation and people. … The 
framers of our Constitution…did not provide for any rider to dispense with such 
notice in the event of urgency. They insisted on sufficient time.89 … The history 
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of our country justifies a constitutional provision that requires time to be given. In 
such a case, some time, albeit not a long time, must be given to enable 
canvassing of public and expert opinion.90 
The HC agreed with the plaintiffs that in an ‘open and democratic society’ such notice is 
indispensable to ensure ‘popular participation’ in the legislative-making process. Thus in 
relation to Section 56 (1) the trial court stated that ‘the purpose of Standing Orders or 
statutes made under section 56(1) of the Constitution is to regulate procedure, not to create 
new powers.’91 In other words ‘a constitutional provision that requires one to give time to 
enable sufficient canvassing of expert and public opinion is clearly not served by a provision 
that does not give such time. It could be served by a provision that gives less time, but not 
by one that gives none at all.’92 The HC took the position that SO 114 (4) created new 
powers for the National Assembly contrary to what ‘the framers of our Constitution’93 had 
‘obvious[ly]’94 intended. Therefore, the HC declared SO 114 (4) invalid. The trial judge 
concluded that ‘the first plaintiff and the two members of Parliament should have been given 
21 days’ notice.’95 
In effect therefore one would expect that the legislative business transacted pursuant to the 
purported ‘waiver of notice’ would have been accordingly ‘void’. Nevertheless the HC took 
the view that inadequacy of notice alone would not have led to the declaration of the Act as 
invalid; 96a position similar to that of the appellate court.97As a matter of ‘transformative 
jurisprudence’ the HC rightly needed to pay attention to the history of the country in its 
application of S. 96 (2) of the Constitution to circumscribe the ambit of SO 114 (4). There 
was in that sense a valid recognition of the historical imperative which ‘motivated’ the 
stipulation of ample notice to precede the introduction of legislation in Parliament. Indeed it is 
axiomatic that constitutionalism demands accountability from the executive in legislative 
proposals. Conceptually, the requirement of time for consultations and participation would be 
legitimate democratic prerequisites within a social trust based governance framework. 
The Supreme Court Determination 
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The SC seems to have taken the approach that the executive ‘knows best’ and is (almost 
always) deemed to act within the law.98 The SC chose to exploit the ambiguity in Section 96 
(2) to justify deference to the executive by stating that the section did ‘not specify to whom 
legislative proposals should be made available, whether to members of Parliament or 
members of the public generally, or to both.’99 The SC surprisingly went on to declare that 
there was no ‘nexus between section 96(2) and SO 114,’100 despite the fact that both deal 
with issues of ‘time lines’ within the legislative process. It seems the SC was unwilling to 
even consider the compatibility of SO 114 (4) with the constitutional demands for notice 
under section 96(2)-which is the approach taken by Mwaungulu, J – but simply declared that 
‘…failure to comply with section 96(2) cannot render SO 114(1) invalid, as Mwaungulu J 
held.’101  
 
Had the SC stopped there, maybe the impact of its deference on subsequent legislative 
processes in Malawi would have been mitigated. However, the appellate court proceeded to 
create what is tantamount to a presumption of compliance with constitutional provisions on 
legislative processes in favour of the executive.102 It pronounced that since ‘the process of 
legislation does not begin in Parliament … [but] in Government departments … it ha[d] 
almost become a rule … for Government departments to consult the representatives of the 
interests affected before introducing a Bill into Parliament.’103 Consequently, the SC held that 
it was ‘a mistake to look exclusively at what happens in Parliament,’104 when deciding a 
question on whether the government had complied with constitutional provisions on the 
legislative processes.  In so doing the SC somehow created a dubious presumption of 
adequate and representative consultation on legislative proposals in favour of the executive. 
There was no mention as to which evidence the SC had recourse to in order to find that it 
was now an ‘established rule’ that ‘government departments consulted widely’ before 
legislation was presented before parliament. In any event, that inquiry would have no 
practical impact on the Act since the SC held that ‘even if there was a breach of section 
96(2)’ they ‘were of the view that that breach would not invalidate the Act.’105 In their opinion 
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‘if the requirement under section 96(2) was necessary...for the purposes of legislation, it 
would have been included in section 48(1) of the Constitution [dealing with functions and 
duties of the legislature]. ’106 As a matter of constitutional review the SC may just as well 
have ‘deleted’ S. 96 (2) from the Constitution-for that seems to be the legal effect of such a 
‘deferential’ analysis of the provision vis-a-vis other aspects of the Constitution. It could even 
be argued that the ‘subsidiary legislation’ of Parliamentary (SO 114 (4)) effectively ‘tramped’ 
an otherwise clear constitutional provision.  
It is rather curious to observe that in its deference to the executive, the SC interprets 
Constitutional provisions not as a whole but in isolation – there seems to be more 
importance given to the lexicographic arrangement of constitutional provisions than to their 
substantive import. To that extent the whole mandate of ‘enforcing’ and ‘interpreting’ the 
Constitution can be said to be ‘lost’ on the courts. 
6.3.1.3 SC: Quorum and Speaker’s non-Justiciability 
Another ground on which the plaintiffs sought the invalidation of the Act was that it had been 
enacted without the requisite quorum as provided by section 50 of the Constitution. 
The Appellate court’s approach to the question of quorum (even if it were to be correct) 
underscores their fundamental assumptions of constitutionality of legislation - a typically 
deferential position which conceptually seeks to avoid any ‘conflict’ by establishing an almost 
‘insurmountable’ threshold of evidence in order to prove ‘non-compliance’. However, in 
fairness to the SC, it must be conceded here that legitimate differences of opinion were 
inevitable in respect of the question of ‘quorum’ in the Malawi Constitution (prior to the 2001 
amendment). 
 
The High Court Determination 
The HC proceeded on the basis that though a procedural issue the question of quorum 
needed to conform to fundamental constitutional values. As such it became a condition 
precedent to the validity of an Act of Parliament. It was observed that: 
In a jurisdiction, like in the United Kingdom, where there is no written Constitution, 
the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament entails that the procedure affecting 
legislation can only be a product of Parliament itself and alterable by Parliament. The 
immutability of the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament results in the inability of 
courts to question the validity of Acts of Parliament on any basis, including the 
procedure under which the Act was passed. Where the fundamental law is a written 
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Constitution, however, the legislature cannot overlook the procedure laid by the 
Constitution for validity of its legislative actions or exercise of its legislative will.107  
In this case the legal dispute was whether the ‘absence’ of MCP MPs in the chamber when 
the Bill was actually debated meant that there was no quorum even though they had been 
there at the beginning of that day’s business. The pertinent legal issues therefore became 
‘what was the requisite quorum and when is it computed’ (or more accurately for the second 
limb ‘what constitutes a sitting’)? Section 50 (1) of the Constitution provided that the quorum 
shall be formed at the beginning of the sitting by the presence of two-thirds of the members 
entitled to vote.  Section 50 (2) stipulated that where the speaker was informed of the 
absence of the quorum he shall adjourn the chamber upon verification.   
 
The HC quoted extensively and followed the judicial reasoning from various foreign 
jurisdictions. It concluded that the hallmark of a quorum was actual presence at the entire 
meeting and its ultimate purpose was to validate the whole proceedings from beginning to 
end.108 Thus Sections 50 (1) and (2) must be read together since ‘the framers of our 
Constitution wanted to deal with the question of the quorum of the chambers in two stages, 
at the beginning of each sitting (S. 50 [1]) and during the sitting (S. 50 [2]).’109 Consequently, 
SO 26 which provided for two-thirds quorum without reference to the beginning of the sitting 
signified the need for a quorum to be retained throughout the sitting.110 The possibility of a 
minority government being held to ransom by the majority opposition represented a political 
question which required statesmanship and not legal resolution.111 Hence Section 56 (2) 
stipulating that ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, [parliament] may act unless 
more than two thirds of all their seats are vacant’ could not modify the two-third requirement 
under section 50 since the issue of quorum determined the capacity of parliament to act qua-
parliament.112 The view of the HC was that ‘the essence of democracy is the pluralism of 
ideas and debate’ [such that] ‘the best of decisions can only come from a wider participation 
of those who are responsible for decision-making.’113 Therefore, for the Speaker’s failure to 
adjourn proceedings once notified of the lack of forum, the Act was invalidated.114 
The HC’s determination (except on S. 56[2]) entrenches the essence of representative 
democracy. It remains moot whether the refusal by the court to resolve a question that would 
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be better handled by political dialogue would have forced Malawian politicians to learn the 
skills of dialogue and compromise which is essential in the consolidation of democracy.115 
However, it was arguably erroneous for the HC to state that S. 56 (2) of the Constitution did 
not affect the question of quorum when it patently alluded to the capacity of parliament to 
conduct business unless its members roll fell below one-third of the seats available (which 
would of necessity imply a valid quorum constituted by less than two-thirds of the entire 
membership as required under Section 50).116 By failing to consider an alternative viewpoint, 
the HC missed an opportunity, within its excellent articulation of the purpose of a quorum, to 
outline the principles that should guide the application of S. 56 (2) of the Constitution. It 
would appear the HC was pre-occupied with preventing abuse from ‘an innocuous and 
reasonable provision’117 that the trial judge opted to deprive it of legal effect – that of leaving 
it open to parliament to act with less than two-thirds of the members. 
The Supreme Court Determination 
The SC overturned the HC on almost every point on the issue of the quorum. For instance, 
the SC stated that contrary to the HC conclusion section 50 ‘clearly requires a quorum at the 
beginning of the sitting’ only.118 
While on the question of notice the SC court had ‘seen no nexus between’ a constitutional 
provision and a Standing Order,119 now they could just as easily hold SO 26 as invalid for 
offending the constitution (S. 50 [1]). Arguably however, on the relationship between SO 26 
and Section 50, the HC pronouncements appear to be more accurate – that SO 26 
implemented S. 50 (2) of the Constitution hence could not be held to be inconsistent with S. 
50 (1). It would appear that the SC in the earlier scenario took the view that insisting on the 
constitutional requirement for ample notice to accommodate consultations would have 
created ‘problems’ and undermined ‘executive business.’ Regrettably from the perspective of 
the democratic imperative to entrench constitutional accountability of the legislature, the SC 
reversed the HC finding that the Speaker should have adjourned the proceedings and 
granted the Speaker more or less absolute immunity.  
In reaching that conclusion the SC applied S. 53 (5) of the Constitution which provides for 
the functional independence of the Speaker. The SC interpreted that provision to mean that 
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the Speaker had absolute immunity so that, he is protected from ‘challenges in [the] courts 
as a result of his exercise of the powers conferred upon him.’120 According to the SC such a 
deferential interpretation of the Constitution was necessary because ‘if (they) construe[d] the 
Constitution strictly, no Government would be able to function properly, and this would be to 
the detriment of the nation as a whole.’121Thus political expediency was allowed to determine 
constitutional validity of legislative conduct.  
6.3.1.4 The Significance of the SC Approach 
This study proposes that on the ‘substantive question’ of the Press Trust Case, namely 
whether it was a private or public trust, legitimate difference of opinion may exist. Such 
differences may reflect the conceptual predispositions of different judicial officers to either 
‘unsullied’ liberal democratic values or ‘transformative constitutionalism’ models which 
account for the ‘peculiar governance’ needs of Malawi. 122 Actually, this thesis is of the view 
that the decision of the SC represents the justice of the case by reason of its fidelity to social 
trust based formulations of constitutionalism. However, it is worth contending ‘the end does 
not necessarily justify the means’; it should have been possible for the SC to arrive at a just 
decision without undue deference to the executive and the legislature (indeed without 
recourse to the dubious ‘doctrine of necessity’).123 
As subsequent developments have shown in Malawi, political parties appear to see no need 
for ‘political and social dialogue, concessions and compromise, for the benefit of the whole 
nation. Instead politicians in Malawi seem to be preoccupied with preserving power, gaining 
power and preventing others from getting power.’124 
6.3.2 Cases Subsequent To the Press Trust Case 
6.3.2.1 MCP Factionalism Cases 
When Kamuzu Banda indicated that he did not wish to continue with the Presidency of the 
MCP, the ‘heir apparent’ was perceived to be JZU Tembo. However, Dr. Banda left the 
mantle to Gwanda Chakuamba. After the MCP lost elections to the UDF in 1999, Tembo 
ascribed the losses to Chakuamba; hence leadership wrangles developed leading to the 
emergence of two factions. Subsequently, the two factions held two separate conventions 
which led to the case of   Re Constitution of Malawi Congress Party and Re a Convention 
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and Part 4 Article 40 of the Constitution of the Malawi Congress Party.125 The HC whilst 
declaring the two conventions a nullity, refused to get drawn into choosing a leader for a 
political party. A vice-president of the MCP lodged an appeal to the SC in the case of Peter 
Chiwona v. Hon. Gwanda Chakuamba126 against the decision of the HC. The SC upheld the 
findings of the HC.  
Interestingly, the trial judge in the HC was the same judge as in the Press Trust Case (HC). 
The rationale for refusing to get involved was similar to his reasoning in the quorum decision 
– that politicians must resolve political stalemates amongst themselves. The SC however, 
appears to distinguish between political stalemates between the executive and the 
opposition (in which case the SC held the courts must intervene)127 and political stalemates 
between or within political parties (in which case courts must not intervene).  
6.3.2.2 Cases cited in Research studies  
A considerable number of scholars have analysed the decisions of both the HC and the SC 
on politically charged matters in the context of political studies.128 The cases involved intra-
party disputes, election disputes, and separation of powers.129 Notable cases include - 
Attorney General vs. Mapopa Chipeta;130 Fred Nseula v. Attorney General and Malawi 
Congress Part; 131the State v. Speaker of the National Assembly and the Attorney General 
ex parte Mary Nagwale;132 and the State and the National Assembly ex part Hon Sylvester 
Kasambala and the Registered Trustees of the Public Affairs Committee (PAC).133 The 
research findings show that ‘while the court’s decisions as a whole were balanced between 
the government and its opponents, high interest cases tended to go the government’s 
way.’134 As between the SC and the HC it is the SC that ‘largely remained supportive of’135 
the executive.  
Vondoepp argues that the decisions of the courts in Malawi including the SC have been 
motivated by ‘ethno-regional identities.’136 However, as Ellet responds to similar claims from 
other scholars, such arguments are misleading,137 as they fail to take into account the 
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consistent judicial reasoning of the SC. The SC has largely upheld the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy in most constitutional review cases which it considered to have 
high national interest implications. Even though the SC has not expressly employed the term 
‘deference’ in any of its judgments, the application of the principle of ‘judicial deference’ is 
replete within the emerging jurisprudence. Whereas the allegations of ethno-regional 
tendencies may be worth analysing in the context of ‘judicial politics’ they are a misdiagnosis 
of the manifest ‘jurisprudential’ problem – this study suggests that the courts’ own 
‘misapprehension’ of the new ‘constitutional dispensation’ offers a more apposite theoretical 
account for the consistently ‘inadequate’ jurisprudence (despite the strong evidence of 
judicial independence).   
6.4 Implications on Legislative Developments 
Vondoepp records that the supportive tendencies of the SC were ‘not lost on the key players 
in Malawian politics’138 especially the government. It is argued in this chapter that the 
subsequent legislative developments that followed emanated from such perceptions that 
were strengthened by the judicial deference adopted by the SC especially. 
6.4.1 The Abolition of the Senate 
The 1994 Constitution originally provided for a second chamber called the Senate from 
sections 68 to 72.139  Its functions included ‘the power to propose and pass legislation; to 
amend existing laws; and to indict or convict the President on impeachment.’140  By Act No. 4 
of 2001, the National Assembly abolished the Senate, through constitutional amendment (?). 
The main reason advanced was that the Senate would have been very expensive to run 
hence posing an unnecessary burden on already scarce government resources. 141  As a 
result, contrary to the Constitutional order envisioned by the 1994 Constitution, the country 
reverted to the pre-1994 order of a unicameral legislature. 
The reaction of the public to the abolition of the Senate has been consistent condemnation 
coupled with a demand for its re-introduction.142 At the time the amendment was being 
considered in parliament, there was strong condemnation from both civil society and 
opposition parties.143 Civil Society organisations sought an injunction from the High Court to 
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prevent the bill from being tabled. The grounds for challenging the abolition of the Senate 
were framed in Constitutional terms – section 45(8) of the Constitution provides that ‘under 
no circumstance shall it be possible to suspend this Constitution or any part thereof or 
dissolve any of its organs, save as is consistent with the provisions of this Constitution.’ It 
was argued that S. 45 (8) read with S. 196 (3) protected the Senate provisions from an 
amendment without a national referendum. S. 196 (3) provides that Parliament has power to 
amend a provision of the Constitution without a referendum only if ‘the amendment would 
not affect the substance or the effect of the Constitution.’   
However, as the HC was taking its time deliberating on the matter, ‘the government moved 
with unseemly haste by tabling, debating and passing the bill.’144 The dangers of haste, lack 
of consultations and disregard of the views of both the public and opposition parties by the 
Executive when passing legislation was an issue that the HC in the Press Trust Case had 
highlighted. In making reference to the autocratic historical experience whereby the 
Executive had been unaccountable such that Parliament ‘was largely a rubber stamp for 
decisions made by the executive’145 Mwaungulu, J had admonished that such a trend could 
easily recur if the courts were to dispense with the need for notice as required by S. 96 (2) of 
the Constitution. As already discussed however, the SC effectively ‘deleted’ S. 96 (2) 
through its pronouncements in the Press Trust Case.146In so doing, the seeds were sown for 
a ‘return to the sins of the past’ so to speak. 
Consequently, it should not be surprising that when amending a substantial provision of the 
Constitution, the Executive once more hastened the process brandishing the ‘national 
interest’ mantra of ‘cutting down government expenditure’ for good measure – arguably to 
invoke the judicial deference principle in their favour. 
Further, the SC pronouncements on a quorum of two-thirds as being essential only at the 
beginning of the sitting may have undermined the bargaining position of the opposition in 
Parliament. It could also be argued that the SC decision in the Press Trust Case e.g. on S. 
96 (2) may have discouraged civil society organisations from pursuing the matter beyond the 
application for injunction. These points are buttressed by the fact that the even Constitutional 
Review Commission was ‘generally sympathetic to the view that it is quite probable that the 
abolition of the Senate in 2001 by the National Assembly was not entirely consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.’147 
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The abolition of the Senate undermined a Constitutional framework that had taken into 
account the social, cultural and political arrangements that exist in Malawi. The Senate’s 
composition had included Chiefs, and religious leaders who wield significance influence in 
their jurisdiction. Further, the Senate would have provided ‘a forum for the representation of 
special interest groups such as the disabled and women,’148 as well as expert input into 
matters of national importance since some senators were to be people who are experts in 
their fields.149  As a consequence, the nation lost a Constitutional organ that would have 
served as an organ ‘for checks and balances on both the National Assembly’150 and the 
Executive (through its powers to impeach the President). Indeed, ‘by abolishing the Senate, 
a vital mechanism for ensuring accountability was neutralised.’151 
6.4.2 The Recall Provision 
The 1994 Constitution was a product of deliberations of a National Consultative Committee 
that was constituted to come up with a provisional Constitution which would later be adopted 
by the National Assembly as the new multi-party era Constitution.152 One of the provisions in 
the provisional Constitution was Section 64 which had provided for the recall of members of 
parliament by their constituents. 
 By Act No. 6 of 1995, the National Assembly repealed S. 64 of the provisional Constitution 
hence when the Constitution came into effect, it did not have a recall provision. The coalition 
of UDF and AFORD used their numbers in parliament to repeal S. 64 of the provisional 
Constitution contrary to the express resolution of the National Consultative Conference on 
the provisional Constitution.153 The Conference had been set up to discuss provisions that 
were perceived to be contentious, and one of those provisions was the recall provision.154 
The delegates came from wider society, including political parties, even some not 
represented in Parliament, the Churches, the Law Society, Trade Unions, Women’s groups, 
Traditional Authorities, the legal fraternity, the University and the armed forces.155 By 
express resolution, the delegates called for the retention of the recall provision (among 
others like the Senate), on the basis that it would enhance the accountability of members of 
parliament to their constituencies.156  
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In a manner that displayed their blatant desire to fashion the Constitutional framework in a 
manner that consolidated their hold on political power by diminishing the accountability 
devices, the rationale given for the repeal of the recall provision was that ‘it could be abused 
by the constituents.’157 Surely if indeed the concern was fear of abuse, parliament could 
have developed proper criteria for recall by way of legislation.  
Now whereas the repeal of the recall provision was done before the SC decision in the Press 
Trust Case, it is proposed that uproar that followed the repeal should have exercised the 
court’s mind when dealing with the issues of notice, quorum and accountability of the 
Speaker before the courts. Somehow in deciding the issues in the Press Trust case as it did, 
the SC indirectly endorsed the conduct of the National Assembly in the repeal of the recall 
provision thereby entrenching unaccountability. 
6.4.3 Section 65: Crossing the Floor 
The HC and SC decisions on S. 65 of the Constitution have been highlighted as evidence of 
the independence of the Malawi Judiciary.158 However, it is also arguable that some aspects 
of the SC decision are another example of judicial deference and the impact it has had on 
legislative developments. Others have called the deference, ‘the presumption of 
perfection.’159 The case in issue is that of The Presidential Reference on S. 65.160 
 
In order to place the case in its proper context it may be necessary to elaborate that Section 
65, also known as ‘crossing the floor provision,’ is one of the sections that were amended in 
2001. The Original S. 65 as it was in the 1994 Constitution provided as follows: 
‘(1) The Speaker shall declare vacant the seat of any member of the national 
assembly who was, at the time of his or her election, a member of one political party 
represented in the national assembly, other than by that member alone but who has 
voluntarily ceased to be a member of that party and has joined another political party 
represented in the National Assembly. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), all members of all political parties have the 
absolute right to exercise a free vote in any and all proceedings of the national 
Assembly, and a member shall not have his seat declared vacant solely on account of 
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his or her voting in contradiction of the recommendations of a political party, 
represented in the national Assembly, of which he or she is a member.’ 
 
By Act No. 8 of 2001, Parliament amended the S. 65 (1) but maintained S. 65 (2). The 
amendment, currently in force provides (amendments are italicized) –: 
‘(1) The Speaker shall declare vacant the seat of any member of the national 
assembly who was, at the time of his or her election, a member of one political party 
represented in the national assembly, other than by that member alone but who has 
voluntarily ceased to be a member of that party or has joined another political party 
represented in the National Assembly or has joined any other political party, or 
association or organization whose objectives or activities are political in nature. 
 
The first constitutional review of the amendment was the case of The Registered Trustees of 
Public Affairs Committee (PAC) v. Attorney General.161 In that case, the HC was called upon 
to consider the constitutionality of the amended provision in view of the ‘right to freedom of 
association as guaranteed under the Constitution.’162 The HC declared the amended version 
invalid on the basis that it violated the right to freedom of association, but upheld the original 
S. 65 (1) as valid and constitutional. Consequently, ‘the position of the law reverted to that 
which existed before’163 the 2001 amendment. 
 
The subsequent constitutional reviews of the section came by way of Presidential referral to 
the HC164 under S. 89 (1)(h) of the Constitution which ‘empowers the President to refer 
disputes of a Constitutional nature to the High Court.’165 Initially, it was surprisingly that the 
version that the Presidential referral was based on was the amended version of 2001 (which 
had already been invalidated by a HC judge).166  Subsequent events however, have shown 
that the Referral was aimed at delaying the implementation of Section 65 by the Speaker as 
the party the President had formed upon taking office had no elected representatives in 
Parliament. The issues in the referral included167 –  
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(1) Whether S. 65 (1) was not inconsistent with Constitutional provisions 32, 33, 
35 and 40, which provided for freedoms of association, conscience, expression and 
political rights respectively.   
(2) Whether an ‘independent’ member would be deemed to have crossed the 
floor where – (a) he or she joins a political party that is represented in the National 
Assembly; or (b) he or she joins a political party that is not represented in the National 
Assembly. 
 
The HC upheld S. 65 (1) as amended in 2001 as Constitutional hence valid without at any 
point distinguishing the case of The Registered Trustees of Public Affairs Committee (PAC) 
v. Attorney General.168 The fact that the President referred the matter to the SC 169– 
effectively appealing against the decision of the HC, supports the assertion that the referral 
was aimed at simply buying him time. The SC upheld the finding of validity and 
constitutionality of the HC hence the law in force on crossing the floor is S. 65 (1) as 
amended in 2001. 
 
However, whereas it was ‘correct in principle’170 for the SC to hold that ‘courts had no power 
to invalidate a provision of the Constitution, which outlived the period of its provisional 
application’171 [18th May 1994 – 18th May 1995); the same cannot be said of its elaboration of 
the reasoning on the issue. The SC further held that: 
Actually, it appears to us that even provisions of subsequent amendments to the 
Constitution, once duly passed in the normal way by the National Assembly and 
thereby becoming part of the Constitution, those provisions too cannot be invalidated 
or declared to be unconstitutional or inconsistent with the other provisions of the 
Constitution. We would therefore, with respect, query the correctness of the Registered 
Trustees of Public Affairs Committee case on this point. The High Court had no 
jurisdiction to invalidate any of the amended section after the amendment was effected 
following due parliamentary procedure.172 (Emphasis supplied) 
 
It can be argued that the main rationale for the decision of the SC to uphold the ruling of the 
HC on the Presidential Reference Case was its adoption of the principle of judicial deference 
even when it pertains to Constitutional amendment as signified by the quotation above. In 
effect, the SC pronounced beyond reasonable doubt that even when it pertains to 
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Constitutional Amendments which the constitution stipulates must be made in compliance 
with its provisions Parliament will enjoy a form of supremacy. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion therefore it can be observed that by adopting an approach to its judicial 
mandate which is at odds with the clear intentions of the Constitution the apex court in 
Malawi has inadvertently ‘reinstated’ parliamentary supremacy as the definitive governance 
model in the jurisdiction. As has been acknowledged academically as well as in the court 
there were certain ‘historical imperatives’ that influenced the choice of ‘regime’ which the 
framers of the ‘democratic’ Constitution of 1994 adopted. Among other things, it was 
inherent in the despotic nature of Kamuzu Banda’s ‘regime’ that institutional accountability 
was non-existent. Indeed, by design the post-independence constitutional order perpetrated 
the ‘parliamentary supremacy’ model practiced by the departed imperial authority.173 
 
In a deliberate attempt to address the ‘political perversions’ which had ‘manipulated’ such a 
parliamentary system to install an unbridled one-man rule, the framers of the constitution 
entrenched a ‘constitutional supremacy’ model of governance. There were certain socio-
political factors which they proposed to ameliorate by such an arrangement. However, there 
seems to be a body of jurisprudence emerging from the courts (especially at the apex) which 
would suggest that ‘nothing changed’ in terms of the place of the Constitution in the 
governance of the country. Within a jurisdiction exercising the common law principles of 
precedent generally and superior stare decisis, such an approach has the potential to inhibit 
the ability of the jurisprudence to play its anticipated role in articulating the transformative 
permutations embodied in the Constitution.174 
 
Nevertheless, the picture for Malawi is not all bleak. As has been highlighted in the 
discussion of different approaches of the HC and the SC in the Press Trust case, there is no 
reluctance to employ judicial creativity where the courts deem it appropriate. In one instance 
the HC evidenced signs of ‘judicial responsibility’ in its keenness to enforce ‘constitutional 
accountability’ parameters no matter how unpalatable that would be to the ‘powers that be’.  
Even though it reversed the HC, in doing so the SC showed remarkable ‘judicial 
responsiveness’ to the ‘peculiarities’ of Malawian socio-political developments by interpreting 
the relevant constitutional provisions in a fashion that promoted the ‘transformative agenda’ 
of dismantling the ‘hegemonic’ legacy of Kamuzu Banda and his ‘chaebol’. In so doing 
prominence was given to the social trust based governance stipulations embodied within the 
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‘fundamental values’ of the new Constitution. Indeed the findings of other studies give the lie 
to any suggestion that the courts are ‘not independent’. As pointed out by Lord Hoffman: 
In a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is 
necessary to decide which branch of government has in any particular instance 
the decision-making power and what the legal limits of that power are. That is a 
question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts. This means that 
the courts themselves often have to decide the limits of their own decision-
making power. That is inevitable.175  
Consequently, priority must be given to identifying underlying factors that may impinge on 
the Court’s ability to appropriately determine when to exercise judicial deference or not, and 
if so to what extent, and in what manner. In that context, the proposition in this thesis is that 
‘legal culture’ could as well account for the ‘consistently deferential’ approach of the apex 
court to its constitutional review mandate. The fact that, consistently, the SC seems to 
‘reverse’ HC decisions which are less ‘deferential’ might be indicative of the difference in 
‘outlooks’. It is thus pertinent to design training programmes that could address those 
‘disparities’. 
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Chapter 7  
Inability to distinguish between the ‘baby’ and the ‘bath water’? The Impact of 
Common Law Remedies and Precedents on Judicial Review Decisions in Malawi 
Legal analysts and policy makers who focus only on positivistic questions of textual gaps, fidelity of   
interpretation, application and enforcement of the Malawian Constitution perpetuate abstractionism which is  
unlikely to deliver effective answers to the question why after 18 years, the Constitution is honoured more in 
breach than compliance.1 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Malawi inherited its common law legal system with the attendant ‘emphasis on … legal 
precedent and reliance on the body of cases decided in the past to guide the present 
decision of a judge,’ from Britain due to colonisation.2 Soon after the independence of 
African countries including Malawi from Britain, around 1967, research by Gower revealed 
that ‘English Law was applied without consideration of its suitability to local conditions.’3 A 
subsequent study in 1989 similarly showed that the application of English Law was done 
strictly ‘in accordance with English authorities,’ without ‘accommodating … the specific 
problems’ arising in the relevant jurisdiction.4 To the extent of accommodating specific 
problems when interpreting the Constitution, chapter 5 and 6 have demonstrated that 
Malawian Courts, post-1994 have made significant, albeit inconsistent/contradictory 
progress.5  
However the same is not true of the courts’ application of foreign case law (including English 
authorities). Chapter 4 brought out how the HC and the SC post-1994 appear to think the 
problem of applying foreign case law without accommodating local peculiarities lies with the 
other not itself. For instance, the HC stated that the SC ‘rushed to put on old common law 
spectacles, and so to dig up ancient case law’, without first and foremost understanding the 
Constitution.6 The SC on the other hand, pointed the figure back at the HC impliedly stating 
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that it is the HC itself that did not fully understand the relevant provisions of the Constitution.7 
On the other hand, chapters 5 and 6 read together demonstrate that both the HC and the SC 
in constitutional criminal law and adjudication touching on its oversight over the Executive 
and Legislature have actually placed undue weight on foreign case law without critically 
analysing the applicability of the same. In essence, the problem identified in 1967 and 1989 
still remains. 
In fact, chapters 4, 5, and 6 have demonstrated how that problem has in turn contributed to 
the inconsistent and contradictory phenomenon of judicial activism (‘JA’) in Malawi. In that 
context, chapters 5 and 6 pointed to a need to identify the underlying factors behind the 
inconsistencies and contradictions among the judges in their approach if effective solutions 
are to be identified and implemented.  Consequently, this chapter seeks to build on that by 
focusing on judicial review of the Executive and Legislature in public appointments. It is 
hoped that in doing so, the underlying causes will become clearer. 
7.2 Rationale for focusing on judicial review (‘JR’) 
7.2.1 JR in Malawi epitomises the complex relationship Malawi’s future has with its 
past  
Yahalom8 reports that ‘the metaphorical phrase —don't throw out the baby with the 
bathwater’, was first used in German literature, to describe people ‘who by trying to rid 
themselves of a bad thing succeed in destroying whatever good there was as well.’9 This 
chapter submits that consideration of the metaphor is a necessity in the face of research 
findings that the liberal democratic foundations of the current Malawian Constitution are at 
odds with the aspirations of the majority of Malawians. Even though those findings are 
accurate, it cannot be that there are no common values shared between the majority of 
Malawians and liberal democracy per se. For instance, in chapter 1, it was submitted in 
agreement with Beetham that though the principle of separation of powers and that of limited 
state powers have their roots in ‘liberal democratic theories’, there is a general agreement 
that they are indispensable in any democracy regardless of the theory in practice and that 
differences only arise as to how to implement it in practise.10 This is particularly true of 
Malawi due to its history. 
                                                          
7
 Civil Liberties Committee (CILIC) v. Ministry of Justice & Registrar General, MSCA Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1999 
(judgment delivered in 2004), at http://www.sdnp..org.mw/judiciary/civil/cilic_Min_Justice.htm. 
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9
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As discussed in chapter 3, the colonial administration’s governance without accountability 
and abuse of power; as well as Dr. Banda’s regime which was similarly characterised by lack 
of accountability and gross abuse of power, were at odds with traditional governance models 
of Malawi and the aspirations of the majority of Malawians. Consequently, even though the 
1994 Constitution was predominantly the work of elites with insufficient consultation of the 
majority of Malawians, the fact that they ‘structured [it] in a manner that attempts to 
address … past abuses and prevent future abuses,’11 entails that the 1994 Constitution has 
good things that need to be maintained and enforced.  One area in which the drafters of the 
1994 Constitution made ‘a deliberate attempt’ to remedy past mistakes was in including 
provisions that would prevent ‘the concentration of power in the Presidency’12 in key public 
sector position appointments. Thus the principle of separation of powers represents an 
indispensible ‘baby’ worth keeping in the pursuit of constitutionalism in Malawi. However 
differentiating the principle from its implementation in practice may not be so easy to do. JR 
is the means by which the court exercises oversight over the legislature and the executive. It 
is in this context that this thesis submits that JR embodies the difficulties that Courts in 
Malawi appear to encounter hence worth analysing in detail. 
That is, in discourse on JA, the debate at times revolves around whether the courts should 
take positive action to address gaps created by omission on the part of the Executive or the 
legislature. In Malawi, such a question is brought to the fore in the arena of judicial review by 
the omission of the Executive to initiate the promulgation of legislation that would have 
governed the hearing of constitutional judicial review cases by courts in Malawi in the place 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court (‘RSC’) of England and Wales. To put in context, judicial 
review in Malawian courts is as old as the common law itself, dating back to 1902.13 By 
virtue of the inheritance of the common law system from Britain, Malawi equally inherited the 
RSC as the rules governing civil procedure in the High Court and Supreme Courts of Malawi. 
Consequently, before the 1994 Constitution, applications for judicial review were brought 
under Order 53 of the RSC. Thus it has been observed that before 1992, the common law 
judicial review was there, ‘the courts were there, the lawyers were there, [and] the litigants 
were there’14 but no action was brought applying for judicial review in the courts,15 until 
1992.16 The change since 1992 has been ascribed to the re-emergence of democratic forces 
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which emerged in that year, which left individuals feeling secure against the ‘formidable 
opponent’17  the government had come to represent.18  
However, the 1994 Constitution through a reading together of Section 108 (2) and Section 
43, expressly provided for what is referred to as ‘constitutional judicial review’:19  
Section 108 (2): The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to review any 
law, and any action or decision of the Government, for conformity with this 
Constitution, save as otherwise provided by this Constitution and shall have 
such other jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this 
Constitution or any other law. (Emphasis supplied) 
And 
Section 43: Every person shall have a right to- 
(a) Lawful and procedurally fair administrative action, which is justifiable in 
relation to reasons given where his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate 
expectations or interests are affected or threatened; and 
(b) Be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action where his or 
her rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or interests if those are 
known. 
 
Notwithstanding, the Constitution does not in its provisions provide for a procedure to govern 
the JR under it. Further, the legislature did not promulgate any legislation to provide rules to 
govern the JR adjudication under these sections. Under Order 53 of the RSC, court’s power 
of review was restricted to the procedure of decision making and not the merits. Ideally, at 
the very coming into force of the Constitution a pertinent question should have been, in 
view .of S. 108 (2) and S. 43 of the 1994, is Order 53 to be maintained in its totality or only in 
part? If the latter, which aspect is the ‘bath-water’? And which arm of government decides? It 
appears that such questions were never raised. Rather the continuity of the application of 
Order 53 appears to have been presumed by not only the courts, but the lawyers. How then 
have the Courts in Malawi discharged this responsibility in the area of judicial review of the 
actions and/or decisions of Government to prevent ‘an overreaching executive undermining 
the rights of the citizens’?20  Has the judiciary responded to the transformations in 
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institutional arrangement and perspectives entailed by democracy by subjugating all actions, 
decisions and laws to the fundamental law?21   
7.3 The Impact of Order 53 of RSC on public appointment cases 
7.3.1 C.N. Chihana versus Council of the University of Malawi (UNIMA)22 
This case, as a pre-1994 Constitution case, will assist us in tracing the developments in the 
courts in this area.  The facts of the case were that Mrs. Chihana, the wife of Chakufwa 
Chihana who was an early 1990s leading pro-democracy campaigner,23 was employed by 
the University of Malawi (Unima) on 6th October 1985 on permanent and pensionable terms. 
On 21st March 1992, she received a letter from the Registrar of Unima informing her that he 
had ‘been directed to inform’24 her of the termination of her services ‘with immediate effect.’25 
In her affidavit to the court attaching communication from her to the Registrar and the Vice 
Chancellor of Unima, she swore that prior to the letter of 21st March 1992 the Registrar had 
called her to his office to ask her ‘to resign because of her husband’s activities.’26 The letter 
of termination came after her refusal to resign since ‘she did not know what her husband’s 
activities were.’27 Her communication to the Unima authorities received no response.  
Principally the application for judicial review sought to contest ‘the validity and/or the legality 
of the termination of employment...’28 Among others, the applicant specifically sought 
declaratory orders branding the termination as a breach of her rights under the constitution, 
setting aside the decision as a nullity and a further order for reinstatement into her job.29  
Interestingly the Registrar of Unima swore an affidavit in opposition stating that the 
‘termination was without reasons’30 and denied ‘having given the applicant any reasons for 
the termination of her services as alleged.’31 
On the purported authority of an English precedent32 the trial court held that ‘where there is 
an ordinary contractual relationship of master and servant, in the ordinary sense that we 
know it, the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any 
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reason; he is not even obliged to give reasons for so doing. In that case, the servant cannot 
obtain an order of certiorari.’33The HC then found that the termination of employment ‘was 
not unlawful’34 since the contract of employment between the Applicant and the Respondent 
provided for an option for termination of employment on either party by giving three months’ 
pay in lieu of notice.  
7.3.1.1 Insufficient Rigorous Reasoning 
Even at the very level of common law judicial review, the trial judge35 in the Chihana case 
displayed surprising timidity in his analysis of the evidence before him. Despite referring to 
Ridge v. Baldwin the court failed to canvass pertinent legal and factual points raised by the 
Applicant in her affidavit as had been done by the House of Lords in the cited case. For 
instance ‘who was the master in this case (who had made the decision to terminate)’? In her 
application Mrs. Chihana specifically required proof of any meeting that was held to decide 
the termination of her services. By asking in her affidavit ‘at what occasion was the decision 
made,’36 the question whether it was the Unima Council or not that actually took the decision 
became a crucial issue to resolving whether indeed the option to terminate had been lawfully 
exercised. In the case of Ridge v. Baldwin the fact that the decision to dismiss the Applicant 
had been made by the Police Watch Committee who were legally deemed not to be the 
Applicant’s Master contributed significantly to the adverse finding of the House of Lords on 
the matter. Surprisingly the trial judge in the Chihana case appears to have dismissed the 
concerns of the Applicant as to who actually made the decision without so much as referring 
to them in his ratio decidendi. 
It is significant to appreciate that the Unima Council is a creature of statute, the University of 
Malawi (UNIMA) Act, 1974. Section 11 of the Unima Act provides for the composition of the 
Council, one of the members being the Vice- Chancellor. It was in evidence that the Vice-
Chancellor had been outside the country around the time in which her services had been 
terminated. Section 12 (3) of the Unima Act provided that one-third of the Council members 
shall constitute a quorum for purposes of holding meetings of the Council. Despite such 
statutory foundations, the court did not analyse the legislation in relation to the case at all. 
Further, the letter from the Registrar was part of the evidence before the court. The issue of 
being ‘directed’37 was right there before the court and yet the it decided not to inquire into 
that fact. The court did not inquire into whether indeed the Registrar in writing the letter had 
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the authority of the Council of Unima – though in law and in fact it was the Council and not 
the Registrar who was in the position of Master over the applicant’s employment. 
Disregarding Evidence in Totality 
The trial judge completely ignored the uncontested assertions of the Applicant that the 
Registrar had intimated to her need to resign on the basis of ‘her husband’s activities.’ It may 
well be that the court did not want to be drawn into political matters (as happened in her 
husband’s trial).38 In so doing, the court possibly missed an opportunity to set an important 
precedent to curb the intrusive role of politics in public sector appointments – a phenomenon 
that seems prevalent to date to the detriment of Constitutionalism as will be discussed 
subsequently.39  
 
Total Disregard for International Instruments mentioned in the 1966 Constitution 
Despite the fact that the 1966 Malawi Constitution had no Bill of Rights, in its Article 2 (1), it 
made reference to the applicability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to 
Malawi. And yet, when the Applicant invoked Article 23 and Article 15 of the UDHR and   the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights respectively, the judge held that he did ‘not 
propose to go into [that]’40 since ‘municipal law is supreme.’41 Thus the court did not even 
attempt to distinguish the provisions of the UDHR which were expressly mentioned in the 
1966 Constitution; contrary to the established judicial method for reasoned decision-making, 
the court simply made a blanket and unexplained dismissal of the international instruments.  
Further, in so far as ‘municipal law was supreme’ the judge neglected to address the 
argument of the Applicant that the termination of employment breached her rights under the 
Constitution. In a period of considerable legal flux42 the Court failed to avail itself of the 
legitimate legal invitation to examine whether the 1966 Malawian Constitution’s reference to 
the UDHR did not by implication empower Malawian courts to give effect to rights under the 
UDHR. The judge dismissively asserted without any analysis that ‘I see no violation of these 
rights.’43 That statement begs the question: which rights were not violated? Nevertheless the 
court concluded that the Respondent had failed to observe the rules of natural justice in 
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contravention of Statute XVII (c) of the University Statutes which governed the Contract 
between the Applicant and the Respondent.44 
The court also failed to give discernible reasons for the conclusion that the case was 
distinguishable from the Ridge v. Baldwin precedent so that remedy of reinstatement was 
declined. It was simply stated that ‘in the present case, it is not a simple and pure case of 
master and servant.’45  
7.3.1.2 A Reliance on Unquestioning Presumption  
The Court seems to have simply assumed that the letter by the Registrar was written under 
the authority of the Council despite the fact that the evidence on record did not indicate any 
proof of the Council having met (or otherwise transacted) to consider the Applicant’s 
termination. Without furnishing any factual authority, the court bluntly refused to refer the 
matter to the Council on the basis that it would be nugatory as ‘the Council has already 
made up its mind not to hear her, and even if the Council heard her appeal, I doubt very 
much if its decision, which is final, will be any different.’46 Yet the question of who exactly 
had made the purported decision was in issue before the court; somehow it was never 
properly inquired into. The Court did not even attempt to disclose what factors it had 
considered to determine that the Council’s decision on Mrs. Chihana’s employment would 
not have been any different. 
Neither did the Court bother to explain why after refusing a reinstatement as sought by the 
Applicant; it found that the ‘best remedy’47 was to award the Applicant damages for loss of 
salary to the age of her retirement in addition to a gratuity. In the final analysis, it could be 
argued that with unwitting judicial condonation, Mrs. Chihana was made to pay ‘for her 
husband’s pronouncements’48 against the Banda regime. Indeed as subsequent 
developments have shown in the (premature and unexplained) removal of a Director of Anti-
Corruption Bureau (2006), an Attorney General (2006), government does not seem to 
consider payment of lost earnings in form of prospective salary (no matter how substantial) 
and gratuity a realistic check whenever incumbents are deemed ‘dispensable’.49  
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7.3.2 In the Matter of the Removal of Mac William Lunguzi50 
The case of Mr Mac William Lunguzi’s removal from the position of Inspector General (IG) of 
Police provided an opportunity to entrench the transition from the pre – to the post- 1994 
Constitutional order in the courts.51 Mr Lunguzi was appointed IG on 27th April 1990 about 4 
years prior to the 1994 democratic transition. Barely a week after assuming the Presidency 
Bakili Muluzi purported to remove Lunguzi from the post first by offering him a diplomatic 
appointment (which the latter declined) and secondly by assigning him to the new office of 
principal secretary in the Office of President and Cabinet (OPC). Lunguzi challenged the 
president’s action as breaching the terms of section 43 (guaranteeing fair administrative 
action) and section 154 (prescribing circumstances under which president may remove IG) 
of the Constitution. The applicant sought a declaration that the president’s decision was 
unconstitutional as it violated his rights; he thus prayed for an order of reinstatement and 
damages for unlawful dismissal. For the president it was argued first that since the applicant 
was appointed prior to 18 May 1994 (when the Constitution took effect)52 he was hereby 
excluded from invoking its protection by reason of Section 206 which guaranteed continuity 
in office for persons in position by the effective date unless they were replaced or retired or 
otherwise removed in compliance with the 1994 Constitution. There was a proviso to cater 
for persons occupying offices which, by operation of the new Constitution would be renamed 
or otherwise reconfigured: in that case the incumbents would receive similar protection as 
outlined above. For purposes of a smooth swearing ceremony post the general elections 
subsection 2 explicitly confirmed that the sitting Chief Justice would be deemed to have 
been appointed under the 1994 Constitution.53 
 
Thus the argument for Muluzi was that as the incumbent IG Lunguzi fell beyond the purview 
of section 206 since no such appointment was effected (a tenuous argument at best). In the 
alternative it was contended that neither could section 154 of the Constitution (prescribing 
grounds for presidential removal) protect the applicant because had allegedly compromised 
his professional objectivity during the run up to the elections that resulted in Muluzi’s UDF 
unseating the MCP. The relevant evidence to that effect being the formal correspondence 
between the applicant and the Malawi Electoral Commission; thus by operation of section 
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154 (4) (b) the president would have been entitled to remove the applicant from his office 
legally. 
In granting the application the HC (same justice who later acquitted Dr. Banda and others in 
the infamous Mwanza murders trial)54 held that even though the applicant had been 
reassigned within the public service, the result was effectively his removal from the post of 
IG and section 206 could not exclude him from constitutional protection as contended. 
According to the trial court ‘it is clear …that section 206 is subordinate to and conditional 
upon other relevant provisions of the Constitution. One cannot properly invoke the provisions 
of section 206 without first satisfying the relevant provisions of the Constitution’.55 In that vein 
therefore, there was a clear breach of natural justice in that the respondent acted without 
affording the applicant an opportunity to be heard. This clearly violated the guarantees of 
section 43 against unfair administrative action. The court found that the removal of the 
Applicant was ‘unlawful and unconstitutional.’56 
 However the HC refused to order reinstatement of the Applicant to the position of IG on the 
basis that such would amount to usurpation of authority citing the English decision of Chief 
Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans as legal authority for that position. This is an 
interesting observation indicating a possible conceptual blurring of judicial review as 
conceived under common law generally-being merely about procedural propriety- and review 
for compliance with constitutional guarantees and the general provision guaranteeing 
‘effective remedies’ under section 41 (3) of the Constitution.57 
7.3.2.1 Common law Judicial Review vs. Constitutional Review 
The trial court in the Lunguzi case failed to properly address its mind to the fundamental 
question whether JR of executive action for conformity with the Constitution operates within 
the same narrow confines of procedural propriety as conceived under the common law 
remedy.58 In essence – should a constitutional review only be concerned with ‘reviewing not 
the merits of the decision, but the decision-making process through which the decision was 
reached?’59 
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The conceptual distinction between common law JR and what has been termed 
constitutional review60 has been recognised by the HC in another case involving disputes 
about separation of powers where the court recognised ordinary judicial review (in English 
law) as distinct from constitutional review (as espoused in section 108, the ‘American 
rendition’).61The first difference is that whereas under common law judicial review may be 
time barred, the JR embodied under Section 108 (2) of the Constitution had no such time 
limits.62 Secondly, whereas common law JR is about reviewing the procedural propriety in 
decision making processes (as opposed to the actual merits of the decision); the ‘American 
rendition’ of JR under Section 108 (2) entails a review of the substance of decision making 
processes as well.63  
However in Lunguzi, despite the correct legal conclusion that the provisions of Sections 43 
and 154 of the 1994 Constitution applied to the Applicant, the court refused to undertake the 
necessary substantive examination of the decision to remove Mr Lunguzi as IG. In its 
determination the court displayed some legal equivocation by still pronouncing that ‘under 
Section 154 (4) of the Constitution, the President was perfectly entitled to remove [Mr 
Lunguzi] but the right procedures were not followed.”  That provision stipulates that “A 
person holding the office of Inspector General of Police shall be subject to removal by the 
President only by reason of that person being – 
a. incompetent in the exercise of his or her duties;  
b. compromised in the exercise of his or her duties to the extent that his or her 
capacity to exercise his or her powers impartially is in serious question;  
c. otherwise incapacitated; and  
d. Over the age prescribed for retirement.”64 
It is proposed here that by the phrase ‘only by reason of that person being’ the Constitution 
meant to restrict the removal of an Inspector General of Police to the prescribed scenarios. 
There is no unfettered presidential authority of removal as suggested by the court. 
Consequently, the court needed to make a clear factual analysis as to whether ‘the 
President being perfectly entitled to remove’ the applicant had complied with the substance 
of Section 154 (4) on the merits. By this adjudicative omission the court could be said to 
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have abdicated from its responsibility under Section 9 of the Constitution65 and like in 
Chihana unwittingly served to encourage the pre-1994 culture of unaccountable executive 
decision-making.66 In this instance there seems to have been a considerable divergence 
between the stated ambitions of the constitutional reforms which culminated in the 1994 
Constitution and the judicial application of that document.67  
The constitutional reforms were aimed at bringing about a constitution that would ‘lay the 
foundation for safeguarding basic human rights,’68 and one in which ‘presidential power 
would be limited …and human rights effectively protected.’69  The trial court in the Lunguzi 
case missed another opportunity to effectively protect human rights vis-à-vis public 
appointments. For example, the Applicant had sought the court to make ‘any further or 
additional orders the Court may think just and expedient’ – and yet the court did not award 
any damages after finding that the removal was unconstitutional on the basis that ‘the first 
plaintiff is not claiming any damages.’70 It could be that an uncritical adherence to the 
common law conception of JR led the court to operate under the restrictive procedure rules 
of civil pleadings and corresponding available remedies.71 Could the judge have awarded 
damages as a ‘just and expedient’ remedy if the conceptual distinctive of constitutional 
review exercised his judicial mind?  
 
7.3.2.2 The Duty to Provide an Effective Remedy 
It is certainly open to suggest that in refusing to re-instate Mr Lunguzi to the position of IG, 
the court failed to give an ‘effective remedy’ as contemplated in Section 41 (2) of the 1994 
Constitution. Reinstatement as a viable remedy in the case of unconstitutional (as opposed 
to mere unlawful) dismissal was recognised in the celebrated case of Bongwe and 11 Others 
versus Ministry of Education72which will be discussed presently. The constitutional restriction 
on the removal of the IG was intended to limit the control of the President over the security 
services as had been the case in Kamuzu Banda’s dictatorial regime.73 Subsequent 
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developments would indicate that the lost opportunity to entrench such executive 
accountability has significantly compromised the practical effect of Section 154 (4) on the 
security of tenure (and hence professional independence) of the Police IG. Two subsequent 
Inspectors General of Police (Mr Aironi74 – 2005, and Mr Kumbambe75 – 2009) have been 
removed in remarkably similar scenarios.76 Mr Kumbambe was reportedly removed for, 
among others, preventing the police band from performing at ruling political party rallies.77  
However, unlike Lunguzi these two officers did not seek judicial intervention to contest their 
reassignment to diplomatic posts. It is moot whether the compliant precedent set by the 
court in the Lunguzi case could have discouraged any recourse to the courts on the part of 
these latter two police chiefs. Regardless, arguably and indirectly, the court seems to have 
connived in consolidating an unbridled presidential control over the position of IG of Police 
(and thereby the security apparatus) in a spirit inimical to the founding principles of the 1994 
Constitution. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of the current thesis to undertake a comprehensive empirical 
analysis of the extent of political manipulation within the security machinery, yet recent press 
reports of academic material cited for sedition78 and detention of a reporter for simply ‘asking 
the president tough questions’79  at a press briefing do not augur well for the professional 
independence and functional integrity of the police. Such high-handed reaction to 
constructive dissent has prompted some keen observers to note that ‘sedition was widely 
used by late dictator Kamuzu Banda to trample on people's rights during the three decades 
of his autocratic rule from 1964 to 1994’.80 When one considers that the alleged sedition 
related directly to a publication critical of the government’s policy on a quota-based 
admission to publicly-funded tertiary institutions as ‘lacking distributive justice’81the 
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attempted justification of the police chief (who incidentally replaced Kumbambe)82 that the 
material was deemed capable of inciting violence amongst the different sections of Malawian 
society83raises serious questions about the path of Malawi’s nascent democracy.84A recent 
attempt to challenge the criminal offence of ‘insulting the president’85 has encountered a 
formidable hurdle in that the Chief Justice declined to certify the matter for consideration 
before the High Court as a Constitutional Court. The particular incident related to two young 
men who uttered remarks critical of the president as his convoy drove down the highway in 
the capital city. They were in fact apprehended by a traffic police officer who was creating 
way for the presidential motorcade when he overheard the ‘insulting language’.86 
7.3.3 Bongwe and 11 others versus Ministry of Education  
In this trial the Court progressively developed the law on the remedies available in JR 
proceedings in Malawi. The twelve applicants in the case were teachers working under the 
Ministry of Education.87 In July 1997 they were served with a letter from the ministry 
purporting to terminate their services in ‘the public interest’88. It appeared that one of the 
reasons for the termination was the fact that they had joined a Teacher’s Trade Union 
Association.89 They applied to the court for JR of that decision alleging that it violated the 
constitutional guarantees to freedom of economic activity, right to fair labour practices and to 
participate in trade union activities as well as the right to procedurally fair and accountable 
administrative action. The ministry lodged no defence to the application (and from the 
judgment seems to have indicated its willingness to comply with any decision of the court).90 
In upholding the application, Justice Ndovi observed that by virtue of section 108 of the 
Constitution the court clearly had jurisdiction to determine the question of the constitutionality 
as well as the legality of the purported dismissals. In his legal analysis the judge concluded 
that the authority to take such a decision was vested in the Public Service Commission and 
not the Ministry of Education (who had authored and conveyed the letters of termination). As 
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such the latter had acted beyond its authority. In considering the appropriate relief the judge 
observed that the courts ‘cannot…stick to the rigorous common law principles when dealing 
with employment.’91 Instead ‘the courts are called upon to accept the current changes 
enshrined in our Constitution…in dealing with employment law.’92 Thus although ‘under 
common law reinstatement is not one of the remedies’93 yet ‘with the development of labour 
law globally and with the new consideration in  (Section) 46 of the Constitution this is 
available’.94The pertinent aspect of Section 46 grants power on the courts upon a finding of 
violation of ‘any rights or freedoms conferred by this Constitution…to make any orders that 
are necessary and appropriate to secure the enjoyment of those rights’ and where 
necessary ‘to prevent those rights and freedoms from being unlawfully denied or 
violated.’95In a creative judgment the court made constant reference to relevant international 
labour instruments on the basis of the constitutional provision that encourages consideration 
of ‘relevant norms of international law’96in seeking to propound ‘interpretation’ that ‘reflects 
the unique character and supreme status of (the) Constitution.’97 
Nevertheless it is worth highlighting that in his otherwise progressive approach the judge 
made some doubtful conclusions about the nature of infringements the applicants had 
suffered. Justice Ndovi formed the view that ‘forced retirement for no apparent or justifiable 
reasons at reduced benefits must be cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’98 
and ‘stressed…that the right’ was ‘non-derogable in terms of Section 44 (1) (b) of the 
Constitution’.99It is seriously debatable whether such characterization of unconstitutional 
removal from employment as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is legally sound. But 
such incoherent constitutional jurisprudence has been described elsewhere as ‘startling,’ 
‘inexplicable’ and ‘disturbing’ because ‘the courts have thus far shown a random and 
unprincipled application’ of the constitutional provisions.100 
7.3.3.1 Remedies Available under Constitutional Judicial Review 
The legal dispute in Bongwe was very similar to the other cases brought for judicial review 
before the High Court under Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, as in 
previous cases the Applicants framed their claims around the human rights guarantees of 
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the 1994 Constitution as well as the UDHR. Since the action arose after the enactment of 
the Labour Relations Act of 1996 and the Public Service Act 1994, they also based some of 
their claims on those pieces of legislation.101 
It is interesting to note that the trial Court in this case also applied the same principles of 
judicial review under common law and observed that the matter was “concerned with 
reviewing not the merits of the decision in respect of which the application for judicial review 
is made, but the decision-making process itself.”102Indeed the English precedent of Chief 
Constable of North Wales Police -v- Erdus was cited as authority for the familiar common 
law proposition that “it is important to remember in every case that the purpose of (the 
remedy of judicial review) is to ensure that the individual is given fair treatment by the 
authority to which he has been subjected and that it is not part of the purpose to substitute 
the opinion of the judiciary or of the judges for that of the authority constituted by law to 
decide the matter in question.”103 
In that context it is fair to suggest that thus far that the Courts in Malawi have tended to treat 
constitutional review of the actions and decisions of the government and its agents as 
nothing more than a form of Order 53-based judicial review governed by established 
common law principles.  It is submitted that this is inadequate; for example the omissions of 
the court in Chihana are made all the more glaring by the analysis made by the court in the 
Bongwe Case. In Bongwe the trial Court first identified the Statute that was applicable to the 
case, which was the Public Service Act 1994. By applying the provisions of that Act, the 
Court found that civil servants under pensionable terms (such as the Applicants) could only 
be disciplined or have their services terminated by the Public Service Commission (the 
Master) and not the Minister of Education. No attempt was made in Chihana for a similar 
analysis (which might have yielded a more just result).  
Furthermore, in Bongwe the Court found that in terminating the services of the Applicants in 
the ‘public interest’ it was ‘as bad as giving no reasons at all … as enunciated in’104 Ridge -
vs.- Baldwin.105 It is quite ironic that two judges faced with similar facts and citing the same 
English precedent on judicial review could come up with two different conclusions on the 
applicability of the remedy of certiorari. The difference could be attributed to the more refined 
factual analysis whereby the judge in the Bongwe case took the time to examine who the 
Master was; whereas in Chihana the court seems to have made an unsubstantiated factual 
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presumption of the termination originating from the lawful Master. In all fairness it needs to 
be further acknowledged that Chihana predated the enactment of the 1994 Constitution. 
One can only speculate as to what influence (if any) the knowledge that the ministry of 
education would not contest and were keen to comply with any final court order had on the 
trial judge in Bongwe. All the same his final order, especially with regard to its express 
invocation of the enforcement mandate under Section 46 (3) to modify the common law 
remedies to encompass reinstatement for such a review was quite novel. 
As a matter of contrast in Lunguzi the trial court found that Section 43 of the Constitution had 
been infringed but then refused to order either a reinstatement or any compensation. Again 
in another curious use of precedent the court in Bongwe made reference to the discussion of 
Section 43 guarantees of fair administrative action in the Lunguzi case and concluded that 
both cases represented breaches of such constitutional rights;106 but unlike Judge Mtegha in 
Lunguzi Justice Ndovi decided that the only effective remedy would be an order of 
reinstatement as well as compensation. Indeed whilst the court in Lunguzi refused to nullify 
the appointment of Mr Lunguzi’s successor (even though the purported removal was 
deemed unconstitutional) in Bongwe the court rightly censured the Ministry of Education for 
inappropriate conduct by advertising the positions of the Applicants (who had been 
unlawfully dismissed).107 In justifying the order of certiorari (reinstatement), the trial court in 
the Bongwe stated that 
In matters of practice and discretion it is essential for the courts to take into 
account all important changes ... [which] have already crystallized in the 
form of the Constitution of 1994.  We cannot therefore stick to the rigorous 
common law principles when dealing with employment. … Under common 
law reinstatement is not one of the remedies. However, with the 
development of labour law globally and with the new consideration in 
Clause 46 of the Constitution this is available.108 
It needs to be pointed out that in this case, the Ministry of Education never entered a 
defence and expressed readiness to comply with the Courts decision.109 The Bongwe case 
marked a welcome development in Constitutional review; for some reason its progressive 
approach to fashioning ‘appropriate and necessary orders’110 as part of the judiciary’s 
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mandate to provide ‘effective remedies’111 seems to have been largely ignored in the 
subsequent significant judicial disputes on public appointments. 
7.3.4 In the Matter of Mary Nangwale112 
It is submitted that by virtue of Section 4 and 5 of the 1994 Constitution ‘government’ 
encompasses the ‘executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State at all levels.’ To that 
extent it would seem that judicial review of ‘government’ actions as contemplated in Section 
108 (2) extends to actions of the legislative branch as well. The High Court in Nangwale 
readily agreed that ‘clearly therefore Parliament must act within the Constitution and where it 
does not it can be challenged before courts.’113It is the determination of the permissible remit 
of such judicial supervision that raises salient points of discussion in the context of 
constitutional review.  
The applicant in the case, Mrs Mary Nangwale was appointed to the office of Inspector 
General (IG) of Police on 6 September 2004 ‘presumably’114 under Section 154 (2) of the 
Constitution by the President. On 30th March 2005, the Government introduced a motion in 
the National Assembly for confirmation of the appointment pursuant to Section 154 (2) of the 
Constitution which stipulates that an appointment of the IG required confirmation by 
parliamentary majority.115 
‘As usual’116 the application was brought under Order 53 RSC. The application was heard 
before a ‘full’ constitutional bench (three judges of HC). Her claim was based on the failure 
of parliament to confirm her appointment as IG. Part of the argument being that (in terms of 
section 43) she had suffered unfair administrative action, in that she had not been granted 
an opportunity to be heard during the confirmation proceedings (where adverse comments 
were made about her suitability) and legislators with an interest voted on the matter without 
disclosing their interest. 
In dismissing the application the court held that Section 43 did not apply to ‘legislative’ (as 
opposed to ‘administrative’) action. The court took the view that as a matter of parliamentary 
privilege the courts could not (even under the new constitution) review the business of the 
legislature. In any event the duty for disclosure did not arise for lack of material interest.  
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7.3.4.1 Internal Parliamentary Procedures versus Parliamentary Constitutional 
Substantive procedures 
The ‘Constitutional Court’117 correctly concluded that just because Section 60 (1) of the 
Constitution recognised parliamentary privileges it did not follow that Parliament and its 
members were absolutely excluded from judicial oversight in the conduct of their 
parliamentary business. However, the Court determined that such judicial supervision would 
not include matters pertaining to internal proceedings of Parliament. The Court relied upon 
Section 56 (1) of the Constitution which says that ‘subject to this Constitution, the National 
Assembly, may by Standing Orders or otherwise regulate its own procedure.’ 
In that light it was not for the courts to interfere in the internal procedures set by parliament 
because ‘no doubt Parliament itself will do all possible to avoid internal procedures that 
undermine the Constitution.’118 If that were true why would there be any need to explicitly 
declare that any such procedures must be ‘subject to this Constitution’?119 Is there no 
mechanism for ensuring that indeed the ‘legislature...enact laws…that further the values 
explicit or implicit in this Constitution’?120 One would understand the judicial ‘responsibility of 
interpreting, protecting and enforcing (the) Constitution and all laws’121 to be a sufficient 
mandate for courts to examine such parliamentary procedures especially where as in 
Nangwale an applicant is seeking ‘an effective remedy….for acts violating rights and 
freedoms granted to (her) by (the) Constitution.’122  
Yet again when confronted with an epochal scenario to ‘develop appropriate principles of 
interpretation to reflect the unique character and supreme status of this Constitution’123 the 
Court opted to confine its legal analysis to hackneyed common law judicial review principles. 
Thus the Court simply observed that ‘we have come a long way and it is a well-trodden path 
that the remedy of judicial review is concerned with reviewing, not the merits of the decision 
in respect of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making 
process itself.’124  
It is suggested that in adopting this approach the Court avoided its delicate but necessary 
Constitutional review responsibility. The Court completely ignored the distinction made 
between judicial review under common law and under the 1994 Constitution as discussed in 
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the case of Nseula vs. Attorney General.125 Under the ‘American rendition,’126 the review 
process delves into the substantive issues beyond just ascertaining mere procedural 
propriety.127 Further, the court seems to have paid no to heed the wisdom of Justice Ndovi in 
Bongwe urging the courts to embrace the changes crystallised into the 1994 Constitution 
instead of a rigorous adherence to old common law remedies and restrictive principles in 
constitutional review matters.128 
Arguably, in order to entrench constitutionalism, those changes should also apply to the 
parliamentary processes in matters of public appointment confirmations. 
Additionally Section 61 (1) of the Constitution required legislators to declare any material 
interest in a subject being debated before the house (and in such a situation to be 
disqualified from the corresponding vote). Mrs. Nagwale claimed that legislators with an 
interest voted on the matter without such disclosure. Purportedly the decision of the Court 
turned on its finding as to the definition of ‘material interest.’ However, before deciding the 
meaning of ‘material interest,’ the Court had already determined that the voting process 
employed by parliament which resulted in the rejection of Mrs. Nagwale was an ‘internal 
procedure’129 as such the Court ‘would be extremely cautious to intervene.’130  
Internal procedures of Parliament are contained in the standing Orders of National 
Assembly. Order 88 of the Standing Orders provides that 
No Member may vote on any matter in which he has a direct or indirect 
material interest without disclosing the nature of that interest and leave of 
the House obtained.131 
 
The Court did not make reference to the standing orders at any point in their deliberations on 
the matter. The Court did not analyse whether Parliament in its voting procedure had 
complied with its own internal procedures as stipulated by Order 88. It is argued that the 
language of Standing Order 88 points to a meaning of material interest beyond just the 
‘pecuniary interest’ held by the Court because it calls upon the relevant member to disclose 
the ‘nature of that interest.’ Such a position is supported by practice in other Commonwealth 
Countries such as Australia, where for example its Financial Management Act 1996 in 
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Section 4 defines material interest as either ‘a direct or indirect financial interest in the 
issue’132 or ‘a direct or indirect interest of any other kind if the interest could conflict with the 
proper exercise of the member's functions in relation to the board's consideration of the 
issue.’133 
 
The Court restricted ‘material interest’ to pecuniary interest referred to Erskine Mary’s 
Treatise on the Law, Privileges, and Proceedings and Usage of Parliament and stated – ‘it 
will not be us opening a floodgate of other possibilities.’134  Once again the Courts in Malawi 
unquestioningly resort to English precedent premised on unqualified parliamentary 
supremacy to determine a novel constitutional dispute. In Nangwale the alleged conflict of 
interest related to several key opposition leaders who were subject to police investigations. 
The matter which the Court refused to examine was the very essence of the review – 
whether Section 61 (1) of the Constitution had been complied with. It is in declaring material 
interest where parliament can be held accountable for its decision on appointment. What are 
the chances that any member of parliament would ever have a pecuniary interest in the 
appointment of a public officer? 
It is quite remarkable that one of the judges who presided over this matter lamented that 
‘such provisions for checks and balances do not always work for the common good of the 
citizenry, as was envisaged in the Constitution.’135 The judge even acknowledged 
subsequently that Mrs. Mary Nangwale was for ‘all intents and purposes…capable of 
delivering as Inspector General’, and that ‘no reasonable explanation was given for non-
confirmation.’136 
The logical outworking of Nangwale might well be that  what was ‘envisaged in the 
Constitution’137 as a mechanism for consolidating the tenet of separation of powers and 
democratic accountability of the executive towards the legislature (by subjecting certain 
appointments to confirmation) could be deployed without any sense of corresponding 
responsibility and the courts will stand aside and watch. Such a development however has a 
bearing on other aspects of governance, such as the enforcement of the criminal law 
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because competent candidates could be excluded from appointments without any proper 
reasons being given.138 
7.4 Beyond separation of powers 
On the face of it, it would be easy to blame the individual judicial officers for failing to give 
effect to the provisions of the Constitution that have introduced ‘newer and expansive 
grounds for review than was the case under common law.’139 Chirwa in his book attributes 
this development to the failure on the part of Malawian courts to fully comprehend the 
revolutionary effect of S. 43; and to ‘the blind allegiance of the Malawian Legal profession to 
the law received from Britain.’140 However, where research141 shows that the approach 
applies to the both the HC and SC, as well as almost all judges including even those judges 
who as discussed in chapter 4 had criticised the SC for failing to understand the Constitution 
appropriately,142 then the root cause of the phenomenon must be more fundamental than 
merely preference. The cause arguably also lies beyond a mere preference for deference 
when deciding on issues that touch on the doctrine of separation of powers. This thesis 
submits that the foregoing points strongly to the conclusion that the problem relates to 
inadequate exposure to Malawian legal theory. 
As aptly put by Thomas: 
Judges undoubtedly bring immense practical skills to the practise of their 
craft. … The judge’s practical skills are utilised to resolve and stabilise the 
facts of the case, to analyse and identify question in issue, to arrive at a 
decision on that issue and, then to justify with reasons the decision that has 
been reached. But practical skills are not enough. Those skills must be 
anchored in a conception of the judicial role. Legal theory is fundamental to 
that conception….To fulfil their judicial function, and to be able to assess 
whether they are fulfilling that function, judges must explore, examine and 
know the theoretical framework for their judicial thinking.143 
By legal theory, Thomas means legal philosophy and jurisprudence- and arguably therein 
lies the problem for the Malawian judge. The author of this thesis is yet to come upon 
jurisprudence literature on Malawi. It is as if the Malawian judge is expected to be both a 
philosopher and a judge. However, other jurisdictions with constitutional law history 
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exceeding a century nevertheless have seen the importance of establishing formal judicial 
schools.144 These schools provide a forum in which judges’ and other disciplines can have a 
dialogue on issues that affect judicial decision-making with the aim of equipping the judges 
with the relevant knowledge needed to discharge their responsibilities competently.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The key argument of this chapter is that there seems to be considerable divergence 
between the stated ambitions of the constitutional reforms which culminated in the 1994 
Constitution and the judicial application of that document. The Courts appear to sacrifice the 
Constitution to common law principles – such that we have a Constitution on paper but its 
intended benefits have been severely restricted by the way the courts have construed its 
role vis-à-vis the other branches of government. The Courts have not shown a coherent 
doctrinal position of their own; instead the jurisprudence borrows uncritically from English 
precedents. This creates a lacuna in principles governing Constitutional Review resulting in 
considerable inconsistency of adjudicative approaches. Predominantly the Court has 
resorted to avoidance disguised as sticking to process not merits – cases like Bongwe have 
not been allowed to influence this area of constitutional law development. 
To the question- is the behaviour of the Malawian courts analysed in this chapter judicial 
deference/restraint or JA? The answer would be- it depends. It depends on how one defines 
JA. Most of the decisions could fall into any category. They could be judicial deference by 
virtue of the fact that the Court declined to go into the merits of the decisions when the 
Constitution gives them the power to do so. But they could also be JA in effect, the Courts 
have brought back parliamentary supremacy and subsumed constitutional supremacy, this 
is the type of JA that Campbell refers to as negative JA. But the thrust of this thesis is that 
concentrating on whether or not the courts in Malawi have been practising JA risks diverting 
attention from the more urgent issue- that of facilitating the acquisition of appropriate 
knowledge by judges to enable them to discharge their duties competently. 
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Judges undoubtedly bring immense practical skills to the practise of their craft. … But practical 
skills are not enough. Those skills must be anchored in a conception of the judicial role. Legal 
theory is fundamental to that conception….judges must … know the theoretical framework for 
their judicial thinking.1 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis was to highlight the need to avoid the repetition of past mistakes 
when exhorting the judiciary in Malawi to be an instrument for social transformation through 
the practise of ‘judicial activism’ (‘JA’) as a method for entrenching constitutionalism and 
good governance. In order to emphasise what those past mistakes were, this study drew on 
scholarly research conducted on or related to the status of Malawi’s constitutionalism and 
good governance after the adoption of the 1994 Constitution.  The research brought out 
various conclusions, some of which have formed the foundational blocks of this thesis. 
Firstly, because liberal democracy (based on western values, traditions and customs) had 
worked well in western countries, it was assumed that it would work equally well anywhere 
else. As a result it was exported wholesale to Africa as the best form of democracy. Thus in 
1994 Malawi apparently adopted one of the most liberal democratic constitutions in the 
world. Years on, research has shown that liberal democracy has failed Africa in general and 
Malawi in particular. One major factor for such failure is the lack of autochthony: thus the 
people of Malawi (and Africa generally), do not identify with liberal democratic values and 
ideologies as a result of which they have never had a collective motivation for the 
enforcement of a liberal democratic constitution. The first mistake of those who facilitated the 
adoption of such a constitution was their failure to critically assess the suitability or validity of 
liberal democratic values and ideologies to the Malawian context in view of its cultural, 
traditional, philosophical, historical and social peculiarities. The second mistake was their 
failure to distinguish between democracy as a concept and liberal democracy as a theory of 
democracy (which would have helped them to appreciate the need to adopt democracy in 
Malawi without imposing ‘a pre-fixed meaning … loaded with particular values.’)2 The third 
mistake was that the constitution was drafted and adopted more by elites without sufficient 
consultation of the majority of Malawians in a country where decision-making by consultation 
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is greatly valued traditionally. As a consequence, Malawi more than a decade on, has a 
constitution without constitutionalism and democracy without good governance. 
Secondly, that in spite of the foregoing, constitutionalism and rule of law remains the 
foundational building blocks of any State that seeks to promote the welfare of its citizens; 
and a written constitution remains fundamental to the attainment of those two ideals. Even 
though the 1994 Constitution has legitimacy deficiencies, it is unlikely that sufficient political 
consensus would be achieved for its repeal in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the 1994 
Constitution is the constitution that must be enforced if constitutionalism and the rule of law 
are to be entrenched in Malawi. The good news is that despite the dominance of liberal 
democratic values in the 1994 constitution, it contains fundamental provisions that this thesis 
has argued are its saving grace – Sections 12 and 13, since they introduce within the very 
constitution what Nkhata has lucidly described as a ‘social trust-based governance’ 
framework. Consequently, the solution to the challenge of entrenching constitutionalism lies 
within the very framework of the 1994 constitution in spite of its acknowledged shortfalls.  To 
that end, scholars in various contexts have called on the Malawi Judiciary to practice JA in 
order to make the current constitution fulfil its transformative role in the Malawi nation. 
However, it appears that those calls emanate from the perception that the Malawi judiciary 
only practiced JA around the period between 1993 and 1996. Further, there seems to be an 
assumption that JA on the part of the judiciary would necessarily enhance constitutionalism 
and rule of law. 
It is in response to such calls and perceptions that this thesis’ main argument was that 
lessons need to be drawn from the Malawian experience with liberal democracy when calls 
are made for the Malawian judiciary to practice judicial activism. And in this case, the main 
lesson drawn from Malawi’s experience is that the adoption of any concept or theory aimed 
at organising a society under the umbrella of the law must follow a critical appraisal of its 
suitability or significance to that society by paying due regard to its cultural, historical, 
philosophical and/or social peculiarities. It is in that context that the current thesis set out 
mainly to answer the question whether judicial (in)activism is a solution or a hindrance to the 
entrenchment of constitutionalism and the rule of law in Malawi.  
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8.2 Major Conclusions of this Thesis 
8.2.1 The positive contribution of judicial activism to the constitutionalism must not 
be assumed 
This thesis has discussed research findings which show that a presumptuous and uncritical 
approach to the democratisation of Africa in general and Malawi in particular, which resulted 
in the wholesale importation of liberal democracy, has contributed significantly to the 
deficiency of constitutionalism and good governance in Africa. When liberal democracy was 
deemed to have worked very well in some societies, certain sets of questions should have 
been asked when considering its importation– Set 1: what is liberal democracy? What are its 
fundamental elements or principles? Set 2: How did the social, cultural, historical and 
philosophical peculiarities of the societ(ies) where it worked contribute to its success? Are 
those peculiarities similar to those present in Malawi? If not, how are the differences likely to 
impact on its success if it is imported wholesale? Set 3: Is it the best model of democracy to 
adopt in Malawi? If regardless of the differences, it still remains the best model to import, 
how can it be modified to suit the society it is imported into in order to enhance its success?  
It is only after liberal democracy had been imported and was seen not to be working that 
such questions were raised and attempts were made to address them. 
Now that other scholars are of the view that the Malawi judiciary could discharge its 
responsibilities better if it practised judicial activism, similar questions need to be raised and 
addressed, even if only in part. The mere fact that questions raised may be addressed only 
in part does not discredit the contribution of this thesis to studies on constitutionalism or 
judicial activism among others, since at times ‘attempts to devise a theory or system that can 
answer all problems often suffer from indeterminacy, vagueness, [lack of] clarity and 
grandiosity.’3  
8.2.1.1 Addressing Set 1 questions 
It may serve the interests of some to glorify the impact of Marbury v. Madison when 
discussing JA in the USA and completely ignore the ignominy of Dred Scott v. Standford; or 
exalt the introduction of public interest litigation through JA in India and overlook the further 
marginalisation of the already marginalised that has come about in that jurisdiction due to 
the same JA; or even applaud the strides made in human rights protection due to JA in 
South Africa and completely disregard the formidable hurdles placed in the way of access to 
justice for the poor by means of the same process. However, it does not serve the interests 
                                                          
3
Ibid. 
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of those who seek to enhance constitutionalism and rule of law in a society deficient of those 
values to adopt such a biased approach to JA. 
That is why chapter 2, through a comparative analysis approach, discussed the definitions 
and manifestations of JA in order to bring out both its positive and negative permutations. 
What is judicial Activism and what are its fundamental elements or principles? 
Thus in chapter 2, it has been shown that the term or phrase ‘judicial activism’ may be 
likened to an empty shell available for anyone who desires to fill it with contents of their 
choice; those contents may not only be contradictory but even irreconcilable to those chosen 
by a previous person even within a single jurisdiction. Some have used it to describe the 
courts’ handling of precedent, or choice of constitutional interpretive methodology, or 
preference for a particular result among other things. However, chapter 2 has demonstrated 
how such categorisations and/or definitions are superficial and unhelpful for purposes of 
drawing a conceptual framework adequately robust to apply across all jurisdictions.  In 
addition, chapter 2 has shown how the positive and negative effects of court decisions 
classified as JA in different jurisdictions reveal that JA has no essential link to concepts such 
as justice, liberalism, progressiveness, etc.  
As a consequence, there seems to be no agreement on the essential elements of JA. To 
reiterate, in the case of liberal democracy, no matter what differences of opinion of its 
appropriateness may exist among scholars, it is generally agreed that three of its 
fundamental elements/principles are separation of powers, the independence of the 
judiciary, and limitation of government powers. The same cannot be said of JA this far- its 
essential elements/principles remain entirely subjective. To that end, any user of the term 
who seeks to avoid misinforming or misleading others should use it in a manner that 
presents it as a value-free, judgment-free, and ideology-free concept, which has both 
positive and negative attributes. 
8.2.1.2 Addressing Set 2 questions 
How did the social, cultural, historical and philosophical peculiarities of the 
society(ies) where it worked contribute to its success? 
First and foremost the question to ask is whether JA can be said to have been successful. 
The parameters for determining success have not been spelt out in this thesis as that was 
beyond the scope of this study. Suffice to say however, that chapter 2 has demonstrated that 
the path of JA in jurisdictions such as Australia, USA, India, and South Africa has not been 
free from controversy due to its mixed results. 
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For instance, in the USA, it is accredited with the successful and commendable introduction 
of judicial review even though its practice over the centuries by judges in that jurisdiction has 
attracted criticism from different quarters at different times such that the term JA in the USA 
is a term of censure. Similarly, in Australia, it is credited with greater protection of human 
rights including remedying to some extent the past injustices occasioned to aborigines vis-a-
vis land rights. Nevertheless, general usage of the term JA in Australia is that of censure 
other than of commendation. It is worth appreciating that in spite of the negativity attached to 
JA in both the USA and Australia, the constitutional frameworks of those countries have not 
been undermined. India on the other hand presents an entirely different picture. JA in India 
though instrumental in promoting access to justice and accountability of the usage of state 
powers, has also led to the further marginalisation of some sections of Indian society as well 
as undermined India’s constitutional framework. In South Africa, JA is a term of 
commendation even though it is acknowledged that in the process of enhancing the 
enjoyment of human rights through JA, the Constitutional Court has nevertheless put hurdles 
in the way of access to justice for the poor. It can thus be seen that JA has brought about 
different results in different jurisdictions as far as the stability of the constitutional framework 
is concerned.  
In that context, chapter 2 brought out the fact that legal, social, historical, philosophical 
and/or cultural factors have an impact on the manifestations and results of JA. These factors 
include (but are not limited to): the constitutional framework (which determines the 
distribution of state power, and defines its limitations {if any} among others); the 
cultural/social understanding of the judicial function/role; the fundamental values or 
philosophies that the given society prioritises; the historical and/or political developments in 
that society; and the commitment/will of the populace to ensuring that those entrusted with 
state power exercise it within its appropriate limits (which factor may be affected by the level 
of education/awareness of the populace to the prescribed limits, or the extent to which they 
identify with the constitution). To give an example, in the same chapter 2, it was 
demonstrated how regardless of which side of the debate on the appropriateness of JA 
scholars in the USA may stand, all of them uphold the supremacy of the USA constitution in 
the regulation of all power (including that of the judiciary), and none of them are keen to do 
away with the conception that it is capable of having one uniform national meaning. It thus 
may not come as a surprise that despite the heated debates on JA, the status of the USA 
Constitution as the supreme and final arbiter of all legal authority has withstood the test of 
time (300+ years). 
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Are those peculiarities similar to those present in Malawi? 
Chapter 3 set out to outline the social, historical, philosophical and cultural peculiarities of 
the Malawi nation. Just to highlight some of the factors outlined, this conclusion will use the 
USA (as discussed in chapter 2), to bring out some of the differences: 1) whereas the liberal 
democratic underpinnings of the USA Constitution reflect the values and ideologies that 
most of its citizens identify with and prioritise, the liberal democratic underpinnings of the 
Malawian Constitution were more or less imposed on the people of Malawi by elites and are 
at odds with the values and ideologies that the people prioritise; 2) whereas political power in 
the USA is more or less exercised with the consent and consultation of the governed, the 
situation in Malawi is quite the contrary- the majority of Malawians have been significantly 
excluded from participation in decision-making that affects their lives; in addition to this, 
chapter 3 has demonstrated how the governors in Malawi have continuously cast 
themselves as ‘parents’ of the rest hence in a position to know what is best for the rest even 
without consulting them; 3) the culture, philosophy and values of the majority of USA citizens 
is well documented, whereas the culture, philosophy and values of the majority of Malawian 
citizens remain largely undocumented hence largely contestable; this would require setting 
down methods by which to determine which values are really prioritised by the people and 
their appropriateness; 4) and USA does not have traditional governance structures that 
emphasise on unity of the community and operate parallel to the official government 
structures, whereas Malawi has traditional governance structures that promote 
communitarian values and operate parallel to the official government structures; and 5) the 
supremacy of the USA Constitution is largely unchallenged by those who hold political 
power; whereas those who hold political power in Malawi have consistently made efforts to 
be beyond its reach in one area or another.  
If not, how are the differences likely to impact on its success if it is imported 
wholesale? 
Chapter 2 has demonstrated that currently, the term JA has no permanent essence and that 
divergent views on it have hindered the development of objective criteria to measure its 
success. Consequently, this thesis resolved to apply the various definitions and 
manifestations of JA emanating from various jurisdictions across the globe to the Malawian 
context in chapter 4, (as well as partly in chapters 5, 6 and 7). That process has 
demonstrated that contrary to the perceptions of some scholars in Malawi, the Malawi 
judiciary has actually practised JA beyond 1996. And again, that similar to the other 
jurisdictions, the manifestations of JA in Malawi have also been inconsistent and/or 
irreconcilable. 
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Just to highlight how the aforementioned differences in circumstance have impacted on JA in 
Malawi, the Press Trust Cases (I & II) and the Jumbe & Mvula case discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5 respectively will be used.   
In the Jumbe & Mvula case, which is a case where JA in the form of invalidating legislative 
enactments was practised, the issue is one of the applicability of foreign precedents to 
Malawians cases. It is now widely accepted that the drafters of the Malawian Constitution 
significantly drew on Constitutions such as those of South Africa and Canada to come up 
with the current document. Consequently, the Courts in Malawi have held that Canadian and 
South African Constitutional cases among others can be used to bear on the construction of 
the Malawi Constitution. As shown in chapter 5, even though Justices Kapanda and Katsala 
came to the same conclusion of invalidating a provision in the Corrupt Practices Act, their 
application of foreign precedent was contradictory and inconsistent. Ironically, even though 
Justices Mkandawire and Katsala came to opposing conclusions, their application of foreign 
precedents were somewhat similar. Thus the application of the social-trust based 
governance principles in the Constitution by Justice Mkandawire led him to an opposing 
conclusion to that of Justice Katsala even though they had applied the same foreign 
precedents. That is, two opposing conclusions in the same case both qualify as JA when two 
of the various definitions in use are applied. In other words, if the definition of JA as 
invalidation of legislative enactments is applied, the JA is that of Justices Kapanda and 
Katsala; whereas if we apply the definition of JA as sensitivity to social realities and/or 
application of social-trust based governance then the minority decision of Justice 
Mkandawire is the one that is JA.  
Similarly, in Press Trust Cases, both the HC and the SC practised JA in the form of result-
oriented judging’ even though they came to opposing conclusions (the HC found for the 
Plaintiff while the SC found for the Defendant). The HC did so by giving prominence to the 
right to property in the liberal democratic sense whereas the SC highlighted the socio-
historical realities in which the Press Trust had operated in order to override the legal 
ownership of the Trust by the Plaintiff. The HC emphasised individual ownership while the 
SC emphasised communal ownership which is a philosophy/value that is dominant in 
Malawian tradition. At the end of the day, the question would be, between the HC and the 
SC, which Court was faithful to the Constitution? Before addressing this question, there is 
need to recall that even though the Constitution in Malawi is dominated by liberal democratic 
values, it also includes Sections 12 and 13 which calls on those who exercise powers under 
it to do so with the welfare of the people of Malawi in mind among others. In that sense, the 
HC was faithful to the liberal democratic side of the Constitution whilst the SC was faithful to 
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the social-trust based governance side of the Constitution. The answer would then be that 
both the HC and the SC were in a way faithful to the Constitution albeit with irreconcilable 
results.  
Further, using the same cases on the Press Trust, chapter 6 demonstrates that even though 
judicial deference may provide the jurisprudential boundaries within which ‘appropriate’ JA 
operates without losing the democratic legitimacy, excessive judicial deference is 
‘inappropriate’ JA. Chapter 6 has shown that the SC also practised JA in the Press Trust II in 
the form of excessive deference to the Executive and Legislature in its determination on the 
parliamentary procedures prior to the introduction and discussion of legislation, which has 
been credited with undermining constitutionalism in Malawi.  To recap, as stated, unlike the 
USA, Malawi has traditional governance systems that operate parallel to the government 
structures. The 1994 Constitution initially contained a provision on the Senate which 
included representation of chiefs among others who are the traditional rulers. However, 
politicians in Parliament removed that provision through a Constitutional Amendment in 
defiance of public support for the senate. Similarly, through a similar constitutional 
amendment, the recall provision (then S. 64), which would have empowered the people to 
hold members of parliament (‘MPs’) accountable was removed. Subsequently, S. 65 of the 
Constitution was amended in a manner that gave much control of MPs to their party leaders 
as opposed to the people. Chapter 6 has explained how all the aforementioned 
constitutional amendments that have served to undermine the constitutional accountability of 
the Legislature and the Executive, can be directly attributed to the SC decision in the Press 
Trust Case I in relation to appropriate procedures for enactment of legislation in parliament.  
This strongly points to the conclusion that if the concept of JA is imported wholesale (with all 
its inconsistencies) without interrogation, it could lead to the same chaotic results that have 
been reported in other jurisdictions such as India, where the constitutional framework stands 
undermined.  
8.2.1.3 Addressing Set 3 Questions 
Is judicial activism the best model of judicial conduct to adopt in Malawi? 
Even though the results of JA (howsoever defined) have been chaotic, scholars in the 
process of using that term have been grappling with substantive questions pertaining to the 
judicial process and its role or significance in a democracy. Chapter 2 has thus shown that 
efforts to have answers to such questions under the banner of discussions on JA have 
gained momentum in public/political/legal debates and it is such debates that are central to 
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the pursuit of justice. Consequently, the usage of that term in relation to the Malawi judiciary 
cannot be abandoned; rather it is to be encouraged.  
However, chapter 2 has also shown that there is no one particular ‘model’ of JA. Rather, 
there are so many- some of which are inconsistent with one another. Therefore, if the goal is 
to achieve some desired ends beyond having JA for its own sake, the initial step for Malawi 
should be an identification of a definition of the term JA that would serve as a baseline for all 
debates on JA or lack thereof. It is in this context that chapter 2 has proposed a definition of 
the term JA that could be of universal application aimed at reducing the likelihood of 
misinformation and misunderstanding.  
If regardless of the differences, it still remains the best model to import, how can it be 
modified to suit the society it is imported into to enhance its success? 
JA discourse in Malawi must take account of the following two opposing circumstances that 
introduce a peculiarity to the Malawian social/political/historical context: The priority given by 
Malawian tradition and culture to the consultation and participation of those likely to be 
affected by the decision in the decision-making process; and the tendency of those who hold 
political power to exclude those affected by their decisions from consultation and 
participation in their decision-making process. If the judiciary is to be a solution and not part 
of the problem, then its officers who hold political power in the form of judicial power must 
not perpetrate the same mistakes made by the Legislature and the Executive. The 
modification that must be made to JA discourse in order for it to suit the Malawian context 
therefore, is that the judiciary must consult and involve the people in its decision-making on 
whether or not JA is appropriate in Malawi or not, and if it is- in what form? 
However, the consultations and involvement of the people must be such as would not 
undermine the independence of the judiciary, which is another fundamental principle for the 
entrenchment of constitutionalism. It is in this context that lessons can be learnt from other 
jurisdictions like the USA on how they have approached this topic. Among others, the 
discussion in chapter 2 brought out the fact that the development of constitutional 
jurisprudence of which JA discourse is an integral part, in some countries like the USA and 
Australia, has not been the work of the judiciary alone. Rather, a coordinated multi-
disciplinary contribution from judges, legal philosophers, sociologists (especially those 
focusing on sociology of law), anthropologists etc.  
One framework which has been used to facilitate a dialogue (among other things) between 
the judiciary, the public (including the other disciplines) and the bar in other jurisdictions 
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without risking the independence of the judiciary is that of establishing a Judicial Institute.4 
Though different jurisdictions have different approaches, in all jurisdictions studied by C 
Thomas,5 the training content includes ‘the social context of law and the judicial process’, 
and in all common law jurisdictions studied, the judicial institute is linked to ‘a university and 
with multiple organisations involved in the delivery of training.’6 One of the main 
recommendations of this thesis to be discussed in detail subsequently therefore, is that a 
formal Judicial School with strong affiliations to a university should be established in Malawi.  
8.2.2 The existence of JA in courts is not central to constitutionalism rather an 
appropriate understanding of the endemic judicial role 
The discussion in this thesis has brought out several points that are relevant for this section: 
1) that JA has both positive and negative consequences and resonance; 2) that courts in 
Malawi have practised JA though not with conceptual and/or doctrinal consistency; 3) that 
some of the JA practised by the Malawian judiciary has contributed to the failure of 
constitutionalism. These findings on Malawi when added to the result of JA in India, where it 
has undermined the constitutional framework point strongly to the conclusion that desirable 
as it may be, JA is not central to constitutionalism. What then is? 
Chapter 1 and 3 discussed how the 1994 Malawian Constitution has made a break from the 
past by stipulating that it is the supreme law of the land and has entrusted the judiciary with 
the responsibility of enforcing it provisions. Thus whether or not the Constitution will in reality 
be the supreme law of the land depends primarily on how the judiciary will discharge this 
particular responsibility. Research shows that the accurate answer to this lies somewhere in 
the middle. Chapter 4 and 6 has demonstrated how the Malawi judiciary has acted as a 
safety valve in society and earned the confidence of Malawians, to the extent that its 
independence is now widely acknowledged. It has also been demonstrated how in spite of 
the accolade in the area of judicial independence, the doctrinal/conceptual/theoretical 
inconsistencies prevalent in Malawian constitutional jurisprudence is a source of concern to 
many including the author of this thesis. 
For instance, as chapter 6 shows, the SC in most constitutional cases has upheld the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy when interpreting the constitution instead of the 
                                                          
4
 For instance, the USA has the New York Judicial Institute established in 1952, for detailed information see 
http://www.law.pace.edu/new-york-state-judicial-institute; and the UK has the newly established Judicial 
Institute under the Faculty of Law of the University College London (UCL); and for a comparative study on 
Judicial Training approaches, see C Thomas, ‘Review of Judicial Training and Education in Other Jurisdictions’, 
Report prepared for Judicial Studies Board, May 2006 at www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-
legal/.../Review_of_Judicial_Diversity.pdf.   
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Thomas (n 4) 6. 
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doctrine of constitutional supremacy. Even though other scholars attributed that to ethno-
regional loyalties on the part of concerned judges, this thesis has contended that it is rather 
due to the courts’ own misapprehension of the new constitutional dispensation. Some of the 
misapprehensions emanate from the application of English precedent on judicial review as 
discussed in chapter 7. In essence, the Malawian Courts appear not to have adequately 
grasped their role in determining the applicability of foreign precedent to the Malawian 
context among others. This deficiency seems to have struck at the very core of the 
judiciary’s capability to develop Malawi-centric jurisprudence that would have contributed 
significantly to entrenching constitutionalism in Malawi. In this context, it is safe to conclude 
that an appropriate understanding of the endemic judicial role by individual judges is what is 
central to constitutionalism in Malawi. 
8.3 Recommendations 
8.3.1 There is need to prioritise tailor-made judicial training to prevent judges from 
fumbling along 
The finding that incoherence, inconsistency and unprincipled judicial-decision-making on 
matters impacting on policy and/or development of law proceeds from an insufficient 
conception of the judicial role, is not peculiar to this thesis. Similar findings have been made 
in other jurisdictions.7 The unique contribution of this thesis therefore is to the extent that it 
brings to light a similar problem in Malawi. This study would therefore like to borrow from the 
wisdom of the study by Thomas which pointed to the need to ground judges in legal theory if 
they are to acquire a comprehensive conception of the judicial role.8  The grounding would 
not be uncritical acceptance by judges of all theories advanced, rather a process of mutual 
influence where the judges benefit from the theoretical concepts advanced by legal theorists, 
and the legal theorists would benefit from the practical experience judges would bring. The 
legal theory referred to in Thomas’ study, includes the work of western legal theorists such 
as Hart, Kelsen, Dworkin; whose work has contributed much to the understanding of the 
nature of law and/or the judicial process.  
It is with the aim of applying those useful insights that this thesis recommends the urgent 
establishment of a judicial institute in Malawi linked to a university. The judicial institute 
would be instrumental in identifying the training needs of judicial officers as well as 
appropriate resource persons to deliver the trainings, among other things. As regards legal 
                                                          
7
 See for instance Thomas Ch. 2 (n 14) xix- 15 (stating how he had ‘observed that the value judgment a judge 
will make in a particular case [could not] divorced from the judge’s perception of the function of law and the 
role of a judge’).  
8
 Ibid. 
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theory however, Malawi is in a different position from western nations such as the USA, 
Australia, and UK in that whereas Anglo-American jurisprudence (as developed by legal 
philosophers) is well-developed; Malawi-centric jurisprudence is in its embryonic stages. The 
embryonic stage of Malawi-centric legal philosophy should however, be taken as an 
advantage in that if the judicial institute were to be established with urgency, the interaction 
of judges and other disciplines under its auspices could result in an enriched and well-
grounded constitutional jurisprudence. That is, the Malawian judges could benefit from the 
theoretical contributions of the Malawian legal philosophers, whilst the philosophers 
themselves could benefit from the judges practical insight.  
8.3.1.1 The underlying context for the urgency of tailor-made courses 
There are several reasons why judicial training in Malawi should be tailor-made and 
considered as a matter of urgency. However, for purposes of this thesis only two areas will 
be highlighted as warranting such prompt intervention primarily due to their perceived 
relevance to remedy the identified shortcomings in constitutional jurisprudence development: 
Donor-dependent training needs identification and provision 
Malawi is a donor-dependent country and this has negatively impacted on the ability of the 
Judiciary to implement its activities based on identifiable institutional capacity gaps and not 
‘the priorities of donors.’9 For example, the need to train judges on constitutional 
interpretation and related areas should have been a top priority as soon as the 1994 
Constitution entered into force. However, before 2003, prioritised in-depth training focused 
on lay magistrates with funding from the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID),10 whereas training for judges took the form of 1 – 7 days workshops mostly on 
human rights.11 In 2003, the strategic plan developed by the judiciary identified ‘insufficient 
professional capacity and lack of staff development programmes’ as one of the strategic 
areas requiring immediate intervention.12  
In that context, the Judiciary Development Programme (JDP) which was developed 
acknowledged the inadequacy of such workshops to meet ‘the long-term comprehensive 
training’ needs of judges;13 and recommended that a permanent institution for purposes of 
training judges in judicial work be established, among other things.14 A Judicial Training 
                                                          
9
 Malawi Judiciary Strategic Plan 2010 – 2015, para. 6.7.   
10
 Ibid. 
11
 E Kanyongolo, ‘State of the Judiciary Report: Malawi 2003,’ IFES State of the Judiciary Report Series 
12
 Malawi Judiciary Strategic Plan 2003 – 2008. 
13
 Malawi Judiciary Development Programme 2003 - 2008, 11. 
14
 Ibid, 30. 
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Committee was established, a Judiciary Training and Development Policy (JTDP)15 
developed whose ‘overall goal … is to ensure systematic training of judicial officers …’16 The 
JTDP, expressly provided for ‘high priority’ training areas for the Judiciary on the basis that 
‘demand for training often exceeds the capacity and resources available to undertake such 
training.’ The high priority areas were: 
 Court Interpretation/Legal terms Interpretation; 
 Case flow management; 
 Lay Magistrates Training; 
 Court Administration; 
 Financial Management; 
 Records Management; 
 Customer Care; 
 Computer Skills; 
 Practical Skills for Court Reporting; 
 Performance Management and Appraisal; 
 Training function management; 
 Conference for judges on Constitution interpretation; 
 Change management; 
 Induction for court clerks; 
 Induction for Professional Magistrates; 
 Research and Drafting Skills; 
 Procurement management. 17 
Thus yet again the training for judges vis-a-vis the Constitution was restricted to another 
conference/workshop. Even though the JTDP provided that the Registrar and the Human 
Resource Management Section had the responsibility to ‘determine and update priority 
training and development areas’ in order to respond to new training needs, that has never 
been done. Consequently, as far as official training policy is concerned, the above areas 
have remained the priority areas. It may not come as a surprise therefore that training of 
judges has continued to be through workshops, predominantly yet again on human rights 
which have remained adhoc and donor-driven.18  
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 Malawi Judiciary Training and Development Policy 
16
 Ibid, Foreword. 
17
 Exhaustive list, emphasis supplied. 
18
 Such as those organised by the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC), and a variety of Non-
Governmental Organisations with assistance from various donor agencies on topics such as ‘Child Rights’, 
‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,’ and ‘The application of international human rights norms to the 
Malawian Context’. 
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Further, even though some old Government buildings in one of Malawi’s cities, Zomba were 
allocated to house the ‘Judicial Training College’,19 the College has never become fully 
operational, and no training curriculum specific for judges developed,20 due to a shift in 
donor priorities.21 Thus, even five (5)+ years after the adoption of the JTDP, at the 
institutional level, the training of judicial officers in Malawi is still not driven by their training 
requirements, rather by the areas which those with funds or expertise to facilitate or provide 
the training, are interested in. In fact, the Malawi Judiciary Strategic Plan for 2010 to 2015 
implicitly acknowledges this by identifying as a general ‘threat’ to the implementation of the 
planned activities of the judiciary, the variance between those activities and the priorities of 
the donors.22  
Apparent failure to appreciate the complexity of the training required 
The combined effect of the discussions in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis has been to 
demonstrate that the training needs of the judges are much more complex than appears to 
have been hitherto recognised. As stated above, the JTDP was finalised in January 2005, 
long after most of the decisions discussed in this thesis (save three) had been rendered.23 
By then, it should have become evident as demonstrated in Ch. 4 that Malawian judges are 
generally aware of the various constitutional interpretive methodologies, and of the 
uniqueness of the 1994 Constitution. The difficulty they have grappled with, with inconsistent 
results, is how to ‘borrow’ from comparative foreign case law as stipulated in the same 
Constitution without compromising its uniqueness. It is in that context that this thesis has 
sought to argue that such a problem is essentially jurisprudential in nature and the JTDP 
should have reflected that had its developers accurately diagnosed the problem. In 
prioritising a ‘conference for judges on Constitution Interpretation’ only, and not reviewing 
that priority eight (8) years on, it strongly suggests that those responsible have failed to 
appreciate the jurisprudential nature of the training required.24  
As discussed in preceding chapters, Malawian constitutional jurisprudence is very nascent, 
and if any lesson may be learnt from the evolution of western (and other interesting) 
jurisprudence, it is the complexity and multidisciplinary nature of such a process. The design 
of appropriate judicial training in Malawi would thus benefit considerably from the 
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 See (n 15) 40 – this is not an academic institution yet and it is not attached to a University. 
20
 Just to highlight a few problems. 
21
 The Judicial Training College was to become fully operational with financial assistance from DFID. However, 
subsequently, DFID priorities changed and it did not provide the funds needed to operationalize the College. 
22
 See (n 9) para. 6.7.   
23
 Mvula & Jumbe Case (Ch. 5), Mary Nangwale Case (Ch. 7), and the Presidential Referral Case (Ch. 6). 
24
 The MJDP 2010 – 2015 appears to have overlooked the need to either review or update the MTDP as it has 
only included in its ‘Strategic Outcomes, Targets and Outputs’ the implementation (not review) of the Policy 
(4.T1.OP4).  
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competencies of those with the requisite expertise and experience in developing such 
complex study programmes.  
  
8.3.1.2 Why the current training approach and provision is inadequate 
Here again there are several reasons, but only two will be highlighted: 
The uniqueness of the Malawian Constitution 
Malawi’s constitutional peculiarity provides a unique challenge that requires the development 
of theory that could address the problem comprehensively (which would be possible under 
the Judicial Institute) as opposed to a case by case resolution (when judges preside over 
matters). The constitutional peculiarity referred to here is the one where the dominant 
philosophy of the Malawi Constitution is liberal democratic, but the same document contains 
fundamental governing principles that introduce a social-trust based governance framework. 
This thesis has referred to the work of Nkhata who calls on the judiciary to override the 
liberal democratic dominance in the Constitution by utilising the social-trust based framework 
provided in the Constitution. An analysis of the cases where the Malawi judiciary have 
indeed applied the social-trust based framework (Press Trust and Jumbe & Mvula cases) 
has demonstrated that a lucid principle that could guide future constitutional adjudication 
cannot be derived from them. In the Press Trust case, the SC applied questionable foreign 
precedent in the form of the doctrine of necessity and upheld the validity of a legislative 
enactment that was being challenged for unconstitutionality. In the Jumbe & Mvula case, 
Mkandawire J applied similar foreign precedents as Katsala J but came to different 
conclusions, in which it was in the minority decision of Mkandawire J where the legislative 
enactment that was being challenged was upheld. This raises several questions- is it a 
coincidence that in the two cases where the social realities were taken into consideration by 
the court, the courts reached a decision that upheld a legislative enactment otherwise 
questioned as unconstitutional? Or is this approach to be confined to the particular issues 
under consideration- economic empowerment of Malawians and prevention of corruption?   
This points to a need to have a dialogue/research that would assist in the development of a 
theory on the circumstances in which the courts should emphasise on the social-trust based 
framework over the liberal democratic values in the constitution. Or does the mere fact that 
the liberal democratic values are at odds with most Malawians mean that they must be 
overridden when ‘social realities’ dictate it? How should a judge objectively ascertain when 
social realities so dictate? In fact, how should a judge identify those social realities? Or does 
it depend on the constitutional interpretive methodology chosen by the judge (s)? The 
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foregoing questions are only aimed at highlighting the need for a judicial institute that could 
encourage research into topical issues that may affect the work of the courts.  
The fact that jurisdictions with centuries-old democracies and constitutions like the UK and 
the USA, and whose judges have a wealth of local precedents and legal theorists still see an 
increasing need for formal judicial schools, points to the centrality of such institutions in 
equipping judges to discharge their responsibility with competence and to remain up-to-date 
with emerging topics. What more a country like Malawi which is still in its nascent stages of 
democratisation and constitutionalism? 
Diversification of judicial appointees’ professional background 
The Constitution has broadened the legal professional backgrounds of judicial appointees. 
By virtue of Section 112, as long as a prospective appointee is entitled and has been entitled 
to practise in the High Court ‘for not less than ten years’, they may be appointed even if they 
hold an office that precludes them ‘from practising in court’ or ‘does not hold a practising 
certificate.’25 This entails that judges may come from positions of specialisation.26 For 
instance, potential appointees may be drawn (and have been drawn) from private firms that 
are on the face of it non-specialised but whose legal practitioners tend to specialise in 
practice for efficiency; company secretaries, whose primary work has been primarily 
corporate law; and magistrates, whose primary work has been criminal law. In spite of such 
initial professional specialisation, with the exception of the specialised Commercial Courts 
Division, the High Court in Malawi is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction which means that its 
judges will be required to decide cases on any area of the law depending on the issues 
raised by the litigants.  
Notwithstanding, there currently is no formal induction programme for newly appointed 
judges to the Malawi judiciary. Consequently, a training approach that focuses on 1 – 2 days’ 
workshop on a substantive area of law may be largely inadequate to meet the training needs 
of judges.  
 
8.3.2 Prioritise promulgation of legislation that impacts on the work of the Courts 
Constitutional provisions are by their very nature very broad and often require the detail to 
be provided in pertinent statutes and other subsidiary legislation or procedural rules. 
                                                          
25
 Under Section 111 (2) of the Constitution Judges are appointed by the President on recommendation from  
the Judicial Service Commission which is chaired by the Chief Justice (by virtue of holding a Bachelor of Laws 
degree from a recognised institution) for ten years. 
26
 This includes specialisation in postgraduate qualifications (as well as the fact that nowadays even in terms of 
the first degree the appointees may have obtained from different jurisdictions as diverse as Malawi, UK and 
Tanzania). 
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However, despite the constitutional provisions that establish constitutional judicial review in 
Malawi, no procedures for bringing such cases have ever been promulgated. As a 
consequence, parties have had to commence their proceedings under the procedural rules 
as found in the obsolete UK Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC). This fact alone could be the 
reason why Malawian courts have attached undue weight to English precedents on judicial 
review to Malawian judicial review cases when the former has parliamentary supremacy and 
the latter espouses constitutional supremacy. As a consequence, the transformative 
potential of the 1994 Constitution has not been realised fully especially in the area of judicial 
review.   
Consequently, it is recommended that the identification and subsequent promulgation of 
legislation impacting on the ability of the courts to fulfil their constitutional mandate efficiently 
and effectively needs to be prioritised. 
8.4 Contribution to knowledge and areas for further research 
This thesis set out to answer several questions of which the main one was whether judicial 
(in)activism is a solution or a hindrance to the entrenchment of constitutionalism and rule of 
law in Malawi. The word ‘(in)activism’ was chosen as at the beginning of the research, much 
of the existing literature on Malawi appeared to suggest that the Malawian Judiciary was not 
practising JA. Thus first and foremost, the aim was to verify those suggestions by analysing 
the definition of JA. That analysis has demonstrated that the term JA is an empty shell. Even 
though other studies have reached similar conclusions, they have not done so through a 
comparative analysis of JA definitions across various jurisdictions encompassing both 
established and emerging democracies. To the extent that this thesis analysed JA definitions 
across various jurisdictions to show how a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach should be eschewed in 
the promotion of JA, it has significantly contributed to the current discourse on JA. 
In addition, this thesis has demonstrated that going by the definitions of JA currently in use. 
Malawian courts have in fact been practising JA contrary to the impression created by some 
scholars. This highlighted the need to have some form of uniformity in the definition of JA to 
avoid misinformation and understanding. In a bid to provide a starting point in that direction, 
this thesis proposed a definition of the term. The definition chosen emanated from some 
facts that the thesis has demonstrated- 1) that judicial discretion is inherent in judicial 
decision-making therefore cannot be eliminated hence the discussion should be what its 
appropriate limits may be and how those may be established without impinging on the 
independence of the judiciary; 2) that the fundamental principle that justice must not only be 
done but must be seen to be done should not be restricted to administrative issues but the 
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constitutional adjudication as well if constitutionalism is to be entrenched in a society- and 
that this fact must inform any discourse on JA that seeks to promote it as ‘courts going 
beyond the constitution’; 3) that justice can be seen by observers only if there is a shared 
understanding on its essential elements- and that this points to the importance of ‘shared 
understanding’ in society. The following demonstrated facts contribute to knowledge in that 
they bring out the factors the judiciary needs to pay particular attention to if indeed it is to be 
a solution and not part of the problem. That is, this thesis has contributed to knowledge by 
showing that if left unchecked, JA can itself be a tool for the marginalisation of people in 
preference for elitist notions.27  
These factors are essential in a country like Malawi where the exercise of power beyond its 
limits appears to be the order of the day, and where the views of the people on matters of 
national importance are often ignored. If the judiciary were to follow the same path then the 
most credible branch of government would lose its credibility. A situation where the judiciary 
loses credibility must be avoided at all costs - and this thesis has contributed to knowledge 
by showing that the discourse of JA is indeed within the means of those engaged in 
public/legal/philosophical debates on the judicial role in society hence must be approached 
responsibly. In that context, the facts brought out by this thesis that some of that JA 
practised in Malawi has actually contributed to the lack of constitutionalism; enrich the study 
on the possible effects of JA in general. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this thesis has also demonstrated that debates on whether or 
not JA is appropriate or not should to be encouraged in Malawi. The most important thing in 
Malawi right now for the entrenchment of constitutionalism is consultation and participation 
of those affected by the decisions. To that extent the proposed definition of JA and the 
recommendations in this thesis only provide a starting point for the discussions.  However, in 
the process of analysing the term JA, its manifestations and consequences in Malawi, and 
making recommendations more questions have arisen that would require follow-up research 
as they were beyond the scope of this thesis. Some of the questions have been highlighted 
in Section 8.3.1 of this chapter. 
                                                          
27
 Gloppen and Kanyongolo Ch. 1 (n 148) 289, (describing judges as part of the ‘elite’).  
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